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Within a public employment setting, both administrative and labour law jurisprudence 
continue to advance the fundamental rights and protections afforded to individuals by the 
Constitution under section 23 and 33. Although the Constitutional Court (arguably) seems to 
favour the determination of one right over another, there exists no legal basis – other than a 
policy basis – for such a direction. In the context of the employment of public officials, the 
Constitutional Court side-lined administrative law jurisprudence. The purpose of this 
dissertation is to explore whether public sector employees are still able to bring an application 
in a court of law under administrative law even when such is to be applied to quintessential 
labour cases. This dissertation has analysed the meaning of administrative action under 
section 33 and PAJA in Chapter 2 and, in Chapter 3, how the courts have approached 
administrative law within labour cases, uncovering important judicial arguments and 
direction. This leads to Chapter 4 where since Gcaba, case law and academic arguments have 
shown that the extent to which section 33 and PAJA apply to public-sector employment 
depends primarily on how one pleads.   
The research methodology used in advancing these objectives has comprised solely of 
desktop literature review of case law, statute, various text books and academic journal 
articles. In the absence of legislative intention to deny public sector employees their right to 
administrative justice, it is shown that it is not uncommon for more than one constitutional 
right to apply to one set of facts. It is argued that three causes of action exist under PAJA, the 
LRA and legality and that these causes of action are still available to litigants, even though 
the court in Gcaba provided the general rule that administrative law no longer applies. The 
Constitutional Court’s explicit recognition on pleadings has resulted in lower courts 
providing protection to public sector employees by hearing matters pleaded under PAJA or 
the principle of legality as the chosen forum. A new direction of administrative law 
jurisprudence is being realised by lower courts in labour cases, which correctly balances the 
intention of the legislature and favourably adds to the notion that rights are cumulative and 
complimentary of each other. Chapter 5 concludes all the relevant literature as well as 
providing several recommendations. Although PAJA and legality are applicable, the LRA 
should be the first port of call.  It would be beneficial for the Constitutional Court to re-look 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Cameron JA at the Supreme Court of Appeal (hereafter SCA) made a profound statement 
regarding administrative law and public-sector employment as follows: 
 
‘No doctrine of constitutional law confines a beneficiary of more than one right to 
only one remedy, even where a statute provides a remedy of great amplitude. If the 
legislature sought to deprive dismissed public employees of their administrative 
justice cause of action in the ordinary courts, because they enjoy rights under the 
LRA, it could have said so when it enacted PAJA.’1 
 
1.1 ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
The purpose of this subsection is to provide an overview of judicial decisions, academic 
arguments and legislation in establishing the legal position of public sector employees. In 
achieving this purpose, specific legislation will be set out to show the legislature’s approach 
when dealing with the overlap between administrative and labour law. The application and 
interpretation of the various sections of legislation in several cases are also discussed with the 
aim of showing the conflicting view of our courts on the issue. Lastly, various views of 
academics on the courts’ approaches will also analysed.  
 
Legislation on Administrative and Labour law 
 
Prior to the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereafter LRA), the Labour Relations Act 28 of 
1956 regulated employment relations. The 1956 Act only applied to privately employed 
individuals and expressly excluded state employees from its ambit. Therefore, in order to 
offer state employees some protection, decisions of the employers were subjected to the 
requirements of administrative law and natural justice. In SA Police Union and Another v 
National Commissioner of the SA Police Service and Another2 (hereafter SAPU), Murphy AJ 
recognised the extended protection, holding that, historically, courts had to develop the 
common law to grant protection to state employees by regarding the conduct of state 
                                                          
1 Transnet Ltd & Others v Chirwa 2007 (2) SA 198 (SCA) at para 63. 
2 (2005) 26 ILJ 2403 (LC). 
2 
 
employers as administrative action in the aim of advancing labour rights where labour laws 
were inadequate.3  
 
It seems that the position has dramatically changed since the legislature gave effect to section 
234 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution)5 in 
promulgating the LRA. An employee under section 213 of the LRA is defined as ‘any person, 
excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person or for the state, moreover 
public sector employees are not expressly excluded from the ambit of the LRA under section 
2.’6  
 
In 2000, the legislature, giving effect to section 337 of the Constitution, promulgated the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (hereafter PAJA). It is significant that 
PAJA does not exclude public sector employees from its ambit and even though the 
Constitutional Court (hereafter CC) has argued for a ‘one stop shop’ in labour matters, the 
legislature has not followed suit and has not attended to the ambiguity created by the various 
acts.  
 
Section 157(1) of the LRA provides that, although the Labour Court (hereafter LC) has 
exclusive jurisdiction in labour related matters, section 157(2) (b) of the LRA affords the 
High Court (hereafter HC) concurrent jurisdiction with the LC in matters arising out of any 
dispute over the constitutionality of any administrative act or conduct or any threatened 
administrative act or conduct by the state in its capacity as an employer. It is significant to 
recognise, that the Constitution guarantees ‘everyone’ the right to fair labour practices and 
administrative justice that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. Therefore, the 
legislature recognised the need to provide public sector employees with a cause of action 
under the LRA by giving effect to their section 23 right to fair labour practices (previously 
not afforded). However, the legislature further recognises the need to control the exercise of 
public power and give effect to the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable 
                                                          
3 Ibid para 65. 
4 Section 23(1) provides that everyone has a right to fair labour practices.  
5 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
6 Section 2 provides that the act will not apply to member of the National Defence force and members of the 
State Security Agency. 




and procedurally fair under section 33, even though exercising such powers arise out of an 
employment setting 
 
It is important to highlight further key pieces of legislation. Section 1698 of the Constitution 
affords the HC original jurisdiction over all matters not assigned to a court of similar status. 
Section 157(2)9 of the LRA expressly acknowledges the HC’s jurisdiction in labour matters, 
thus conferring concurrent jurisdiction of labour matters on both the LC and HC. Section 
158(1)(h) of the LRA provides that the LC may review any decision taken or any act 
performed by the state in its capacity as employer on grounds that are permissible in law. The 
latter section is significant because as it will be shown in Chapter 4 that itsinclusion has led 
the LCs to hold state employers accountable under PAJA and/or under the principle of 
legality.  
 
It is arguable that the legislature’s intention correctly balances these two constitutional rights 
under section 157(1) and (2) and section 158(1)(h) of the LRA, ensuring that public sector 
employees have a cause of action under the LRA, which provides specialised labour relations 
mechanisms protecting against unfair labour practices, as well as providing them with a 
choice in holding public officials accountable under administrative law. 
 
Conflicting Judicial Interpretation of Legislation 
 
Recognition of the legislature’s intention is not always acknowledged. Murphy AJ followed 
an approach which effectively denied the right to section 33 of the Constitution and PAJA 
where it was held in SAPU that:  
                                                          
8  (1) The High Court of South Africa may decide- 
(a) any constitutional matter except a matter that- 
(i) the Constitutional Court has agreed to hear directly in terms of section 167(6)(a); or 
(ii) is assigned by an act of Parliament to another court of similar status to the High Court of South 
Africa; and  
(b) any other matter not assigned to another court by an act of parliament 
9  (2) The Labour Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court in respect of any alleged or threatened 
violation of any fundamental right entrenched in Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, and arising from –  
(a) employment and from labour relations;  
(b) any dispute over the constitutionality of any executive or administrative act or conduct, or any 
threatened executive or administrative act or conduct, by the State in its capacity as an employer. 
4 
 
‘in extending the benefits of labour legislation protection to public sector 
employees, it arguably meant that there is no longer any reason to extend the 
protection of administrative law to public sector employees.’10  
 
Skweyiya J writing for the majority in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd and Others11 had to determine 
whether the dismissal of Chirwa amounted to administrative action under section 33 and 
PAJA and whether the HC had concurrent jurisdiction to hear the matter. It held that the HC 
did not have concurrent jurisdiction with the LC on labour related matters.12 This approach 
had been informed by policy considerations, because the court held that the LRA provided a 
better route under a specialised forum to deal with labour matters, and thus Chirwa should 
have used this route.13   
 
Ngcobo J writing a separate majority judgment concurred and regarded the claim as 
‘essentially’ a labour dispute, endorsing the jurisdictional approach with the same policy 
considerations.  Ngcobo J held that courts should interpret section 157(1) and (2) of the LRA 
purposively in light of section 23 of the Constitution and the LRA and, in doing so, it was 
held that the legislator’s use of the word ‘concurrent’ is unfortunate.14 It is significant that the 
CC in an earlier decision concluded by O’Regan J in Fredericks v MEC for Education and 
Training, Eastern Cape15 held that ‘whatever else its import, section 157(2) cannot be 
interpreted as ousting the jurisdiction of the HC since it expressly provides for concurrent 
jurisdiction.’16  
 
Although Skweyiya J did not deal with the administrative action question, Ngcobo J 
determined the question whether Transnet’s conduct in terminating the employment contract 
constituted administrative action. It was held that due to a lack of legislation being 
implemented, the source of the power to dismiss was found to be in contract and was 
therefore not administrative in nature.17 Hoexter states that it was this line of reasoning which 
ultimately guided the court’s decision.18 The significance of the reasoning on the 
                                                          
10 (2005) 26 ILJ 2403 (LC) para 66. 
11 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC). 
12 Chirwa (note 11 above) para73. 
13 Ibid paras 66-65. 
14 Ibid para 121. 
15 2002 (2) SA 693 (CC). 
16 Ibid para 41. 
17 Chirwa (note 11 above) para 142. 
18 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa 2ed (2012) 213. 
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administrative action question suggest that had there been correct implementation of 
legislation, the court would have come to a different outcome. 
 
There are several other judgments recognising the legislature’s intention. Cameron JA in 
Transnet Ltd and others v Chirwa19 recognised that the existence of labour-law remedies 
does not exclude the respondent’s remedies in administrative law.’20 Langa CJ writing for the 
minority in Chirwa held that ‘litigants are entitled to the full protection of all and any 
applicable rights provided in the Constitution and courts should not presume to determine 
that the “essence” of a claim engages one right more than another.’21  Langa CJ held that 
whatever we think of the wisdom of Chirwa’s election to avoid the specialist provisions of 
the LRA, the court should evaluate Chirwa’s claim as it was presented to the court.22 Langa 
CJ further held that while the majority may question what the intention of the legislature was 
in enacting section 157 of the LRA, ‘courts must respect that path chosen and in doing so 
must be mindful not to substitute preferred policy choices for those of the legislature.’23 
 
Plasket J further recognised in Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union v Minister of 
Correctional Services (No1)24:  
 
‘There is nothing incongruous about litigants having more legal protection rather 
than less, or of more than one fundamental right applying to one act, or of more than 
one branch of law applying to the same set of facts.’25  
 
 
Conflicting views as to whether public sector employees have the right to both causes of 
action has led to uncertainty and needs to be addressed by the CC. The court had the 
opportunity to do so in Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security and Others.26  
 
Van der Westhuizen J writing for an unanimous majority in Gcaba dealt with two questions: 
whether the decision not to appoint the applicant was administrative action thus subjected to 
                                                          
19 2007 (2) SA 198 (SCA).  
20 Ibid para 58. 
21 Ibid para 175. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid para 173. 
24 2008 (3) SA 91 (E). 
25 Ibid para 61. 
26 2010 (1) SA 238 (CC). 
6 
 
administrative review; and whether an applicant whose claim is based on a labour matter may 
approach a HC or should follow the channels provided for by the LRA. 
 
The court held correctly that ‘legislation must not be interpreted to exclude or unduly limit 
remedies for the enforcement of constitutional rights.’27 Van der Westhuizen J held that 
‘where litigants are at liberty to relegate the finely-tuned dispute resolution structures created 
by the LRA, a dual system of law could fester in cases of dismissals.’28 The court’s view is 
arguably disagreeable on the basis found in Langa CJ’s minority judgment in Chirwa because 
‘like Chirwa, Gcaba is not asking a non-labour court to decide a purely “labour issue", 
instead what is being asked is that a High Court decide an administrative law issue.’29   
 
Van der Westhuizen J held that a court is bound by the previous decision of a higher court 
and by its own previous decisions in similar matters.30 However, notwithstanding the 
conclusion reached on the administrative action issue by Ncgobo J in Chirwa, Van der 
Westhuizen J concluded that ‘generally, employment and labour relationship issues do not 
amount to administrative action within the meaning of PAJA.’31 Hoexter argues that the court 
seems to indicate that controlling the exercise of public power through the role of section 33 
of the Constitution cannot simply be denied as it was ruled out in Chirwa.32  
 
Van der Westhuizen J further held that the failure to promote and appoint Gcaba appears to 
be a quintessential labour-related issue.33Van der Westhuizen J correctly held that jurisdiction 
is determined on the basis of the pleadings and not the merits of the case; however, the court 
then proceeded to hold that, because Gcaba had not pleaded a case adequately on 
administrative actions grounds, the HC had no jurisdiction.34 When dealing with the 
administrative action question, the court is silent as to why the decision did not fall into 
section 33 and PAJA, rather holding that the impact of Gcaba’s dismissal was mainly felt by 
Gcaba and had little or no direct consequence for any other citizens.35 Under PAJA, one of 
                                                          
27 Ibid para 44. 
28 Ibid para 56. 
29 Chirwa (note 11 above) para 173. 
30 Gcaba (note 26 above) para 58. 
31 Ibid para 64. 
32 Hoexter C ‘From Chirwa to Gcaba: An Administrative Lawyer’s View’ in M Kidd & S Hoctor (eds) Stella 
Iuris: Celebrating 100 Years of Teaching Law in Pietermaritzburg 2010 47 at 54. 
33 Ibid para 66. 




the factors to take into account to determine whether action qualifies as administrative is that 
it must have direct, external legal effect.  
 
Since station commanders are appointed to serve the interest of the public, it is then arguable 
that the decision to appoint a new station commander who met only the minimum standards 
required over someone who had years of experience would have a public impact. The 
approach taken by Van der Westhuizen J seems to contradict the overall theme of Ngcobo J’s 
judgment as there is clearly legislation which deals with the appointments and dismissals of 
police officials in the South African Police Services Act36. Yet, the court in Gcaba’s case was 
silent on this issue. The approach taken in not applying the elements effectively under PAJA 
not only violated the principle of subsidiarity (see heading 4.2 below) but also shows that the 
court selectively ignored settled jurisprudence on the administrative action enquiry. 
 
Various Brief Views on the Constitutional Court’s Approach 
 
In providing guidance as to the meaning of ‘external effect’ under PAJA, Pfaff and Schneider 
argue the phrase is ‘aimed at excluding administrative measures that are taken within the 
sphere of public administration.’37 They argue that in cases dealing with public-sector 
employment it is often difficult to distinguish between internal and external measures; 
however, they argue correctly that, for example, ‘internal measures would be setting working 
hours as these decisions only affect persons as part of public administration.’38 
 
This reasoning is similar and can been seen in the ratio of the SAPU case where it was held 
that the setting of working hours was within the administration and had no public element 
attached to the decision.39 The authors argue that ‘external measures involve a decision which 
affects a person’s rights as an individual, therefore such decisions qualifies as administrative 
action’,40 and that, moreover, ‘a decision about whether a civil servant should be promoted or 
not, affects that persons individual rights and is reviewable.’41 The court’s addition of the 
                                                          
36 68 of 1995. 
37 Pfaff, R & Schneider, H ‘The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act from a German Perspective’ (2001) 17 
South African Journal on Human Rights 59 at 70ff 73. 
38 Ibid 74. 





‘public impact’ factor seems to have similar meaning to that of ‘external effect’; however its 
inclusion and placement within the PAJA enquiry is confusing.  
 
Hoexter argues that reliance on the public impact enquiry without determining the list of 
factors in SARFU or determining which of the elements under PAJA are lacking shows that 
the court fudges the enquiry.’ 42    Hoexter argues consequently that:  
 
‘…the court’s reasoning in Gcaba raises more questions about administrative action 
than it answers, arguably causing just the sort of “complexity and confusion” that 
the court accuses others of having created after Chirwa.’ 43    
 
Brassey maintains that Gcaba’s conclusion on the administrative action question is correct 
because there is no longer any need for administrative review to apply at all as Gcaba has 
been placed within the ‘protective umbrella’ of the labour practice regimes.44 Furthermore, 
Brassey states that since the decision to grant or refuse a promotion is now governed under 
the labour regimes, there will not have been any few or direct consequences or implications 
for other citizens as administrative law no longer applied.45 
 
Respectfully, the argument proposed by Brassey is incorrect, as Ngcukaitobi correctly argues 
that the court’s reasoning that ‘the decision is not administrative action because it is a labour 
issue, conflates the nature of the decision with the constitutional standard against which the 
decision must be measured for validity.’46 Van der Westhuizen J does seems to indicate that 
administrative action would have applied if Gcaba sustained a cause of action under PAJA; 
however, Ngcukaitobi rightly points out that the court, in approaching the question as to 
whether the decision was administrative action, ‘appeared to believe, wrongly, that the 
validity of a decision should be measured against the right to fair labour practices, 
consequently, this is why the decision was not administrative action.’47 Ngcukaitobi rightly 
argues that Gcaba was a departure from precedent  on the administrative action issue set by 
O’Regan J in Fredericks  and by Ngcobo J in Chirwa.  
                                                          
42 Hoexter (note 18 above) 216. 
43 Ibid 217. 
44 Brassey, M ‘Back off But Back Up! Administrative Law Rightly Yields to Labour Law’ (2009) 2 
Constitutional Court Review 232-233. 
45 Ibid 221. 
46 Ngcukaitobi, T ‘Unbound by Precedent: Critical Reflections on the Decision of the Constitutional Court in 
Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 (1) SA 238 (CC)’.  




According to Grogan, ‘the fact that South Africa has a ‘one stop shop’ for resolving labour 
disputes is all very well but whether this should deprive litigants of their right to shop 
elsewhere remains debatable.’48 However, the ‘one stop shop’ approach has not been entirely 
effective. O’Regan J correctly argued in Fredericks that jurisdiction is determined on the 
basis of pleadings and not the substantive merits of the case.49 The Gcaba judgment did not 
follow this approach and, had the court correctly determined the case under PAJA, section 
157(2) of the LRA would have been given effect, and the use of a purposive approach was 
the result in contradiction to the wording of section 157(2).50 
 
Hoexter states that: 
 
‘[P]olicy argument cannot alter the express terms of section 157 of the LRA-
however unfortunate those terms may seem…the majority’s interpretation of the 
provision is in conflict not only with the wording of section 157 but also with the 
Court’s own previous interpretation of that wording in Fredericks...’51 
 
In Fredericks, ‘the applicant expressly disavowed any reliance to section 23(1) of the 
Constitution, which entrenches the right to fair labour practices, therefore the case was 
decided on the administrative action basis as pleaded.’52  
 
Van der Westhuizen J in Gcaba underscored the holding in Fredericks that ‘the applicant’s 
pleadings are the determining factor as they contain the legal basis of the claim which the 
applicant has chosen to invoke the court’s competence.’53 This approach to pleadings seems 
to elucidate the position on public sector employees. However, the position where an 
employee makes application in the HC both under the LRA and PAJA has not been 
established. Moreover, it is a route that does not follow the ‘one stop shop’ general policy 
direction in which our CC in Chirwa and Gcaba have chosen to approach matters of public 
sector employment. Unusually, it is only in labour and administrative law where a litigant has 
only one cause of action under the LRA.  
                                                          
48 Grogan J ‘Pandora’s Box: The Con Court’s take on Chirwa’ (2009) ELJ 8. 
49 Fredericks (note 15 above) para 38-40. 
50 Hoexter (note 32 above) 48. 
51 Hoexter C ‘Clearing the Intersection? Administrative Law and Labour Law in the Constitutional Court.’ 
(2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review 219. 
52 Fredericks (note 15 above) para 34. 




In general, where two or more violations of constitutional rights arise out of a single set of 
facts, they are actionable before a court of law. An example of this scenario is when an 
employee is subjected to an unfair disciplinary proceeding conducted in a manner which 
violates their section 23 right to fair labour practices, the LRA and its specialised forums 
governs the labour dispute. However, where disciplinary proceedings are conducted in a 
manner which violates an employee’s right not to be unfairly discriminated against based on 
sexual orientation, the employee would simultaneously have cause of action in the Equality 
Court. It is unclear why the CC has persistently preferred the LRA route over the PAJA route.  
  
The Constitution guarantees rights to those within its jurisdiction; yet those rights are not 
absolute and may be lawfully limited. In the absence of any express legislative intention to do 
so, it is necessary to analyse the Chirwa and Gcaba judgments in detail in Chapter 3 to 
ascertain on what legal basis the courts have chosen to rely on achieving this movement. The 
effect of achieving a ‘one stop shop’ without any legal basis denies a right guaranteed under 
section 33 of the Constitution. It has been briefly mentioned above that where your right to 
fair labour practices as well as your right not to be unfairly discriminated against has been 
violated, both rights would be available even though your right not to be unfairly 
discriminated against happens to arise out of an employment setting.  
 
It is important to recognise that Chirwa and Gcaba are infamous cases within this area of law 
because the CC sought to limit the right to administrative justice in favour of the right to fair 
labour practices and followed an approach contrary to settled administrative law 
jurisprudence. Although infamous, the CC does pronounce on important issues regarding the 
interconnectivity of rights and the various courts’ jurisdictions based on pleadings. The effect 
of Gcaba’s recognition of those issues have resulted in cases since Gcaba proceeding to 
determine administrative law within labour cases. Chapter 4 aims to set out those post-Gcaba 
cases along with identifying concepts such as the principle of legality, subsidiarity, duality of 
rights, dismissals via operation of law, pleadings and the exceptions to the general rule 
applied by post-Gcaba cases, to establish the extent to which public sector employees’ 
constitutional rights are afforded to them.  
 
Only the CC’s judgments will be discussed below. Chapter 4 deals with the Chirwa and 
Gcaba in depth with the respective HC, and SCA judgments. Chapter 4 subsequently 
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includes discussions on the SAPU and the Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union v Minister 
of Correctional Services and Others (hereafter POPCRU) judgments in detail because the 
decisions in those cases on administrative and labour law adds favourably to the developing 
jurisprudence leading up to the decisions of the CC.  
 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Hoexter recognises two schools of thought emerging out of this debate: the first assumes that 
‘any type of employment relationship should be governed by section 23 of the Constitution 
and its associated legislation [giving effect to section 23] to the complete exclusion of section 
33 of the Constitution and PAJA.’54 The second argues that:  
 
‘the exercise of public powers inevitably attracts the protection of administrative 
law as well as labour law, irrespective of context, so that remedies are 
simultaneously available in both branches of law in cases of public sector-
employment.’ 55  
 
1.3 RESEARCH STATEMENT AND OBJECTIVES 
 
Since Chirwa and Gcaba, the position as to whether public sector employees have two causes 
of action remains unclear. The CC in Gcaba had the opportunity to clarify the position as to 
whether an applicant can approach the HC on administrative action grounds in circumstances 
arising out of an employment relationship. The addition of the ‘public impact’ factor along 
with the courts silence as to which elements in the PAJA enquiry remains unsatisfied thus 
contributes to further uncertainty as to the extent to which PAJA is applicable to public sector 
employees. The court seemed to indicate that if there were public impact, PAJA would have 
succeeded as a cause of action. The CC’s addition of a general rule is not absolute and does 
not discourage litigation in its entirety. There are circumstances where administrative law 
principles still find application to employment situations through pleadings.  Consequently, 
                                                          
54 Hoexter (note 18 above) 210. 
55 Ibid 210-211. 
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there is insufficient finality pertaining to the extent to which administrative law applies to 
public-sector employment and is left open by Gcaba. 
 
1.3.1 RESEARCH PURPOSE 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore whether public sector employees are presently 
able to bring an application in a court of law under administrative law applied to labour cases 
and under what circumstances could this possibly be achieved.  
 
1.3.2 QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
In achieving the main research question under 1.3.1, several secondary questions and 
objectives must be ascertained: 
I. To what extent does section 33 of the Constitution and PAJA apply to public sector 
employment? 
II. To what extent can the HC and LC possibly exercise concurrent jurisdiction? 
III. Under what basis does the court in Chirwa and Gcaba seek to deny constitutional rights? 
IV. Does an infringement of dual rights exist arising out of a single set of facts within 
employment setting?  
V. Considering the Gcaba judgment’s recognition on pleadings, under which possible cause 
of actions could public sector employees ‘choose’ to invoke the courts competence? 
 
This dissertation does not seek to deal with the provisions of the LRA in detail nor advocate 
that the LRA is the only route which must be pursued. It merely seeks to determine the extent 
to which rights are afforded to public sector employees by examining an array of causes of 
actions which are applicable under certain circumstances.  
1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This dissertation has been researched using only desktop, literature review. Relevant 
literature consisting of case law, statute, academic arguments and text books have been relied 




1.5 CHAPTER BREAKDOWN 
 
1.5.1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
This chapter comprises an introduction and background as well as highlighting the purpose 
and rationale behind the research based on various arguments surrounding public sector 
employment. Chirwa and Gcaba have been dealt with briefly in this chapter to establish some 
context, these cases, amongst others, being analysed in greater depth in Chapter 3. 
 
1.5.2 CHAPTER 2: DEFINING ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION WITHIN 
PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 
 
This chapter seeks to define what constitutes administrative action under section 33 of the 
Constitution and, by unpacking PAJA’s definition in the aim, to establish what each element 
under PAJA requires for a decision or conduct to fall under PAJA’s ambit. This chapter also 
discusses the principle of legality and the circumstances in which the principle is applied. 
 
1.5.3 CHAPTER 3: ANALYSING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPLIED IN 
LABOUR CASES 
 
This chapter seeks to provide an in-depth analysis of the Chirwa and Gcaba judgments with 
the aim of establishing an understanding in the court’s reasoning. Since Chirwa and Gcaba’s 
approach seems to prefer one constitutional right over another, it is necessary to discuss cases 
such as SAPU, Fredericks, POPCRU and the Chirwa HC and SCA leading up to Gcaba. The 
aim of establishing the views of the judges in this area of research is vital because ultimately 
their views have significant impact on the public-sector employees’ legal position and the 
development of administrative and labour law jurisprudence. 
 
1.5.4 CHAPTER 4: POST GCABA, APPLYING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TO LABOUR CASES 
 
Chapter 3 seeks to determine the legal basis for the CC decision to effectively deny public 
sector employees of their section 33 right. Based on how Gcaba reasoned, among other 
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important cases, Chapter 4 is aimed at determining the effectiveness of the Gcaba outcome 
by exploring concepts such as the Principle of Subsidiarity, the Principle of Legality, Duality 
of Rights, Dismissals via Operation of Law, Invoking the Courts Competence through 
Pleadings and Exceptions identified by Gcaba. The crux of Chapter 4 leads on from Chapter 
3 in that effectively, public sector employees are still able to pursue other causes of action 
other than the LRA within certain circumstances. 
 
1.5.5 CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Chapter 5 aims to summarise the findings of the research in the furtherance of contributing to 
knowledge and understanding as well as answering the research questions identified in 




In conclusion, under our current constitutional dispensation, the constitution expressly 
provides two fundamental rights under section 23 and 33. It is problematic that, in the past, 
public sector employees were not afforded the benefit of labour protection. Thus, 
administrative law and the law of natural justice had to be extended in order to provide some 
protection. Administrative justice is presently a constitutional right along with the right to fair 
labour practices. It is arguable that both rights apply to a single set of facts arising out of an 
employment setting. It is simply undeniable that the existence of one right should not side-
line the existence of another because a court through policy considerations feels as though the 
former is preferable. When public sector employees approach a court seeking protection 
under section 33 and PAJA, an enquiry as to whether the decision is of an administrative 
nature should be dealt with on a case- by-case basis. Without such an enquiry, it is incorrect 
to conclude that the decision is not administrative in nature simply because the matter arose 
out of an employment setting.    
Although the Chirwa and Gcaba judgments have been mentioned above as infamous, this 
dissertation does not advocate that the justices’ wisdom and reasoning on the debate should 
be simply ignored because the direction taken by the court is not in line with the particular 
legal regime. On the contrary, within a healthy constitutional democracy, courts are to 
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develop the law in such a way as to advance and protect individual rights. Jurisprudence 
within our law system develops on a daily basis. It is important for there to be conflicting 
views by other courts in order for a particular area of law to be improved so that all grey 
areas are covered. The direction taken by the CC has resulted in lower courts following a 
different approach. This dissertation in Chapter 4 identifies those cases which have followed 
a contrary approach to that of the CC by determining the legal position of public sector 
employees and the extent to which constitutional rights are afforded to them.  
 
To provide an understanding of administrative law, this dissertation now turns to setting out 
an in-depth analysis of the meaning of administrative action under section 33 and PAJA in 
Chapter 2 with the aim of determining whether administrative action can be said to apply to 









Administrative law principles over the past decade or two have strengthened within our 
constitutional democracy where courts, academic arguments and the legislature have added to 
the provision of favourable protection to individuals dealing with the administration the 
advancement of administrative law jurisprudence. Chapter 1 sought briefly to identify 
administrative law principles to provide some context. Chapter 3 provides an in-depth 
analysis of key cases, specifically on administrative law principles within labour cases. To 
fully comprehend how the case law discussed in Chapter 3 applied administrative law 
principles, a well-informed analysis of current administrative law jurisprudence is necessary. 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify what constitutes administrative action under the 
common law, under section 33 of the Constitution and under PAJA. This chapter also 
identifies the constitutional standard of legality and its development as a general aspect of 
administrative law. It must be made clear that this chapter does not identify the development 
of administrative law as a whole. The focus is confined to establishing what administrative 
action is under section 33 and PAJA as defined and whether decisions made under 
employment related circumstance fall within the ambit of section 33 and PAJA.  
2.2 ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION UNDER THE COMMON LAW 
 
Reviewing administrative action under the common-law principles of natural justice 
protected against the abuse of powers ensured that decisions were not ultra vires56 as well as 
conforming to the audi alteram partem57 rule.58 The purpose of the rules of natural justice 
was to constrain public powers from acting arbitrarily, capriciously or mala fide.59 As 
mentioned above  in Chapter 1, prior to the 1995 LRA and PAJA, public sector employees 
were afforded review protection from dismissals involving the exercise of public power 
which adversely affected their rights, especially in instances where the principles of natural 
                                                          
56 Beyond one’s powers or legal authority. 
57 To hear the other side or let the other side be heard as well.  
58 Ngcukaitobi T & Brickhill J ‘A Difficult Boundary: Public Sector Employment and Administrative Law’ 
2007(28)(4) ILJ 771. 
59 Johannesburg Stock Exchange and Another v Witwatersrand Nigel Ltd. and Another [1988] 2 All SA 308 (A). 
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justice were not adhered to.60 Due to the change in South Africa’s dispensation, the common 
law principles of natural justice and ultra vires, although useful in providing substance and 
context, no longer provide direct force in such matters.  
2.3 ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION UNDER SECTION 33 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 
 
Section 33 of the Constitution provides for just administrative action, more particularly: 
‘(1) everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally 
fair.’ 
Importantly, section 33 further provides: 
‘(3) National Legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must- 
(a) Provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an 
independent and impartial tribunal; 
(b) Impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and (2); and 
(c) Promote an efficient administration.’ 
The concept of ‘administrative action’ is not defined under the administrative justice clause 
(section 33), therefore it was primarily up to the courts to give it meaning and distinguish it 
from legislative, executive and judicial action.61 Thus as outlined below, three CC judgments 
informed by the doctrine of separation of powers, provided constitutional meaning of 
‘administrative action’ under section 33.62  
In the case of Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council,63 the CC held that ‘The enactment of legislation by an elected local council acting in 
accordance with the Constitution is legislative and not an administrative act.’64 In the case of 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union 
                                                          
60 Administrator of Natal and Another v Sibiya and Another [1992] 2 All SA 442 (A); see Administrator, 
Transvaal, and Others v Zenzile and Others [1991] (1) SA 21 (A) where the court affirms certain legal 
principles of general application to the dismissal of an employee by a public authority; see also South African 
Roads Board v Johannesburg City Council 1991(4) SA 1 at 13B – C.  
61 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) at 172. 
62 Ibid 175. 
63 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC). 
64 Ibid para 42. 
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and Others65 (SARFU) the CC held that the ‘appointment by the president of a commission 
of enquiry does not constitute administrative action as the power is akin to a prerogative 
power conferred by the Constitution onto the Head of State.’66 It would have amounted to 
administrative action; however it was an exercise of direct constitutional power.67 In the case 
of Nel v Le Roux NO and Others68 the CC held that the summary sentence procedure of 
persons who refused to give evidence was judicial rather than administrative in nature.69  
The significance of the cases mentioned above seemingly influenced the legislature in 
excluding, inter alia, executive, legislative and judicial action within the ambit of PAJA.  
The SCA in Greys Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Public Works and 
Others70 held that from a construction of section 33, conduct of ‘an administrative nature’ 
does not extend to: 
‘…the exercise of legislative powers by deliberative elected legislative bodies, nor 
to the ordinary exercise of judicial powers, nor to the formulation of policy or the 
initiation of legislation by the executive, nor the exercise of original powers 
conferred upon the President as head of state.’ 71 
 
SARFU provides significant meaning to section 33 and held that its principal function is: 
‘...to regulate conduct of the public administration and in particular ensuring if 
action has taken place by the administration, which affects or threatens individuals, 
the procedure to be followed must comply with the constitutional standards of 
administrative justice.’72  
 
Section 33 of the Constitution serves as a guardian against the abuse of public power and 
gives effect to our system of constitutional law based on the separation of powers doctrine.73 
Although section 33 provides important protection, the CC is mindful of the difficulty of 
                                                          
65 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC).  
66 Ibid paras 144-147; See also Hoexter (note 61 above) 177. 
67 Ngcukaitobi (note 58 above). 
68 1996 (3) SA 562 (CC). 
69 Ibid para 24.  
70 2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA). 
71 Ibid para 24.  
72 SARFU (note 65 above) para 136. 
73 Ngcukaitobi T ‘Life after Chirwa: Is there Scope for Harmony between Public Sector Labour Law and 
Administrative Law?’ 2008(2) ILJ 847. 
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determining the nature of administrative action. Therefore, it must be done on a case by case 
basis.74 In Fedsure, the CC underscored that it is necessary to consider on a case by case 
basis whether the particular action of the organ of state is of its nature an administrative 
action for the purpose of section 33 of the Constitution.75  
This approach is important because, while an act may qualify as administrative action 
broadly, when considering the nature of the power exercised and its context, a difficult 
outcome could appear. In determining what to take into account when faced with this 
difficulty, the SARFU judgement laid down certain factors to be taken into account in 
considering the nature of the action being exercised when determining whether an action fell 
within the meaning of section 33. The factors include the following:  
‘The source of the power, though not necessarily decisive, is a relevant factor. So too 
is the nature of the power, its subject matter, whether it involves the exercise of a 
public duty, and how closely it is related on the one hand to policy matters, which 
are not administrative, and on the other to the implementation of legislation, which 
is.’ 76 
 
SARFU further determined that 
‘What matters is not so much the functionary as the function… The focus of the 
enquiry as to whether conduct is Aadministrative action is not on the arm of 
government to which the relevant actor belongs, but on the nature of the power he or 
she is exercising.’77  
The SCA in Greys Marine endorsed this approach, holding that ‘whether particular conduct 
constitutes administrative action depends primarily on the nature of the power that is being 
exercised rather than upon the identity of the person who does so.’78  
The purpose of determining the nature of the power exercised rather than a broad 
determination of exercises of public powers gives effect to the meaning and purpose of 
section 33. Greys Marine rightly stated that:  
                                                          
74 SARFU (note 65 above) para 143. 
75 Fedsure (note 63 above) para 26. 
76 SARFU (note 65 above) para 143. 
77 Ibid para 141.  
78 Greys Marine (note 70 above) para 24; See Hoexter (note 61 above)  at 175-176 where Hoexter states that the 
purpose of confining the enquiry to the function being performed rather than the functionary indicates that it is 
possible for other branches of the State performing administrative action.  
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‘Administrative action is rather, in general terms, the conduct of the bureaucracy 
(whoever the bureaucratic functionary might be) in carrying out the daily functions 
of the state which necessarily involves the application of policy, usually after its 
translation into law, with direct and immediate consequences for individuals or 
groups of individuals.’79  
 
The development of administrative law jurisprudence by the CC in SARFU, Fedsure and Nel  
led to clarity as to the principle function of section 33 of the Constitution, which is to regulate 
the public administration ensuring that any action taken does not affect or threaten 
individuals if adherence to procedural requirements comply with the constitutional standard 
of administrative justice.80 The legislature in the year 2000, as per its constitutional duty, 
promulgated legislation giving effect to the meaning of section 33. Having discussed the 
meaning of section 33 prior to legislation being enacted, the next subsection discusses the 
meaning of section 33 under legislation. 
2.4 ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION UNDER PAJA 
 
Section 33 of the Constitution required legislation to be enacted to give effect to the right to 
administrative justice that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair as well as the right to be 
given written reasons. In promulgating PAJA, the legislature aimed to satisfy its 
constitutional obligation. The long title of PAJA states its purpose in giving effect to the right 
to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair and to the right to 
written reasons for administrative action as contemplated in section 33… However, the 
objective stated within the preamble is equally important, namely, that it strives to ‘promote 
an efficient administration and good governance; and create a culture of accountability, 
openness and transparency in the public administration or in the exercise of a public power or 
the performance of a public function (my emphasis), by giving effect to the right to just 
administrative action.’  
Prior to the introduction of the interim constitution, the basis for judicial review of 
administrative action was the common-law principles mentioned above, and therefore the 
question as to whether the common-law principles could be used as a separate and distinct 
                                                          
79 Greys Marine (note 70 above) para 24. 
80 SARFU (note 65 above) para 136. 
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cause of action for judicial review has now been settled. In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association of SA v President of the RSA,81 the court held that: 
‘the control of public power by the courts through judicial review is and has always 
been a constitutional matter…The common-law principles have been subsumed 
under the Constitution, and insofar as they might continue to be relevant to judicial 
review of public power, the two are intertwined and do not constitute separate 
concepts.’82  
 
This was later stated in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental affairs83 
where the CC held that the court’s power to ‘review no longer flows from the common law 
but from PAJA and the Constitution, therefore the ground norm of administrative law is to be 
found in the principles of our Constitution.’84  
In Sokhela and Others v MEC for Agriculture and Environmental Affairs (Kwazulu-Natal) 
and Others85 Wallis J provided the correct approach to administrative action claims where a 
‘court is required to make a positive decision (my emphasis) whether a particular exercise of 
public power or performance of a public function is of an administrative character in order 
for the power of judicial review under PAJA to be engaged.’86 Therefore, ‘administrative 
action does not occur by default on the basis that it does not fit into some other juristic 
pigeonhole.’87 Wallis J further found that the ‘requirement that the decision be of an 
administrative nature demands a detailed analysis of the nature of the public power or public 
function being exercised to determine its true character.’88  
It is aphoristic that the gateway to judicial review of administrative action flows not from the 
common law, or directly from section 33 of the Constitution, but from PAJA which was 
constitutionally mandated to give effect to section 33. Thus, PAJA is the first port of call in 
administrative law matters.  
 
                                                          
81 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC). 
82 Ibid para 33. 
83 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC). 
84 Ibid para 22; see also Fedsure (note 63 above) para 59.  
85 2010 (5) SA 574 (KZP). 
86 Ibid para 61. 
87 Ibid.  
88 Ibid.  
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The Principle of Legality  
Although PAJA is the first port of call in holding the administration accountable when 
exercising public power of an administrative nature, another possible means of holding the 
administration accountable is through the principle of legality. An in-depth discussion on the 
principle of legality will follow in section 2.5. Chapter 4 will deal with the significant 
development of the principle in holding the administration accountable in labour cases. 
It is important to lay down below the requirements as to what constitutes administrative 
action for the purposes of section 33 under PAJA, Thereafter a closer look at employment 
related cases as provided in Chapter 3 is necessary to ascertain the jurisprudential direction 
taken by the courts. 
2.4.1 DEFINITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION UNDER PAJA 
 
Section 1 of PAJA defines administrative action as follows: 
‘Administrative action’ is defined as ‘any decision taken, or failure to take a decision by (a) 
an organ of state when (i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or provincial 
Constitution or (ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any 
legislation or (b) a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a 
public power or performing a public function in terms of an empowering provision which 
adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal effect…’ 
‘Decision’ under section 1 is defined as ‘any decision of an administrative nature made, 
proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be under an empowering 
provision.’  
Section 1(i)(b)(aa)-(ii) of PAJA provides for nine specific exclusions of decisions from the 
definition of administrative action and from the application of PAJA. It is significant to state 
that those exclusions make no reference to specifically excluding employment decisions 
taken by public bodies.89 It is important to note that, although a decision may not specifically 
be excluded from within PAJA’s ambit, through proper analysis of legal principles by our 
courts, a decision could very well not be administrative in nature.  
                                                          
89 Ngcukaitobi (note 73 above) 850. 
23 
 
The CC reiterated this settled position where Mogoeng J held in Viking Pony Africa Pumps 
(Pty) Ltd t/a Tricom Africa v Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd and Another90 that ‘whether 
administrative action has been taken, which would make PAJA apply, or not, it cannot be 
determined in the abstract, therefore regard must be had to the facts of each case.’91 
To ensure that decisions are not determined in the abstract, the SCA in Greys Marine held 
that the definition as to what constitutes administrative action for the purposes of PAJA can 
be conveniently divided into seven main elements in a ‘consolidated and abbreviated form 
which will suffice to convey its principal elements.’92 The principal elements are:  
(a) a decision; 
(b) by an organ of state (or natural or juristic person); 
(c) exercising a public power or performing a public function; 
(d) in terms of any legislation (or in terms of an empowering provision); 
(e) that adversely affects rights; 
(f) that has direct, external legal effect; 
(g) and that does not fall under any of the listed exclusions.  
 
Each of these elements will now be discussed in turn. 
 
2.4.2 EXPANDING PAJA’S DEFINITION 
 
(a) Decision 
A ‘decision’ for the purposes of section 1 of PAJA has been defined above. Importantly, the 
act not only provides for decisions made or proposed to be made, but also makes provision 
for  situations where the decision maker fails93 to take a decision as well as situations of 
refusal to take a decision.94 In City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and Others v 
Nambiti Technologies (Pty) Ltd,95 the SCA recognised that there are instances where a 
decision not to do something may constitute administrative action, as in the case of a failure 
                                                          
90 2011 (1) SA 372 (CC).  
91 Ibid para 37. 
92 Greys Marine (note 70 above) para 21.  
93 See Sibiya v Director-General: Home Affairs 2009 (5) SA 145 (KZP) at paras 13-15.  
94 Hoexter (note 61 above) 198. 
95 2016 (2) SA 494 (SCA). 
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to issue a passport or identity document; however, for the SCA, inaction is not ordinarily to 
be equated with action and even less so to being administrative in nature.96 
Hoexter states that, notwithstanding the lengthy definition of a decision from (a)-(g) under 
section 1 of PAJA, it should not be assumed that every official act will qualify as a 
‘decision’.97 This ties in with the overall approach mentioned above, that the question of what 
is and what is not administrative action must be determined positively and not in the abstract.  
In City of Cape Town v Hendricks and Another,98 the SCA held that notices served on the 
respondents did not amount to a ‘decision’ for the purposes of PAJA. In reaching this 
conclusion it held that the City had taken no decision in issuing and serving the notices:  
'The notices simply informed the respondents that they must comply with the law 
(i.e. remove the structures which contravene the by-laws and the Ordinance) and 
informed them of the consequences should they fail to do so'.99 
The definition of ‘decision’ includes that it must be ‘of an administrative nature’ and ‘made 
under an empowering provision’. Each of these will be dealt with under their respective 
headings below.  
 
(b) By an organ of state (natural or juristic) 
In terms of section 1 of PAJA, ‘organ of state’ has been defined to bear the meaning assigned 
to it in section 239 of the Constitution. Therefore, in terms of section 239, ‘organ of state’ is 
defined as ‘any state department or other institution or functionary exercising a power or 
providing a public function in terms of the Constitution or in terms of any legislation.’ Based 
on the interpretation of this definition of ‘organ of state’ any power exercised will suffice. 
PAJA does provide for who an administrator is for the purposes of PAJA: a natural or juristic 
person, not an organ of state exercising a public power or performing a public function.  
 
(c) Administrative in Nature: 
                                                          
96 Ibid para 31. 
97 Hoexter (note 61 above) 199; see also 198-203 for a detailed analysis of what constitutes a decision for the 
purposes of PAJA.  
98 2012 (6) SA 492 (SCA). 
99 Ibid para 10. 
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Where a decision is administrative in nature, the exclusions section in PAJA suggests that the 
decision does not include executive, legislative or judicial action within its meaning. In 
SARFU, the court held that a decision is administrative in nature when it is directed at 
implementing legislation rather than at the formulation of policy.100 Although implementing 
legislation implies that a decision is administrative in nature, it is not decisive on its own and 
all factors need to be considered within the circumstances in each case. SARFU further held 
that in determining ‘administrative in nature’ one looks at the function being performed 
rather than the functionary and therefore the question to be determined is whether the task 
itself is administrative or not.101 The purpose of seeking the true nature of the power 
exercised qualifies the action as administrative for the purposes of section 33. A series of 
factors may be relevant in deciding on which side of the line a particular action falls.102 A 
decision made by the executive could at first glance be excluded from PAJA for being an 
executive action, however one looks not at the functionary performing the action, but rather 
the function being performed in establishing the true nature of the decision. 
Wallis J in Sokhela103 provided reasoning as to why it is important to determine whether an 
action is ‘administrative in nature’ as the enquiry serves two purposes. The first purpose  
‘focusses the court’s attention on determining whether the exercise of public power of 
performance of a public function under consideration is properly classified as administrative 
action’, and therefore, as noted above, courts are required to make a positive finding.104 The 
second is closely related to the first. This is to make it clear that the mere fact that an exercise 
of public power of the performance of a public function does not fall within one of the 
exclusions in sub-paragraphs (aa) to (ii) of the definition of ‘administrative action’, which 
does not necessarily mean that the exercise of public power or the performance of a public 
function in question constitutes administrative action.105  
Although the legislature has not excluded public-sector employment within the ambit of e 
PAJA, as per the reasoning of Wallis J, a positive finding as to whether the exercising of a 
public power or the performing of a public function within an employment context is 
administrative in nature conforms with the standard imposed in ensuring constitutional 
validity on a case-by-case basis. Determining whether conduct amounts to being 
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administrative in nature, Wallis J distinguished the facts before him and the action in Chirwa 
and regarded the termination of board members as not of an administrative nature. In coming 
to this conclusion, Wallis J held that, firstly, there was an absence of an employment 
relationship and, secondly, unlike Chirwa, the board members did not have to resort to any 
other constitutionally protected rights.106 
In Greys Marine, the court held that ‘whether particular conduct constitutes administrative 
action depends primarily on the nature of the power that is being exercised rather than upon 
the identity of the person who does so.’107 Therefore, where the requirements under PAJA 
have been established, it arguably does not matter whether the decision maker is an employer 
in determining the nature of the power exercised. Greys Marine indicates that ‘administrative 
action is action that has the capacity to affect legal rights… administrative action impacts 
directly and immediately on individuals.’108  
Determining whether conduct is administrative action is not always easy as one must look at 
a variety of factors. The question of how to decide whether conduct constitutes administrative 
action has recently been applied by the CC below. 
In Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau,109 the majority of the CC disagreed 
with the decision of the HC where it concluded that the Minister’s decision to terminate 
board members of Armaments Corporation of South Africa (SOC) Limited (Armscor) met 
the positive requirements of the administrative action definition and was not expressly 
excluded from PAJA’s ambit. In arriving at the conclusion, the court noted that the executive 
power to implement legislation in terms of section 85(2)(a) of the Constitution was not 
expressly excluded under PAJA’s definition of what constitutes administrative action.110 The 
court also noted that the implementation of legislation by a senior member of the executive 
would ordinarily amount to administrative action for the purposes of PAJA.111 The court, 
however, noted that the power under section 85(2)(e) to perform any executive function other 
than implementing national legislation was excluded from PAJA’s ambit.112 The court then 
turned to examine the nature of the Minister’s power giving guidance as how to go about this 
enquiry: 
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‘In summary, the important question in this context is whether the power is more 
closely related to the formulation of policy, which would render it executive in 
nature, or the implementation of legislation, which would make it administrative. 
Underpinning this enquiry is the question whether it is appropriate to subject the 
power to the more rigorous, administrative-law review standard. The other pointers 
– the source of the power and the extent of the discretion afforded to the functionary 
– are ancillary in that they are often symptoms of these bigger questions.’113 
The significance of the majority description of the basic question as to whether it is 
appropriate to subject conduct to a more rigorous standard of review imposed by PAJA is 
argued by Brand and Murcott as being as close a formulation as one gets to the idea that, if it 
is possible to apply PAJA, courts should determine whether it would be desirable to do 
so,given that PAJA imposes a higher level of scrutiny and less scope to exhibit deference 
than legality.114  
 
(d) Exercising a public power or performing a public function 
Quinot and Maree state that establishing what is a public power or a public function is not an 
easy task.115 This was acknowledged by Langa CJ in the minority judgment in Chirwa v 
Transnet116 where it was held that ‘determining whether a power or function is “public” is a 
notoriously difficult exercise as there is no simple definition or clear test to be applied.’117  
Furthermore, Quinot and Maree state that administrative action is action of a public nature.118 
In establishing what is public in nature, Langa CJ listed several factors, that are not 
exhaustive, which provides some indication of whether the power or function is public: the 
relationship of coercion or power that the actor has in its capacity as a public institution; the 
impact of the decision on the public; the source of the power; and whether there is a need for 
the decision to be exercised in the public interest.119 However, Quinot and Maree rightly state 
that no single one of these factors will determine on its own the public nature of the decision 
but may point in that direction where a combination of these factors are present.120 The 
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authors also list other factors that are indicative of public power being exercised in order for 
one to identify the true nature of the decision.121 
An important question is whether administrative action affects the rights of the public or an 
individual. In answering this question, Burns and Beukes state that ‘public’ does not refer to 
the public as a whole but rather includes a portion, section or class within the community.122  
Van Rensburg states that although administrative action affects the public where there is 
general impact and it is impersonal in nature, the rights of an individual are also affected 
where there is particular impact on the individual that is personal in nature.123 Van Rensburg 
states that decisions relating to ‘granting of licences or permits as well as dismissals, 
promotions and changing of working conditions all have individual impact on public 
servants.’124 
Plasket J held in Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union v Minister of Correctional Services 
(No 1)125 that ‘public power is not limited to exercises of power that impact on the public at 
large and that many administrative acts do not.’126 For Plasket J, in these instances, ‘what 
makes a power involved public is the fact that the power has been vested in a public 
functionary who is required to exercise it in the public interest and not in his or her private 
interest.’127 The public interest element must be viewed together with other relevant factors. 
Nugent JA, in Calibre Clinical Consultants (Pty) Ltd and Another v National Bargaining 
Council for the Road Freight Industry and Another,128 however, ‘cautioned that a decision 
will not necessarily be public in nature merely because the public has an interest in it.’129  
Plasket J does provide an important argument that ‘a statutory source of power is significant 
because it places the existence of public power largely, if not completely, beyond 
contention.’130 However, Ngcukaitobi and Brickhil argue that ‘it is now accepted the source 
of the power is not decisive, moreover the power itself cannot be characterised simply by 
reference to its source.’131 Murphy AJ held in SAPU132 that, although the source of the power 
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to change the shift system fell within the South African Police Services (hereafter SAPS) Act, 
the decision was not administrative action as the source of the power is not decisive and, 
moreover, when one looks at the nature of the decision one comes to the conclusion that there 
is nothing inherently public about setting working hours; therefore, the decision falls on the 
labour and employment relations side of the line.133 
 
(e) Under an empowering provision 
Section 1 of PAJA defines ‘empowering provision’ as ‘a law, rule of common law, customary 
law, or agreement, instrument or other document in terms of which an administrative action 
was purportedly taken.’ Therefore, PAJA requires a decision maker to act under an 
empowering provision for the particular action to constitute administrative action.   
For example, Section 17(3)(b) of the Public Service Act (hereafter PSA) provides the relevant 
executive authority with the discretion, considering good cause shown, to reinstate an 
employee to the public service following a deemed dismissal. The empowering provision 
affords a discretion to overturn the consequences of a deemed dismissal via operation of law 
and approve a reinstatement. Another similar empowering provision in the Employment of 
Educators Act is section 14(2) which affords the same discretion, considering good cause 
shown whether to reinstate an educator, thus reversing the consequence of the deemed 
dismissal.  
Hoexter states that the definition of ‘empowering provision’ is quite broad, yet organs of state 
are subjected to a more stringent requirement where they must act either in terms of the 
Constitution, provincial constitution or, significantly for our purposes here, legislation134. 
APS, for example, is an organ of state which acts under legislation. The fact that SAPS acts 
under national legislation does not necessarily entail that all decisions are administrative 
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(f) That adversely affects rights 
Burns and Beukes state that ‘adversely affects’ means the same as an onerous effect; in other 
words, ‘for administrative action to adversely affect rights, it must place or impose a burden 
on individuals for example receiving a traffic fine.’135 However, where the administration 
grants an individual a driving permit, the authors state that the administrative action benefits 
the individual and therefore does not impose a burden; nevertheless,  an action which is 
beneficial to one may well have an onerous effect on third parties.136 For example, an 
individual granted h a liquor licence benefits, whereas third parties residing near the liquor 
establishment may be adversely effected. The authors state that a person’s rights may be 
affected in two ways: the decision may deprive a person of their rights or a person’s rights 
may be affected where rights are determined.137  
When one interprets the phrase literally, Quinot and Maree argue that it would then ‘imply 
that only those decisions which have a negative effect on rights can ever qualify as 
administrative action.’138 Yet, the position has been settled by Nugent JA in Greys Marine 
where the literal interpretation method was correctly rejected, with the court holding that it 
would be inconsistent with section 3(1) of PAJA, which envisages that administrative action 
might or might not effect rights adversely.139 For Nugent JA, the requirement was ‘probably 
intended to convey that administrative action is action that has the capacity to affect legal 
rights.’140 The authors argue that Nugent JA in this case does not explain what is meant by 
‘adverse’ in the elemental requirements; however, almost a decade later, Nugent JA, in 
Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Scalabrini Centre and Others,141 held that ‘it is true 
that only a person who is refused a licence will have reason to complain, but that goes to the 
enforceability of the decision, and not to its nature.’142 The authors argue that it is clear that 
from the generous interpretation adopted by Nugent JA, a decision could affect an individual 
negatively or positively but would still qualify as administrative action.143 The only thing that 
would be affected would be whether the decision is actionable. 
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It is important to recognise that the impact requirement (adversely affects rights) has been 
adopted in several cases involving employment and labour relations. In Kiva v Minister of 
Correctional Services,144 Plasket J agreed with Nugent JA before finding that the decision not 
to promote the applicant ‘certainly had the potential to affect his rights to fair labour practices 
and equality, therefore the decision amounted to administrative action.’145 Lewis AJ held  in 
Minister of Defence and Others v Dunn146 that the decision not to appoint a person to a public 
service position had the capacity to affect legal rights even though there was no right to be 
appointed it nevertheless amounted to administrative action.147 In Wessels v Minister for 
Justice and Constitutional Development and Others,148 the court relied on Greys Marine and 
Dunn to hold that the decision to appoint a person to the public service amounted to 
administrative action.149  
The impact requirement in PAJA’s definition used to be potentially restrictive when a narrow 
interpretation had been adopted. However, in Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and 
Others,150 the CC expanded the traditional understanding of legal rights to include their 
public law rights holding that ‘when the applicants received electricity, they did so by virtue 
of their corresponding public-law right to receive this basic municipal service.’151 Quinot and 
Maree state that the effect of this judgment entails that the definition of administrative action 
should no longer be interpreted to refer only to private law, common law and fundamental 
rights in the Bill of Rights, but also to refer to public law rights, which emanate from broad 
constitutional and statutory obligations placed on organs of state.152  
In JDJ Properties CC and Another v Umngeni Local Municipality and Another153  the SCA 
followed the same broad approach as in Greys Marine. The SCA held the decision to approve 
the building plans of a shopping development which has the capacity to affect the rights of 
the appellants and others living and doing business in the area concerned and which would 
impact directly on them.154 In coming to this conclusion, the SCA held that the consequence 
of such a decision would lead to an increase in traffic and congestion, which would inevitably 
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follow that the free parking provided nearby for customers of the smaller business would be 
used by customers of the development.155 
The requirement that rights must be adversely affected is broad enough to include any 
recognised legal right. If a decision impacts directly and immediately on a person, it would 
satisfy this requirement. As will be discussed in the next subsection, a decision within an 
employment setting may very well affect one’s legal rights and amount to administrative 
action. However the difficulty lies in determining whether a decision is internal or external to 
the administrator.  
 
(g) Direct, external legal effect 
The phrase ‘direct, external legal effect’ was borrowed by the legislature from German 
administrative law. It is important here to first determine the meaning of the phrase within the 
German context and then to move on to establishing how South African courts have 
interpreted it. ‘Direct’ indicates that ‘decisions must be final and immediate for the decision 
to be subjected to review.’156 Pfaff and Schneider state that preliminary decisions are not 
open for judicial review because it may be unnecessary to delay a series of steps within an 
administrative procedure where it is unknown whether the individual will be affected by the 
final decision or not, because it is only the last decision which is directed at the citizen.157 
The SCA in Greys Marine  held that the phrase ‘direct, external legal effect’ serves to 
emphasise that when administrative action is taken, it impacts directly and immediately on 
individuals.158 Fabricius AJ in Oosthuizen’s Transport (Pty) Ltd v MEC, Road Traffic 
Matters, Mpumalanga159 held that a decision to recommend suspension amounted to 
administrative action for the purposes of section 1 of PAJA.160 In coming to this conclusion, 
Fabricius AJ agreed with the proposition made in Greys Marine that administrative action 
merely needs to have the capacity to affect legal rights.161 The CC in Viking Pony 
underscores the Greys Marine proposition.162 Fabricius AJ in Viking Pony held that the view 
expressed by Nugent J in Greys Marine is in line with the German definition that the 
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administrative act need not have direct legal consequences but that it is sufficient to note 
where such an act is ‘aimed at’ rather than maintaining that it ‘will’ have such 
consequences.163 Interestingly, Fabricius AJ supported the view that a decision does not 
necessarily have to be final, as a preliminary decision ‘can have serious consequences 
especially where it lays “the necessary foundation for a possible decision” which may have 
grave results.’164 Further expanding on this area is not significant for this dissertation.  
The ‘external effect’ part of the phrase is aimed at excluding administrative measures that are 
taken within the public administration. Moreover, Pfaff and Schneider argue that what this 
means is that administrative action only affects a person who is different from the 
authority.165 Pfaff and Schneider state that only in certain cases of a ‘special relationship’ is it 
often difficult to distinguish between internal and external measures taken.166  
The authors provide insight into the meaning of ‘external effect’ with reference to those 
‘special relationships’ comprising ‘for example the relationship between a civil servant and 
his or her employer (my emphasis), the national, provincial or local government between 
students and schools or universities.’167 The authors provide for two types of relationships; 
basic relationship (external) and operational relationship (internal).168 The authors provide 
that a person will be adversely and individually affected within a basic relationship, thus 
amounting to administrative action, whe, for example, the decision amounts to ‘denial of 
annual leave, failing matric, dismissal from school or university or the appointment or 
dismissal of a civil servant.’169 However, where the person is affected within the operational 
relationship (internal) pertaining to his/her ‘specific role or function, individual rights are not 
infringed and those decisions do not amount to administrative action.’170 Examples of such 
decisions are ‘internal orders, procedures between different public authorities, homework for 
students or a normal test at school…most cases deal with decisions taken by some higher 
public official towards subordinate civil servants such as setting working hours or ordering 
him/her to move to another office room or building or to complete certain tasks.’171  
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According to Burns and Beukes, the purpose of establishing whether the decision of the 
administration is internal or external balances the rights of the individual between the rights 
of the State172. The ‘right of the individual should be protected within an administrative law 
relationship, also ensuring that the business of the State is not unnecessarily hampered in 
performing its functions or duties.’173  
Pfaff and Schneider argue that to ‘avoid misunderstanding: it is important to see that 
‘external’ does not have a physical connotation, whether a person is physically working or 
acting within or outside an organ of state is not decisive. It merely depends on whether rights 
are affected.’174  Burns and Beukes argue that because this part of the PAJA enquiry has been 
copied and pasted from foreign law jurisdictions, PAJA must be interpreted within the 
context of our legal system175 and, therefore, the views expressed by Pfaff and Schneider that 
‘external’ should not be seen as a physical connotation has been endorsed in Greys Marine.176 
Freund AJ, in Nxele v Chief Deputy Commissioner, Corporate Services, Department of 
Correctional Services,177agreed with the approach taken by the SCA in Greys Marine that 
‘external effect’ should not be ‘literally interpreted to exclude actions which affect members 
of or within the public body itself.178  The Nxele judgment endorsed this view, following the 
disapproval by the approach taken in SAPU, which held that ‘in order to have ‘external 
effect’, a decision must effect ‘outsiders’ and that decisions only affecting employees within 
a departmental administration do not have this affect.’179  
It is difficult to ascertain whether a decision has an internal or external effect. However the 
SCA in Greys Marine have provided clarity, holding that ‘external’ does not literally mean 
physically outside the decision maker’s parameters, but is rather a decision taken by the 
administrator which not only has the possibility of affecting members of the public outside 
the decision maker, but also members within the state department. Determining whether a 
decision is an administrative action provides for a holistic enquiry into all relevant factors 
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with the aim of determining the true nature of the decision which allows the court, on a case 
by case basis, to consider the requirements ensuring constitutional validity.180 
The Meaning of ‘legal effect’ 
The phrase ‘legal effect’ has been interpreted in Greys Marine to mean that administrative 
action, along with ‘direct and external effect’, was ‘probably intended to convey that 
administrative action has the capacity to affect legal rights…emphasising that administrative 
action impacts directly and immediately on individuals.’181 Wallis J held in Sokhela that the 
decision to ‘suspend the board members was external to the MEC, who is the decision-maker, 
and its legal effect impacts upon the rights of the board members in a manner which affects 
their right to dignity, reputation, standing as well as preventing them from performing their 
lawful functions as board members in the future.’182  
Hoexter states, from a jurisprudential point of view, that the CC suggests the easiest way to 
satisfy the element of ‘legal effect’ within the phrase ‘direct, external legal effect’ is to 
acknowledge that there is an overlap and that it may be restated that legal effect means that 
rights are adversely affected.183  
In Joseph,184 Skweyiya J rejected the respondents’ argument that the ‘ambit of “legal effect” 
should not be interpreted too broadly as it would lead to administrative paralysis’; moreover, 
the respondents’ in the case argued that, because there was ‘no contractual nexus between the 
applicants and City Power, in terminating the electricity supply by City Power there was no 
direct ‘legal effect’ therefore the harm was through the landlord defaulting with City 
Power.’185 However, the court, in rejecting the movement to narrow the interpretation of 
‘legal effect’, held that ‘administrative efficiency primarily informs the duties imposed under 
administrative law, therefore administrative law is determined by the relationship that already 
exist between the state and its citizens186 and should not be too strictly delaminated.’187 For 
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the purposes of section 3 of PAJA, the applicants were materially and adversely affected and 
should have been notified of the pending administrative action in order for the affected 
parties to arrange their affairs accordingly.  
In City of Cape Town v Hendricks and Another,188 Southwood AJA held that the serving of 
notices had no immediate and direct effect on the respondents and did not adversely affect 
their rights as the notice was simply a warning putting the respondents on notice.189  
Having discussed what constitutes administrative action under section 33 and PAJA, it is 
necessary to deal with another means of controlling the exercise of public power that exists 
under the constitutional rule of law. The principle of legality, which is known as a more 
general aspect of administrative law, will now be discussed. 
 
2.5 THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY 
 
2.5.1 DEFINING THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY 
 
An important place to start is the Constitution190 – more specifically section 1(c) of the 
Constitution, which provides that ‘the Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, 
democratic, state founded on the following values…(c) Supremacy of the Constitution and 
the rule of law.’ 
The CC, in Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council,191 identified the principle of legality as a fundamental principle and an aspect of the 
rule of law, therefore holding in that case that local government may only act within the 
powers lawfully conferred upon it and that the exercise of public power is only legitimate 
where it is lawful.192 The principle demands that the state may exercise no power or perform 
no function beyond that conferred upon them by law.193  
The CC has recently recognised the principle of legality in Head of Department, Department 
of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High School and Another; Head of Department, 
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Department of Education, Free State Province v Harmony High School and Another194where 
Khampepe J in the main judgment of the court held that ‘State functionaries, no matter how 
well-intentioned, may only do what the law empowers them to do. That is the essence of the 
principle of legality, the bedrock of our constitutional dispensation, and has long been 
enshrined in our law.’195 
In SARFU196 the CC agreed with its earlier decision in Fedsure, holding that the exercise of 
powers is clearly constrained by the principle of legality.  The court, moreover, held that, as 
implicit in the Constitution, the president must act in good faith and must not misconstrue 
those powers. The court further held that the constraints mentioned above on public power 
arise from the provisions of the Constitution other than the administrative justice clause.197 
The legality principle is significant because, as Hoexter states, it is a broad constitutional 
principle that governs the use of all public power rather than the narrower administrative 
action clause under section 33 and PAJA.198 
The principle of legality includes not only lawfulness but also rationality. Chaskalson P held 
in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex parte President of the Republic 
of South Africa199 that rationality requires that exercises of public powers must not be 
arbitrary or irrational, and that, moreover, rationality ‘is a requirement of the rule of law 
where decisions must be rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given, 
otherwise those decisions are in effect arbitrary and inconsistent with the rationality 
requirement.’200  
The CC in Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation201  expanded on the 
legality requirement, adding procedural fairness to the rationality enquiry. The court 
importantly held that, where the president exercises his pardoning powers, it would be 
irrational for not to allow for the victims of the offences to be heard.202 The decision was, 
however, limited to the facts of the case. This was because Ngcobo J added the consultation 
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requirement to legality through rationality, and therefore consultation within legality would 
only be required if the purpose of the decision required it.203 
The SCA in Scalabrini204 proceeded to broaden the rationality requirement by reading the 
requirement of consultation into legality. For Nugent JA, the broadening of rationality to 
include consultation under legality did not mean that there now exists a general duty on 
decision makers to consult organisations or individuals having an interest in their decisions. 
The duty only arises ‘in circumstances where it would be irrational to take the decision 
without such consultation, because of the special knowledge of the person or organisation to 
be consulted, of which the decision maker is aware.’205 The duty to consult is not triggered 
under legality because someone’s interests are adversely affected, but rather, when the 
decision maker is aware that parties have knowledge or information about the decision, such 
parties must be consulted because it is in the public’s interest that they make a contribution to 
the decision.206 
In Association of Regional Magistrates of Southern Africa (ARMSA) v President of South 
Africa,207 the president decided to determine publicly which of the ARMSA members would 
receive an annual salary increase. It was argued that the decision made by the president 
amounted to administrative action and was subject to the procedural requirements of fairness 
because they were not considered for representations.  
The question before the CC was whether the decision constituted administrative action and 
was subject for review in terms of PAJA. In answering this question, Nkabinde J held that it 
did not constitute administrative action but rather executive action and that the decision 
would be subjected to review under the principle of legality.208 Nkabinde J recognised that 
review on the basis of legality can only be done against a limited set of requirements, 
including lawfulness and rationality, and concluded that ‘procedural fairness is not a 
requirement for the exercise of executive powers and…executive action cannot be challenged 
on the ground that the affected party was not given a hearing unless a hearing was required 
by the enabling statute.’209  
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When faced with arguments that ARMSA and its members should have been given the 
opportunity to make representations to the president about their salaries, Nkabinde J followed 
a different approach to that of Scalabrini and Albutt. It was held that adequate remuneration 
by judicial officers is an aspect of judicial independence and it would not be prudent to 
subject the president in circumstances where the members of the judiciary should negotiate 
their salaries with the executive.210  
Brand and Murcott argue that Nkabinde J’s reliance on Masetlha v President of the Republic 
of South Africa and Another211 is worrying because it may have limited the possibility of 
relying on the proposition made in Albutt that, despite the majority judgment in Masetlha, 
under certain circumstance procedural fairness could be read into legality as an essential part 
of the requirement of rationality.212  
Brand and Murcott argue that ARMSA’s decision could equally apply to Masetlha. The 
reasoning is not authority for the general proposition that legality embraces no duty to 
consult.213 It serves as authority that legality does not require procedural fairness of the 
president.214 Brand and Murcott are of the view that the development of the relationship 
between PAJA and legality should be seen as a positive advancement where legality is being 
applied in circumstances where it previously would have been impossible.215 
The recent case before the SCA e.tv (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Communications216 concerned a 
challenge to an amendment to the Broadcasting Digital Migration Policy - published in terms 
of the Electronic Communications Act 36 of 2005 (ECA). Lewis JA held 'where a policy or 
policy amendment impacts on rights . . . it is only fair that those affected be consulted' since 
'[f]airness in procedure, and rationality, are at the heart of the principle of legality'.217 In 
contrast to ARMSA, Lewis JA held that regardless of whether the Minister was explicitly 
required to consult interested parties in terms of statute, the failure to consult was inconsistent 
with the rationality requirement.218 
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Van Der Merwe J in Wessels v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development219 also 
added to the enquiry on legality, holding that the principle of legality includes rationality and 
accountability, where there is a duty imposed upon the functionary exercising a public power 
to provide reasons for decisiona. Brand JA has recently underscored this duty in Judicial 
Service Commission and Another v Cape Bar Council and Another220 where it was held that 
‘As to rationality, I think it is rather cynical to say to an affected individual: you 
have a constitutional right to a rational decision but you are not entitled to know the 
reasons for that decision. How will the individual ever be able to rebut the defence 
by the decision-maker: ‘Trust me, I have good reasons, but I am not prepared to 
provide them’?’221 
From a labour law perspective, the Labour Appeal Court (hereafter LAC) in Carephone (Pty) 
Ltd v Marcus NO and others222  provided a well-known formulation of the test for rationality 
referred to as the Carephone test: 
‘Is there a rational objective basis justifying the connection made by the 
administrative decision maker between the material properly available to him and 
the conclusion he or she eventually arrived at?’223 
The significance of the cases mentioned above is that, as Hoexter states, within constitutional 
dispensations around the world and in South Africa, the legality review is ‘capable of 
referring to the same requirements applicable to administrative action under PAJA, moreover 
the content of legality is also written down in the form of a list of grounds of review under 
section 6 of PAJA.’224 Hoexter states that it is therefore ‘not surprising that the principle of 
legality and its parent, the rule of law, has been described as administrative law under another 
name.’225 
The difference between administrative action and legality review is that the latter applies to 
all exercises of public power whereas, for section 33 and PAJA to apply, the said action must 
be administrative in nature as well as confined to the very narrow statutory definition. 
Chaskalson CJ held in Minister of Health and Another v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 
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and Others226 that ‘what the principle of legality does is act as a safety net’ as it provides the 
courts with some degree of control over action that is not yet administrative action for the 
purposes of PAJA or section 33 of the Constitution but still involves the use of public power. 
This research can do no more than repeat the dictum of Ngcobo J in Affordable Medicines 
Trust and others v Minister of Health and others227 where the CC held that: 
‘The exercise of public power must therefore comply with the Constitution, which is 
the supreme law, and the doctrine of legality, which is part of that law. The doctrine 
of legality, which is an incident of the rule of law, is one of the constitutional 
controls through which the exercise of public power is regulated by the 
Constitution.’228 
 
The principle of legality is an alternative means whereby courts are still capable of exercising 
a supervisory role where Section 33 and PAJA do not apply. Henrico argues that the principle 
restrains the functions of the courts to do what they are required to do, namely, being the 
guardian of the Constitution and ensuring that the rights to human dignity, equality and 
freedom are not compromised by undue exercise of power.229 Moreover, for Hoexter, the 
principle has its advantages as it is ‘simple, general and inclusive instead of being 
complicated, specific and exclusive.’230 Henrico agrees with Hoexter that section 33 and 
PAJA are restrictive.231 For Henrico, whether the act in question is administrative action is 
not always the question because not all exercises of power are formally designated under 
PAJA’s definition of administrative action.232 The extent to which the said act violates rights 
in terms of the Bill of Rights must be determined; therefore, applying the principle of legality 
is instrumental in addressing this lacuna.233 Nevertheless, any individual affected by an abuse 
of public power is constitutionally entitled to decisions being lawful and rational; in other 
words, where there is an exercise of public power, individuals are constitutionally protected 
where there is an abuse of that power.  
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Although the principle of legality has been regarded as a ‘safety net’ by providing courts with 
a means of exercising a supervisory role over all exercises of public power, the principle has 
developed over the years to include most of the requirements under PAJA, which arguably 
threatens the use of PAJA. This dissertation now examines the various reservations on the 
scope of the principle and where it should fit into administrative law. 
 
2.5.2 RESERVATIONS CONCERNING THE LEGALITY PRINCIPLE 
 
Hoexter, Quinot and Maree express concern that the danger of the principle of legality is that 
it would encourage parallel systems of law, one under the legality principle and another under 
section 33 of the Constitution;234 moreover, it would not necessarily be a positive 
development as far as PAJA and Section 33 is concerned.235  
Chaskalson CJ in New Clicks236 warned against what Hoexter refers to as the ‘free 
alternative’237 approach, holding that PAJA is national legislation which gives effect to the 
rights in section 33.238 A litigant cannot avoid the provisions of PAJA by going behind it.239 
Ngcobo J agreed with Chaskalson CJ and held that there are not two systems of law 
regulating administrative action but only one system under our Constitution and one cannot 
rely directly under section 33(1) of the Constitution.240  
Hoexter states that PAJA must not be bypassed but must be applied where it is applicable. 
Thus, the correct approach to any administrative law enquiry is to ask the question whether 
there is a more specific norm (PAJA) that is applicable and not whether the matter could be 
reviewed under the more general norm of the rule of law.241 Arguably, litigants relying on 
legality will not necessarily conflict with the principle of subsidiarity (discussed above). In 
State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd, 242  Bosielo JA 
(minority) held a different view that the principle of subsidiarity is not inflexible and that 
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failure to bring an application under PAJA could never be a good reason to deny relief sought 
under the principle of legality when raised fairly and unequivocally.243  
Nugent JA in Greys Marine244 held that the Constitution is the repository of all state power. 
Power is distributed directly and indirectly amongst various institutions of state and other 
bodies and functionaries and its exercise is subject to constitutional constraint. Nonetheless, 
Nugent JA held that, the extent to which r the legality principle applies varies depending on 
the nature of the power being exercised.245  
Hoexter underscores the position that review proceedings are directly subject to PAJA and 
less directly to section 33; however, it is only in the latter instance where the principle of 
legality under the ‘abstract principle of the rule of law under our Constitution would be 
applied.’246  
For Ngcobo J in Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Others,247 
the question as to whether the decision of the president to grant amnesty was administrative 
action was an unnecessary determination, even though the issue had been raised in the papers. 
For Ngcobo J the decision was already subject to the constitutional principle of legality.248 
Brand and Murcott argue that Ngcobo J’s approach remained ‘conceptually incoherent with 
the constitutional principle of subsidiarity.’249 The approach taken by Ngcobo J is also at 
odds with New Clicks250 where the court recognised that there are not two systems of law and 
that PAJA is thus the first port of call.251 
The SCA followed a different approach to Albutt in National Director of Public Prosecutions 
(NDPP) v Freedom under Law252 where the court had been called to consider whether the 
decision to withdraw criminal charges amounted to administrative action under PAJA. For 
Brand JA, even though it had been conceded by the NDPP that the decision is reviewable 
under the principle of legality, found that the administrative action question under PAJA must 
be determined from the outset where PAJA has been invoked as a ground of review and 
legality should only be considered where PAJA is not applicable; more specifically, for 
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Brand JA ‘a court may only rely on such channels of review once it has found that the PAJA 
does not apply and it may not side-step this question.’253 Recently the SCA in Gijima254 
endorsed Hoexter's view that, if litigants could elect to rely upon legality even when PAJA is 
applicable, PAJA would invariably become redundant.255 
Brand and Murcott argue that the approach taken by Brand JA is a welcome one.256 Hoexter 
states that there will certainly be further development of the principle of legality within 
administrative law under non-administrative action cases. Hoexter’s argument becomes 
increasingly relevant to the non-administrative action cases where the principle of legality has 




It is abundantly clear that the pathway to judicial review in administrative cases starts from 
the PAJA enquiry that ensures that the decision is positively determined as administrative 
action. Potentially based on the definition of administrative action mentioned above, PAJA 
could apply to dismissals, appointments and promotions, as was determined in Kiva, Dunn 
and Wessels. It also cannot be said that those decisions relating to dismissals, appointments 
and promotions do not to have ‘direct, external legal effect’, as legal authorities have stated 
above that the decision merely has to affects rights and must be final to be reviewable under 
PAJA. Therefore, the argument is that PAJA potentially applies to public sector employees. 
Decisions must be positively determined to be administrative in nature under section 33 and 
PAJA. Having discussed what constitutes administrative action under section 33 and PAJA, 
this dissertation now examines how the above-mentioned principles of administrative law in 
Chapter 3 have been applied to labour cases, showing the development of administrative law 
jurisprudence within the labour sphere. Having explored the principle of legality and its 
significant development, the principle is discussed further within specific labour cases where 
it has been applied as another means of holding public sector employers accountable where 
there has been an exercise of public power. 
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CHAPTER 3: ANALYSING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPLIED IN 
LABOUR CASES 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Chapter 2 analysed what administrative action is under section 33 and PAJA. Having 
concluded that the elements of PAJA potentially applies to decisions made by employers 
exercising a public power, the objective of this chapter is to first set out five cases, in the 
order in which they were handed down, showing the development of administrative action 
within a public employment setting. These five cases are important in establishing the context 
within this area of law. An in-depth analysis of how the various judges reasoned in coming to 
their conclusions will also be provided. The second part of this chapter will examine the final 
CC judgment in Gcaba with the aim of determining in which direction the court proceeded. 
With regard to each case two issues will be discussed: firstly, whether the decision amounts 
to administrative action for the purposes of section 33 of the Constitution and PAJA; and, 
secondly, whether the HC has jurisdiction to review a decision arising out of an employment 
context.  
 
3.2 PUBLIC-SECTOR EMPLOYMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
CASES 
 
3.2.1 Fredericks and others v MEC for Education and Training, Eastern Cape 
and others257 
 
O’Regan J, writing for a unanimous majority,258 handed down judgment concerning the scope 
of the jurisdiction of the HC to determine certain complaints arising out of an employment 
relationship. The applicants were teachers employed by the Department of Education in the 
Eastern Cape. They had applied to be voluntarily retrenched by the department. However 
their applications were refused. The applicants sought to challenge the refusal in the Eastern 
Cape HC, arguing that the refusal constituted a breach of their right to equality in terms of 
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section 9 of the Constitution as well as a breach of their right to administrative justice in 
terms of section 33. A full bench of the HC held that it did not have jurisdiction because the 
LRA had ousted their jurisdiction.  
The Constitutional Court 
The two questions identified by the CC were, firstly, whether the applicants’ claim raised a 
constitutional matter as contemplated by section 167 and 169 of the Constitution. If the 
answer was in the affirmative, the second question to be answered was whether it was a 
matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the HC.  
O’Regan J held that applicants’ claim raised a constitutional matter as they alleged that the 
conduct of the respondents was in conflict with the Constitution and invalid as it infringed on 
the Bill of Rights.259 Moreover, the judge stated that ‘the question as to whether the LRA has 
by virtue of section 169 restricted the HC’s jurisdiction to determine a constitutional matter is 
therefore a constitutional question that falls within the jurisdiction of this constitutional 
court.’260 In essence, ‘given the express constitutional provision conferring jurisdiction to 
determine constitutional matters on the High court…the question restricting the HC’s 
jurisdiction in terms of section 169 in constitutional matters is therefore also a constitutional 
matter.’261 O’Regan J established that the issue before the court was a constitutional matter, 
and therefore the next question is whether the matter now fell within the ambit of the HC’s 
jurisdiction.  
a) Jurisdiction  
In answering the second question, O’Regan J held that in terms of section 24 of the LRA, the 
jurisdiction of the HC was not ousted as section 24 only confers on the LC the power to 
review Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (hereafter CCMA) decisions 
and not the power to determine a dispute; therefore the CCMA is not a court of similar status 
to the HC.262 In coming to this conclusion, O’Regan J focussed on section 169 of the 
Constitution, which provides that the HC ‘may decide any constitutional matter’ other than a 
matter that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the constitutional court or a matter ‘ 
assigned by an Act of Parliament to another court of a status similar to a HC.’263 O’Regan J 
                                                          
259 Fredericks (note 257 above) para 11. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Ibid. 
262 Ibid para 31; para 35. 
263 Ibid para 31. 
47 
 
held that, as indicated above, the CCMA is not a court of similar status to that of the HC, and 
that therefore section 24 of the LRA does not assign to another court of similar status to a HC 
a constitutional matter that the HC would otherwise have the power to decide.264 
O’Regan J held that the preamble to the LRA makes it plain and clear that the purpose of the 
Act is to give statutory effect to the right to fair labour practices entrenched in section 23(1) 
of the Constitution, however O’Regan J correctly points out that the case before it was not 
based on contract or their right to fair labour practices as the applicants expressly disavowed 
any reliance on section 23(1).265 The matter before the court was based on their constitutional 
right to administrative justice and equal treatment as pleaded. It is important to observe at this 
point that jurisdiction is determined based on pleadings. Although the applicants had 
disavowed any reliance on the right to fair labour practices and opted to proceed based on 
administrative justice and equality, O’Regan J found it necessary to consider whether the HC 
had the jurisdiction to determine a dispute arising out of an employment relationship.  
Legislature’s intention on Jurisdiction 
In terms of section 157(1) of the LRA, the legislature provided that the LC shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters that ‘are to be determined’ by it in terms of the LRA or 
other legislation.266 O’Regan J held that section 157(1) therefore ‘has the effect of depriving 
the HC of jurisdiction in matters that the LC is required to decide except where the LRA 
provides otherwise.’267 O’Regan J relied on the sentiment expressed by Nugent JA in Fedlife 
that 
‘…section 157(1) does not purport to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the Labour Court generally 
in relation to matters concerning the relationship between employer and employees.’
268
 
The legislature’s intention under section 157(1) was not to ‘afford general jurisdiction to the 
LC in employment matters, moreover the jurisdiction of the HC is not ousted by section 
157(1) simply because a dispute falls within269 the overall sphere of employment relations.’ 
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In terms of section 157(2), O’Regan J held that ‘where a challenge based on constitutional 
rights arises based on the states conduct in its capacity as employer, the labour court has 
jurisdiction concurrent with the High court.’270 Significantly it was held that ‘whatever else 
its import, section 157(2) cannot be interpreted as ousting the jurisdiction of the High Court 
since it expressly provides for concurrent jurisdiction.’271 As for section 158(1)(h), O’Regan J 
held that it does not expressly confer upon the LC constitutional jurisdiction to determine 
disputes already provided for under section 157(2).272  
b) Administrative Action 
The finding as to whether the HC had jurisdiction is informative, however the question as to 
whether dismissals of public sector employees constitute reviewable administrative action 
remained open and unanswered. One possible reason for this is the effect of disavowing any 
reliance to section 23(1) of the Constitution and its associated legislation so that answering 
this question is superfluous given that the finding of this matter is to be adjudicated as 
pleaded.   
After Fredericks, the SAPU judgment handed down by the LC dealt with whether a decision 
made by the Minister in changing the shift system amounted to administrative action. The 
SAPU judgment becomes relevant because the court applied section 33 and the PAJA enquiry 
in determining the nature of the decision. In doing so, the court also provideds clarity as to 
the meaning of ‘external legal effect’. 
 
 
3.2.2 South African Police Union (SAPU) and another v National 
Commissioner of the South African Police Service (SAPS) and another273 
 
(a) Administrative action 
Murphy AJ came to a decision established by a power-based approach, namely, that, although 
the commissioner exercised a public power sourced in statute, the nature of the decision 
within the circumstances amounted to nothing more than an internal organisational decision 
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within the administration itself. Therefore, the commissioner’s decision to adopt a revised 
shift system did not amount to administrative action for the purposes of PAJA. 
In arriving at this conclusion, the primary question before Murphy AJ was whether the 
decision of the National Commissioner to introduce an adapted 8-hour shift system 
constituted administrative action. The applicants submitted that the ‘Commissioner’s decision 
amounted to “exercising a public power or performing a public function” in terms of 
regulations enacted under section 24(1) of the South African Police Service Act274 and hence 
fell within the ambit of section 1(a)(ii) of the definition of administrative action.275 The 
respondents were of the view that the Commissioner’s decision did not amount to an 
exercising of public power or performance of a public function because Regulation 31 has a 
dual purpose. While 31(a) empowers the Commissioner to determine the work week and 
daily hours of employees, 31(b) empowers the Commissioner to determine the opening and 
closing times of the places of work under his control.276 It was further submitted that 
determining opening and closing times of police stations would amount to an exercise of 
public power or the performance of a public power, but determining hours of work or shift 
times would not. The reasoning provided by the respondents related to the managerial 
prerogative in the conduct of labour relations to do so and the source of the power vested 
within the collective agreement.277  
Murphy AJ held that it is common cause that SAPS are an organ of state for the purposes of 
section 237 of the Constitution. Furthermore, Murphy AJ agreed with the respondents that 
‘there is nothing inherently public about setting the working hours of police officers nor is 
there any public law concern.’278 Moreover, ‘switching the shift system is not public in nature 
but rather resides within the commercial or private domain of labour relations’.279  
Interestingly, Murphy AJ disagreed with the respondents’ argument that the source of the 
Commissioner’s power vested within the collective agreement and held that the 
Commissioner’s power are vested within statute, and therefore the powers are derived from a 
public source.280 Murphy AJ acknowledged the direction taken by the CC and held that ‘the 
source of the power, while relevant, is not necessarily decisive. Equally, if not more, 
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important are the nature of the power, its subject matter and whether it involves the exercise 
of public duty.’281   
Turning to the administrative action issue, the court held that, before a decision can fall 
within the definition of administrative action, it has to be one ‘which adversely affects rights 
of any person and which has direct, external legal effect.’282 The court does not elaborate as 
to what ‘adversely affects rights’. It does, however, propose that an argument could be made 
that at the very least the employees had an expectation to procedural fairness and had no right 
to work a 12-hour shift system; they were therefore not adversely affected.283 This argument 
is too narrow for the purposes of providing extensive interpretation to the meaning of ‘rights’. 
In determining whether the decision has ‘direct, external legal effect’, Murphy AJ held that ‘a 
decision has direct effect when it has a legally binding determination of someone’s rights 
possessed with the quality of finality.’284 Relying on the court a quo in Greys Marine,285 
Murphy AJ held that ‘external effect’ meant that it must affect outsiders and should not be a 
purely internal matter of departmental administration or organisation. The court also held that 
the person affected must be someone other than a person in government.286  
In coming to this conclusion, Murphy AJ followed the court a quo’s decision in Greys 
Marine and held that ‘persons outside the organ of state do not include the SAPS, therefore 
they are insiders and the Commissioner’s decision is an internal matter of departmental 
organisation.’287 The court’s conclusion arguably is not the correct interpretation of ‘external 
effect’ to the extent that it excludes all persons within the state department.   
The reliance on the court a quo’s decision in Greys Marine was subsequently changed by the 
SCA (see note 70 above) where Nugent J held that ‘external effect’ should not literally be 
interpreted to exclude action which affects members of or within the public body itself. 
Conversely, the LC in the Nxele followed the SCA’s decision and subsequently expressed its 
disapproval of SAPU. Although the findings of the SCA on the interpretation of ‘external’ 
does not wholly exclude members within the organisation, the conclusion reached by Murphy 
AJ is arguably correct based on the facts of the case.  
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The reasoning adopted by Murphy AJ seems to be in line with the arguments made by Pfaff 
and Schneider that decisions relating to the daily operational relationship does not affect 
individual rights, and therefore do not amount to administrative action. Where a decision has 
an internal effect, the employees are in the same position as in the private sphere; however, in 
ensuring that Murphy AJ’s concerns are met, decisions must be external in effect and 
therefore not every act will unduly burden the functioning of the state,288 only the ones that 
have a direct, external legal effect.  
 (b) Jurisdiction 
Murphy AJ, analysing section 157(2)(a) and (b) as well as section 158(1)(h) of the LRA, was 
of the view that ‘the progressive decisions of our courts, extending labour rights to public 
sector employees by categorising employers conduct as administrative action, have lost their 
force following the codification of our administrative law and labour law, and the extension 
to full labour rights to public sector employees by the LRA.’289  
Murphy AJ also considered two previously decided cases of equal status handed down 
subsequent to the adoption of the Constitution and the codification of administrative law and 
labour law. In the first case, Mbayeka and Another v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape, 290 it 
was held that the HC had jurisdiction in respect of any alleged violation of the constitutional 
right to fair labour practices, and that the decision made by the MEC to suspend the 
applicants by virtue of section 22(7) of the PSA amounted to an exercise of public power, 
therefore constituting administrative action. In the second case, Simela and Others v MEC for 
Education Eastern Cape and another,291 it was held that the decision without prior 
consultation to transfer an employee amounted to both unjust administrative action and an 
unfair labour practice.  
Considering the judgments in Mbayeka and Simela, Murphy AJ found the court not to be 
bound because to be bound by the doctrine of precedent those cases must have been correctly 
decided. However, the judge concluded these cases did not consider the definition of 
administrative action in PAJA under the new constitutional dispensation but preferred to 
interpret section 157(2) in a manner categorising the conduct of all public-sector employers 
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conduct as administrative action. Both cases were premised upon the doctrinal underpinnings 
of the Zenzile line of cases now no longer relevant or authoritative.  
In reaching this view, Murphy AJ relied on the sentiment expressed by Pillay J in Public 
Servants Association obo Haschke v MEC for Agriculture and Others292 as well as the CC 
view in Bato Star that the grundnorm of administrative law is now to be found in the 
principles of our constitution, and that the relevance of the previous doctrine must therefore 
be reconsidered, applying the new constitutional and statutory framework on a case by case 
basis.293  
SAPU provided an important application of the administrative action enquiry within an 
employment setting which positively determined that PAJA did not apply because the nature 
of the power, although sourced in statute, related to the internal operations of the department 
and lacked ‘external effect’. On the issue of jurisdiction, the court was silent on Fredericks 
recognising the primacy of section 23 of the Constitution and the LRA over administrative 
law.  
POPCRU, discussed below, is another important judgment where it was possible for public 
sector employees to approach a court under section 33 of the Constitution and PAJA.  
 
3.2.3 Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU) and others v Minister 
of Correctional Services and Others294 
 
(a) Administrative Action 
In considering whether the provisions of PAJA applied to dismissals of government 
employees, Plasket J found that the provisions under PAJA applied. Therefore the court 
proceeded to review and set aside the decision made by the Department of Correctional 
Services in dismissing its employees. The court held that the decision amounted to 
administrative action as it is defined in PAJA.  
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In conclusion, Plasket J acknowledged that it was not argued by the respondents that the 
decision was not administrative in nature, that they did not adversely affect rights or that the 
decision did not have direct, external legal effect. The respondents did however argue that the 
decision was not an administrative action as defined because it did not constitute the exercise 
of public power due to a lack of public effect.295  
Plasket J disagreed with the respondents by acknowledging that the ‘concept of ”public 
power” is an elusive concept; therefore not all exercises of public power impact on the public 
at large.’296 Many administrative actions do not impact on the public, for example, an arrest 
of an individual would only have a significant impact on the arrestee and perhaps the 
complainant.297 Thus decisions can alternatively impact the public at large or personal 
individuals.  
In determining what makes the power involved a ‘public power’, Plasket J held ‘that it has 
been vested in a public functionary who is required to exercise it in the public interest.’298 
Plasket J held that 
 
‘…the statutory basis of the power to employ and dismiss correctional officers, the 
subservience of the respondents to the Constitution generally and s 195 in particular, 
the public character of the Department and the pre-eminence of the public interest in 
the proper administration of prisons and the attainment of the purposes specified in s 
2 of the Correctional Services Act all strengthen my view that the powers that are 
sought to be reviewed in this matter are public powers as envisaged by the common 
law, the Constitution and the PAJA.’299 
 
Although the court focusses on specific factors, Plasket J concluded that ‘the court is in any 
event bound by the more general proposition for which the Appellate Division (AD) in 
Zenzile300 is authority, namely that the decision of a public authority to dismiss an employee 
is an exercise of public power.’301 The court held that Zenzile is ‘not an artificial extension of 
administrative law and an aberration–albeit a welcome one–created by the circumstances of 
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the time which should now be consigned to the scrap-heap of history.’302 Therefore, the court 
correctly held that Zenzile was a case upholding the general recognised principle that 
 
‘…one of the important roles that courts play in our society and in our legal 
tradition, is to ensure that when statutory powers (and other powers sourced in 
common law or in customary law) are given in trust to public functionaries for the 
purpose of furthering the public interest, those public functionaries do not abuse the 
trust reposed in them, remain within the bounds of their empowerment and exercise 




Plasket J held that, based on Zenzile, the power to dismiss was a public power and that the 
question as to whether the decision to dismiss amounted to administrative action was in the 
affirmative as the elements under PAJA were present.  
Plasket J takes into consideration that, if the decision does not constitute administrative action 
under PAJA, the decision would remain an exercise of public power and thus be reviewable 
for compliance under the principle of legality which is the founding constitutional value of 
the rule of law entrenched in section 1(c) of the Constitution.  
(b) Jurisdiction 
Although it was not argued by the respondents that the HC lacked jurisdiction, it was argued 
that the jurisdiction of the HC is limited in labour matters to the unfair labour practice 
jurisdiction of the LC. The respondents argued that section 157 of the LRA ousted the 
jurisdiction of the HC in labour related matters. Plasket J concluded that the HC had 
jurisdiction to hear the matter.304  
In conclusion, Plasket J relied on section 19(1) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 (now 
the Superior Court Act) and section 173 of the Constitution providing for inherent 
jurisdiction.305 Plasket J held that the relevance of section 19(1) and section 173 mean that 
‘whereas inferior courts may do nothing that the law does not permit, superior courts may do 
anything that the law does not forbid.’306 Plasket J, in addition, relied on section 169 of the 
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Constitution, which provides that a ‘High Court may decide any constitutional matter except 
matters that are reserved for the exclusive jurisdiction of the constitutional court.’307  
Plasket J turned to section 157(1) and (2) specifically and concluded that those sections: 
‘…do not purport to oust the jurisdiction of the High courts to determine the 
constitutionality of the conduct of organs of state in the field of employment. They 
do not, in other words, limit the jurisdiction of the High Courts that section 169 of 
the Constitution vest in them. Instead, they vest jurisdiction concurrent with that of 
the High Courts in Labour Courts in respect of employment- related alleged or 
threatened violations of fundamental rights, including disputes about the 
constitutionality of executive or administrative conduct of the State as employer.’ 
308 
 
The interpretation adopted by Plasket J was based on settled law in the judgment of Nugent 
AJA in Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaard309 where the SCA held that 
 
‘…s 157(1) does not purport to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the Labour 
Court generally in relation to matters concerning the relationship between 
employer and employee…its exclusive jurisdiction arises only in respect of 
“matters that elsewhere in terms of this act or in terms of any law are to be 
determined by the Labour Court.”’310  
 
Plasket J further relied on the CC’s judgement in Fredericks. Writing for the majority in 
Fredericks, O’Regan J held that the matter, as to whether the HC’s jurisdiction is ousted, 
turned on the interpretation of section 169 of the Constitution and section 157 of the LRA, 
concluding that the HCs jurisdiction had not been ousted.311 Section 157(2) provides that 
where there are ‘challenges based on constitutional rights which arise out of the state’s 
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conduct in its capacity as employer is a matter that may be determined by the Labour Court 
concurrently with the High Court.’312  
Plasket J found the court to be bound by Fredericks and Fedlife and held that the issues 
before the court included allegations that fundamental rights had been violated, and that 
therefore ‘this court and the Labour Court have concurrent jurisdiction in terms of section 
157(2) of the LRA.’313  
Fredericks, SAPU and POPCRU were important judgments in the development of 
administrative law applied to labour cases. Before the POPCRU judgment was handed down, 
the Chirwa matter had started in the HC. In the same month after the POPCRU judgment was 
handed down, the further development of administrative and labour law in the SCA judgment 
in Chirwa followed.   
 
3.2.4 Transnet Ltd and others v Chirwa314 at the Supreme Court of Appeal   
 
The applicant (Chirwa) was employed as Human Resources Executive Manager within the 
business unit of Transnet. Chirwa refused to participate in a disciplinary enquiry because she 
objected to her supervisor being the complainant, witness and presiding officer at the same 
time. The enquiry subsequently continued and Chirwa was dismissed. Following her 
dismissal, Chirwa referred her dispute to the CCMA315 alleging an unfair dismissal. The 
CCMA were unable to resolve her dispute which led to Chirwa approaching the HC on the 
grounds that the disciplinary proceedings amounted to administrative action which was 
procedurally unfair and violated her right to a fair administrative action. 
It is important to focus on how the courts dealt with the issues relating to public-sector 
employment and administrative law, starting with the court a quo, the SCA and lastly the CC.   
In the HC,316 Brassey AJ delivered judgment, holding that the decision of Transnet in 
dismissing Chirwa amounted to administrative action and that it was therefore reviewable by 
administrative law principles. The court did not reach this conclusion based on the alleged 
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provisions of PAJA as pleaded by Chirwa. Brassey AJ concluded that the rules of natural 
justice had been breached and relied on the decision in Zenzile, holding that a dismissal of a 
public-sector employee was not simply the termination of a contractual relationship but the 
exercise of a public power which required the employer to apply the rules of natural justice. 
Although Zenzile was an important decision at the time, the approach taken by Brassey AJ in 
not applying PAJA was not the correct approach, based on the reasoning in Bato Star Fishing 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental affairs317 that an administrative act now arises from 
PAJA and not the common law.318 
Transnet appealed to the SCA,319 raising two issues. Firstly, whether Chirwa’s dismissal was 
a matter which fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the LC in terms of section 157(1) of 
the LRA and, secondly, whether the dismissal constituted administrative action as defined in 
PAJA. The SCA produced a split decision where three judgments were delivered; the first by 
Mthiyane JA with Jafta JA concurring, the second by Conradie AJ and the third by Cameron 
AJ with Mpati DP concurring.  
 
Mthiyane JA with Jafta JA concurring 
a) Jurisdiction 
Mthiyane JA and Jafta JA held that the HC had jurisdiction in the matter320 because the 
appellant alleged that the termination of her services constituted a violation of her right to 
administrative action as it is enshrined in section 33 of the Constitution. Thus, Chirwa raised 
a constitutional issue which the HC had the power to hear based on section 169 of the 
Constitution.321  Mthiyane JA’s reasoning is in line with Fredericks, Fedlife and in United 
National Public Service Association of South Africa v Digomo NO and others322 where it was 
held that ‘if an employment dispute raised an alleged violation of a constitutional right a 
litigant is not confined to the remedy provided under the LRA and the jurisdiction of the High 
Court is not ousted.’323  
b) Administrative Action 
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Turning to the second question, Mthiyane AJ held that, for the appellant to succeed, not only 
must the challenge be framed or pleaded in terms of section 33 of the Constitution and PAJA 
but the appellant must establish that the dismissal constituted administrative action as defined 
in section 1 of PAJA. Mthinyane AJ held that Brassey AJ, in relying solely on Zenzile, had 
erred in not submitting the decision to dismiss to scrutiny under PAJA. In arriving at this 
conclusion, the authority in Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd324 was relied on, the 
judge holding that the cause of action for judicial review of administrative action ordinarily 
arose from PAJA and not from the common law as in the past.  
It was held that the termination of Chirwa’s employment was not administrative action as 
defined in PAJA. In coming to this conclusion, the judge held that Transnet was not 
exercising a public power, or performing a public function in terms of any legislation.325 It 
was further held that, although Transnet was an organ of state and derives its powers to enter 
contracts from statute, it did not necessarily mean that its right to terminate also derived from 
public power.326  
The court held that Transnet was exercising a public power and performing a public function. 
Nevertheless, it relied on the fact that, because there was no implementing legislation at the 
time, the source of the power was not of a public nature but rather based on the employment 
contract. This is in line with Conradie AJ’s reasoning that, because of a lack of implementing 
legislation, the nature of the decision along with the source of the power leaned on the side of 
the LRA. 
Mthinyane AJ held that the nature of the power or function is paramount, the identity of the 
functionary exercising the power or function is secondary. In determining the nature of the 
conduct, it was held that: 
‘The nature of the conduct involved here is the termination of a contract of 
employment. It is based on contract and does not involve the exercise of any public 
power or performance of a public function in terms of some legislation. 
Ordinarily the employment contract has no public law element to it and it is not 
governed by administrative law. The mere fact that Transnet is an organ of state 
does not impart a public law character to its employment contract… The power to 
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dismiss is found, not in legislation, but in the employment contract between 
Transnet and the applicant.’327  
 
It was further held that when Chirwa was dismissed, Transnet was acting in its capacity as 
employer and not in its capacity of a public authority.328 Therefore, Chirwa had not shown 
that the dismissal by Transnet was administrative action as defined in PAJA or that any of her 
rights under section 33 of the Constitution were violated. This line of reasoning ensures that 
when an application is brought before a court under PAJA, its determination must be 
ascertained in a manner that ensures constitutional validity.  
Mthinyane AJ’s reasoning as to why the claim was not administrative action is clear as the 
conduct did not meet the standard invoking the provisions of PAJA to apply. However the 
court does arguably hold that at the time of Chirwa’s dismissal, public sector employees 
enjoyed protection under the LRA, giving effect to their section 23(1) constitutional right to 
fair labour. The court does not hold that the PAJA claim failed because Chirwa also had a 
claim under the LRA. The court simply proceeded correctly as the case was pleaded and held 
that Chirwa failed to sustain a cause of action under PAJA, however it was further held that 
Chirwa also had the option under the LRA.329  
 
Conradie JA 
a) Administrative Action 
Conradie JA delivered a separate judgment agreeing with Mthiyane JA in so far as that the 
appeal should be granted, yet did not decide on the question whether the decision amounted 
to administrative action. Rather Conradie JA proceeded to approach the question as to 
whether PAJA applied or not holistically.330 For Conradie JA, the real question was not 
whether the decision to dismiss the respondent amounted to administrative action, even 
though the judge was prepared to accept that it did as ‘any proper dismissal enquiry in the 
public domain necessarily has the procedural attributes of administrative action.’331 The real 
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question for Conradie JA was whether, since the advent of the LRA, the structure of 
legislation entails that dismissals in the public domain be dealt with as administrative acts.  
In answering this question, Conradie JA agreed with Murphy AJ in SAPU and held that to 
allow every dismissal of an employee to be litigated either in the HC or the LC at the option 
of the employee would not fit into the desired scheme of labour regulations.332 The 
legislature’s intention was clear that ‘behind the LRA structures is to subject disputes 
regarding unfair dismissals, to its schemes.’333 Conradie JA was of the view that, since the 
LRA extended the benefits of the LRA to public sector employment, it would seem perverse 
that PAJA in respect of matters specially assigned to the LC, without expressly saying so, 
effectively repealed the exclusive jurisdiction provision of section 157(1) of the LRA.334 It is 
obvious that the LC as per section 157(1) of the LRA has exclusive jurisdiction to hear 
certain matters before it. However, to reason that, because the LC has exclusive jurisdiction 
to hear matters notwithstanding section 157(2), the HC has no jurisdiction is not in line with 
the interpretation provided by the CC in Fredericks.  
Moreover, Conradie JA’s judgment seems to touch on policy considerations. It seems to 
suggest that, because the LRA now effectively protects public sector employees, one should 
be mindful of the purpose of the LRA even though the legislatures’ intention has been 
expressly provided under section 157(2) of the LRA to create concurrent jurisdiction between 
the LC and the HC.   
Conradie JA does state that, if the conclusions reached are wrong and Chirwa did have a 
cause of action under PAJA, Chirwa should not be entitled to pursue the claim in the HC. In 
reaching this approach, Conradie JA looked at section 158(1)(h) of the LRA and held that, in 
terms of that section, the LC has exclusive jurisdiction to review the decision to dismiss the 
respondent. Although her cause of action is under PAJA, the HC is not the forum for it and 
the LC can hear the matter as section 158(1) (h) confers jurisdiction on the LC to review an 
administrative act performed by the state as an employer.335 Conradie JA’s approach seems to 
suggest that, if one were to look at the purpose and object of the LRA holistically, the power 
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of the LC to review conduct on grounds ‘permissible in law’ means that the LC has exclusive 
jurisdiction to review decisions under PAJA and not the HC.336  
Conradie JA’s reasoning stands alone and does not follow the approach in Fredericks where 
O’Regan J held that section 158(1)(h) cannot be sufficiently interpreted in conferring 
jurisdiction to determine constitutional matters upon the LC when read with section 157(1) to 
exclude the jurisdiction of the HC. In conclusion, O’Regan J held: 
 
‘Whatever the precise ambit of section 158(1)(h), it does not expressly confer upon 
the Labour Court constitutional jurisdiction to determine disputes arising out of 
alleged infringements of the Constitution by the state acting in its capacity as 
employer. Given the express conferral of jurisdiction in such matters by section 
157(2), it would be a strange reading of the Act to interpret section 158(1)(h) read 
with section 157(1) as conferring on the Labour Court an exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine a matter that has already been expressly conferred as a concurrent 
jurisdiction by section 157(2).’337 
 
Cameron JA with Mpati DP concurring 
Cameron JA wrote a dissenting judgment with Mpati DP concurring. The reasoning behind 
the dissent for Cameron JA were the views expressed by Plasket J in POPCRU, which were 
endorsed as correct, and therefore it was held that ‘the Constitution permits an employee of a 
public body to be able to seek relief in the ordinary courts for dismissal-related process 
injustices that constitute administrative action.’338  
For Cameron JA, the difference between his colleagues is that Mthiyane JA denies the 
employee a remedy without relying on the provision of the LRA because he found that the 
dismissal process was not administrative action, whereas Conradie JA finds that the 
legislative intention behind the enactment of the LRA was to get rid of the employee’s 
administrative action-related cause of action in the ordinary courts. The approach taken by 
Mthiyane JA is in line with Fredericks and, although the LRA route was open to Chirwa, this 
was not the route chosen. The court’s competence to hear the matter had been invoked by 
pleading under section 33 of the Constitution and PAJA.  
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Duality of rights 
Cameron JA argued for the proposition that Chirwa had dual rights and therefore, when 
Transnet dismissed Chirwa, that decision violated two constitutional rights: her right to fair 
labour practices under section 23(1) and her right to just administrative action under section 
33.339 The question for Cameron JA was whether the fact that an employee has remedies 
under the LRA precluded her from asking the ordinary courts to vindicate her PAJA rights. 
The answer to this was in the negative because, as stated in Fedlife, the LRA does not confer 
exclusive jurisdiction on the LC in matters arising from employee/employer relationships, 
according to Fredericks, and since the LRA affords no general jurisdiction in employment 
matters, ordinary courts cannot be ousted simply because a dispute falls within the sphere of 
employment relations.340  
Cameron JA rightly held that there is no doctrine of constitutional law which confines a 
beneficiary of more than one right to only one remedy, even where a statute provides a 
remedy of great amplitude. If the legislature sought to deprive dismissed public sector 
employees of their administrative justice rights in the ordinary courts because they now enjoy 
rights under the LRA, the legislature would have said so when PAJA was enacted some five 
year after the LRA was enacted, moreover Cameron JA reasons that because PAJA’s list of 
exclusions make no mention of any deprivation, a cause of action under PAJA survives.341   
No doctrine of constitutional law confines a beneficiary of more than one right to only one 
remedy, even where a statute provides a remedy of great amplitude. If the legislature sought 
to deprive dismissed public employees of their administrative justice cause of action in the 
ordinary courts, because they enjoy rights under the LRA, it could have said so when it 
enacted PAJA. 
Arguably, the fact that an employee approaches an ordinary court under PAJA and fails 
because the claim is lawfully unsound in that it is unable to sustain a cause of action does not 
detract from the reasoning provided by Cameron JA. The fact that an employee failed to 
sustain a cause of action under PAJA does not imply that the right to approach an ordinary 
court was not open to an employee under PAJA in the first place.  
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Cameron JA held that Chirwa was ‘free to frame her cause of action under PAJA as there is 
no suggestion under the Constitution that where one or more rights may be at issue, its 
beneficiaries should be confined to a single legislatively created scheme of rights.’342 
Therefore Cameron JA upheld the jurisdiction of the HC in matters like that of Chirwa.  
a) Administrative Action 
On the question as to whether public sector dismissals constitute administrative action, 
Cameron JA held that they could be classified as such. Relying on the doctrine propounded in 
Zenzile, it was held that ‘employment with a public body attracts the protections of natural 
justice because the employer is a public authority who’s employment-related decision 
involves an exercise of public power, therefore its exercise constitutes administrative 
action.’343 In the case of Chirwa, Cameron JA held that, even if her employment relationship 
with Transnet was not regulated by a statutory provision, it was a fact that Transnet is a 
public entity, created by statute, and that therefore ‘its every act derives from its public, 
statutory character, including the dismissal at issue here.’344  
The effect of the SCA Judgment 
The abovementioned judgment of the SCA produced a split decision. Therefore the judgment 
makes no definitive finding as to whether the conduct by the state and its organs as employer 
should be reviewable under PAJA. Mthiyane JA argued that Transnet’s termination of 
Chirwa’s contract of employment did not amount to an exercise of public power, which in 
turn did not amount to administrative action under PAJA. Cameron JA held that Chirwa was 
at liberty to frame her cause of action under PAJA and should be entitled to relief in terms of 
its provisions. Cameron JA further held that, even if Chirwa’s contract of employment was 
not regulated under statute, the fact that Transnet is an organ of state created by statute, it is a 
public entity, and thus every act including dismissals would have a public statutory character; 
therefore the decision to terminate the employment contract amounted to an exercise of 
public power. 
Conradie JA stood alone in his judgment holding that, when looking at the purpose of the 
LRA holistically, where there is a complaint arising from a procedurally unfair dismissal for 
poor work performance, it is a quintessential LRA matter and that therefore relief under 
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PAJA is not intended to be available. Nevertheless, Conradie JA does go as far as stating that, 
if he is wrong that PAJA does not apply, relief cannot be sought in the ordinary courts and 
thus PAJA would apply in the LC. 
Examining the reasoning of the judges, it appears that Conradie JA held that the HC did not 
have jurisdiction and therefore the question as to whether the dismissal constituted 
administrative action was immaterial. However Mthinyane and Jafta JJA found that the HC 
had jurisdiction, but further found that the decision did not constitute an administrative act. 
The minority judgment of Cameron JA and Mpati DJP disagreed with Judges Mthinyane and 
Jafta JJA and held that the decision to dismiss did amount to an administrative act. Cameron 
JA also disagreed with the jurisdictional point raised by Conradie JA. The court’s conflicting 
views have consequently left the question as to whether Chirwa’s dismissal constituted 
administrative action unanswered as it was left open in Fredericks. It was this burning 
question which arrived before the CC. 
 
3.2.5 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd and others345 at the Constitutional Court 
 
The CC delivered two majority judgments by (a) Skweyiya J346 and (b) Ngcobo J347 along 
with a minority judgment by (c) Langa CJ.348 In Chapter 1, the Chirwa judgment has been 
dealt with in the literature review to establish the general direction which courts have taken in 
matters concerning public sector employment. One of the research objectives set out in 
Chapter 1 was to establish why the courts have chosen to take a policy direction as opposed 
to respecting express legislative provisions. In considering this question, we now turn to how 
the Chirwa judgment was reasoned and why the judgment has not settled the debate and 
provided definitive findings in this area of law. The CC in Chirwa had the opportunity to 
pronounce on the issues facing the courts under this area of law. However, on closer 
inspection, it seems that to provide certainty the CC opted to blanket all public-sector 
employee under the LRA, thus closing the PAJA route completely.  
(a) Skweyiya J 
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Skweyiya J, based on a policy-driven approach, as seen in SAPU as well as the judgment of 
Conradie JA, held that the HC does not have concurrent jurisdiction with the LC, and, 
moreover, that the question as to whether the dismissal amounted to administrative action 
was unnecessary due to the negative finding on jurisdiction.349 Skweyiya J goes so far as to 
hold tha,t had he been called to make a finding on the administrative action question, he 
would have come to the same conclusion as Ngcobo J (which will be dealt with in his 
judgment below).  
For Skweyiya J, the LRA should always be seen as a more appropriate route because 
 
‘…the existence of a purpose-built employment framework in the form of the LRA 
and associated legislation infers that labour processes and forums should take 
precedence over non-purpose-built processes and forums in situations involving 
employment-related matters.’350  
 
However, Skweyiya J recognises that state employees not only have the benefit of protection 
under the LRA, but also have the right to approach ordinary courts for relief under PAJA, and 
that, moreover, ‘courts should be hesitant in depriving litigants of existing rights where one 
or more rights are provided by the Constitution or any other enabling legislation.’351 It was 
further held that:  
‘Where an alternative cause of action can be sustained in matters arising out of an 
employment relationship, in which the employee alleges unfair dismissal or an 
unfair labour practice by the employer, it is in the first instance through the 
mechanisms established by the LRA that the employee should pursue her or his 
claims.’352  
 
Where a litigant alleges an unfair labour practice or an unfair dismissal, the LRA should be 
the first port of call. It is this line of reasoning which led Skweyiya J to the Fredericks 
judgment below.  
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Whether the High Court has Concurrent Jurisdiction with the Labour Court in this matter 
In answering this question, Skweyiya J considered the Fredericks judgment and held that it 
was distinguishable from Chirwa’s circumstances. The court notes that in Fredericks the 
applicants expressly disavowed any reliance on section 23(1) of the Constitution and that, 
furthermore, the applicants had not relied on any of the fair labour practice provisions of the 
LRA. Thus Skweyiya J held that, unlike in Fredericks, Chirwa expressly relied upon the 
LRA provisions dealing with unfair dismissals. Skweyiya J, relying on those provisions, 
asserted that Chirwa’s claim was based on a violation of the provision of the LRA including 
items 8 and 9 of schedule 8 of the LRA.353 It was further held that, although her claim was 
based on the LRA, ‘Chirwa elected to vindicate her rights not under the provisions of the 
LRA, but instead under the provisions of PAJA.’354 In distinguishing Fredericks, Skweyiya J 
does not expressly state but rather implies that, had Chirwa pleaded unequivocally under 
PAJA in the HC, the court would have had jurisdiction. 
Skweyiya J held that the ‘effect of section 157(1) is therefore to divest the High court of 
jurisdiction in matters that the Labour court is required to decide except where the LRA 
provides otherwise.’355 In other words, ‘where the Labour court has exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine a dispute over matters conferred upon the Labour court by the LRA or other 
legislation, the jurisdiction of the High Court is therefore ousted.’356 Since Chirwa’s claim 
fell under section 191 of the LRA concerning a ‘dismissal for poor work performance which 
is covered by the LRA and for which specific dispute resolution procedures have been 
created, [it] is therefore a matter that must, under the LRA be determined exclusively by the 
Labour court.’357 The reasoning as to why the HC did not have jurisdiction makes sense. 
However, Skweyiya J then turns to strong policy considerations. 
It is important to note that Chirwa was held not to have been able to approach the HC. 
Therefore the court did not have jurisdiction because Chirwa alleges an unfair dismissal in 
her application to the HC. Furthermore, another reasoning as to why Chirwa was 
unsuccessful was to reaffirm that forum shopping is not desirable as Chirwa ‘chose to 
abandon the process she had started in the CCMA, and approached the HC where she 
contended that her right to administrative justice, protected by section 33 of the Constitution 
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had been breached.’ For Skweyiya J, Chirwa is not afforded with an election and is therefore 
not at liberty to relegate the finely-tuned dispute resolution structures.’358 Based on the 
reasoning of Skweyiya J, had Chirwa followed the same route as in Fredericks, a different 
conclusion may well have been reached.  
 
(b) Ngcobo J 
Ngcobo J concurred with the order proposed by Skweyiya J, but is at odds with two issues 
that Skweyiya J does not address: the first is the scope of the operation of the provisions of 
section 157(1) and (2) and the second, which flows from the first, is the characterisation of a 
dismissal as an administrative action.359  
In dealing with the first issue, Ngcobo J starts by following the approach taken by Skweyiya J 
that one must follow the route chosen to the very end,360 therefore holding that ‘where two 
courts have concurrent jurisdiction, it means that the party initiating the proceedings must 
make an election before doing so, moreover that the party is bound to complete this process 
under the system that he or she has elected.’361 Ngcobo J was prepared to consider this 
narrow approach, but opted not to because the issues raised before the court dealt with several 
important constitutional problems in reconciling the provisions of section 157(1) and (2).362 
Instead of dealing with the approach taken by O’Regan J in Fredericks that jurisdiction is 
determined on how one pleads, Ngcobo J argued for the use of a purposive interpretation of 
section 157(1) and (2) in light of the primary object of the LRA and its purpose would settle 
the matter.363  
Ngcobo J holds that the LRA trumps every other right where the LRA is capable of more 
than one plausible interpretation.364 Arguably Ngcobo J seems to ignore settled precedent set 
by the same court in Fredericks365 by opting for an interpretation of the LRA that goes 
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against express wording set by the legislature. Ngcobo J holds that when looking at the 
‘interpretative injunction in section 3 of the LRA, it requires anyone applying the LRA to 
give effect to its primary object and the Constitution.’366 Therefore, this approach informs the 
position taken by Skweyiya J and O’Regan J that, where one relies on the provisions of the 
LRA by alleging that one’s cause of action is to be determined under that forum, the LRA 
would trump any other plausible interpretation and this would be the forum which the litigant 
has chosen to invoke the cour’ts competence.  
This approach is why Chirwa was unable to invoke the HC’s competence to hear the matter 
as the nature of the claim was labour related for two reasons as mentioned above: first, that 
Chirwa initially chose the LRA route but then subsequently abandoned it, and, second, 
Chirwa alleged that she was subjected to an unfair dismissal according to Ncgobo J and 
Skweyiya J. This is the nature of her dispute and not the unlawfulness of a decision under a 
litigant’s right to administrative action under section 33 of the Constitution. What seems to be 
certain in the majority’s ruling is that Chirwa should not have approached the HC when she 
had already commenced proceedings in the CCMA for a claim based on an alleged unfair 
dismissal. However uncertainty looms in the air regarding the jurisdictional interpretation 
amongst the judges.367  
Notwithstanding the conclusions reached, Ngcobo J decided to use a purposive interpretation, 
stating that ‘given the manifest purpose of section 157(2) the use of the word “concurrent” is 
unfortunate which may well give rise to forum-shopping.’368 Ngcobo J states that, ‘while 
section 157(2) remains in the statute book, it must be construed in light of the primary 
objectives of the LRA.’369 In light of the ‘one stop shop’ principle, for Ncgobo J ‘section 
157(2) must be narrowly interpreted to those instances where a party relies directly on the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights.’370 
This approach had the effect of going against the judgment in Fredericks by applying a 
method of interpretation against the express wording of section 157(2). In arriving at this 
conclusion, Ngcobo J reasoned that: 
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‘It could not have been the intention of the legislature to allow an employee to raise 
what is essentially a labour dispute under the LRA as a constitutional issue under the 
provisions of section 157(2). To hold otherwise would frustrate the primary objects 
of the LRA and permit an astute litigant to bypass the resolution provisions of the 
LRA. This would inevitably give rise to forum shopping simply because it is 
convenient to do so or as the applicant alleges, convenient in this case ‘for practical 
considerations. What is in essence a labour dispute as envisaged in the LRA should 
not be labelled a violation of a constitutional right in the Bill of Rights simply 
because the issues raised could also support a conclusion that the conduct of the 
employer amounts to a violation of a right entrenched in the Constitution.’371 
 
For Ngcobo J, the matter must be determined exclusively by the LC because the applicant 
alleged that the conduct of Transnet violated the provisions of the LRA.372  
The second issue considered by Ngcobo J was whether the applicant had one or more causes 
of action; one flowing from the LRA and the other flowing from the constitutional right to 
just administrative action.  It is clear that an applicant has a right in terms of the LRA, 
however the issue now is whether an applicant also has a right in the latter.  
Turning to whether the decision to dismiss Chirwa amounted to administrative action, 
Ngcobo J did not agree with the view by Langa CJ in the minority judgment that in 
dismissing the applicant Transnet did not exercise public power.373 Consequently, Ngcobo J 
agreed with Cameron JA that Transnet is a creature of statute and held: 
 
‘…what makes the power a public power is the fact that it has been vested in the 
public functionary, who is required to exercise the power in the public interest…  as 
a public authority, its decision to dismiss necessarily involves the exercise of pubic 
power, and that power is always sourced in statutory provision, whether general or 
specific, and behind it, in the Constitution.’374  
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In conclusion, Ngcobo J relied on Hoffman v South African Airways375 where the CC held 
that ‘Transnet is a statutory body, under the control of the State, which has public powers and 
performs public functions in the public interest.’376  
The fact that the conduct of Transnet in terminating the applicant’s employment contract 
involved the exercise of public power was not decisive on its own. Following an approach in 
conflict with the principle of subsidiarity, Ngcobo J held that the question whether conduct 
constitutes administrative action must be determined by reference to section 33 of the 
Constitution. For Ngcobo J, PAJA only comes into the picture once the conduct in question 
fell within the meaning of section 33. Ngcobo J concluded that Transnet’sterminating the 
employment contract was not administrative action under section 33 of the Constitution and 
that it was therefore unnecessary to decide whether PAJA applied.377 In coming to this 
conclusion, Ngcobo J relied on the factors provided in SARFU, where it was held that: 
 
‘The subject matter of the power here is the termination of employment for poor 
work performance. The source of the power is the employment contract between the 
applicant and Transnet. The nature of the power involved here is therefore 
contractual. The fact that Transnet is a creature of statue does not detract from the 
fact that in terminating the applicant’s contract of employment, it was exercising its 
contractual power. It does not involve the implementation of legislation which 
constitutes administrative action.’378 
 
Ngcobo J stated that section 33 is not concerned with every act of administration performed 
by an organ of state,and that therefore the conduct of Transnet did not constitute 
administrative action under section 33.379 It is significant to recognise that, if there was an 
implementation of legislation, it is implied in the reasoning by Ngcobo J that a conclusion 
that administrative action had taken place would have been the outcome as the source of the 
power would have been statutory and the nature of that power would have been 
administrative. Hoexter states that Ngcobo J focussed on the absence of one of the pointers 
laid down in SARFU, which effectively resulted in PAJA not being engaged at all. For 
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Hoexter, PAJA does not insist that legislation must be implemented as a general 
characteristic of administrative action,380 and that, moreover, ‘finding that the dismissal was 
contractual and at the same time an exercise of public power seems to be perverse.’381 
Notwithstanding the conclusion reached on the administrative action question, the notion as 
to whether administrative law principles applied or not was rejected outright by Ngcobo J as 
it was held that public sector employees do not have dual rights and thus it is ‘no longer 
necessary to treat public sector employee differently and subject them to the protection of 
administrative law, moreover there is no reason in principle why public sector employees 
who fall within the ambit of the LRA should be treated differently from private sector 
employees.’382  
 
(c) Langa CJ: Minority Judgment 
Langa CJ provided a strong minority judgment where for him the primary question to 
consider is whether the applicant’s dismissal constitutes administrative action in terms of 
PAJA. Langa CJ concurs with the outcome reached by Skweyiya J, yet does not necessarily 
agree with how the issue of jurisdiction was reasoned and concluded.  
The correct approach for determining jurisdiction 
For Langa CJ, the substantive merits of a claim cannot determine whether a court has 
jurisdiction to hear it, and therefore, although the question in the CC for determining 
jurisdiction is whether the case raises a constitutional matter, the question in Chirwa’s case is 
whether a claim before the court is a claim that has been assigned to the LC.383 In answering 
this question, Langa CJ, in terms of the nature of the claim, held that the bulk of the 
submissions made were devoted to arguments based squarely on PAJA therefore Chirwa was 
contending that the dismissal was administrative action as understood by PAJA. Langa CJ 
held that, while reference to items 8 and 9 were used, it only formed a small part of the 
argument to bolster further that her dismissal also violated certain sections in PAJA.384 Langa 
CJ held that, ‘whatever we think of the wisdom of her election to avoid the specialised 
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provisions of the LRA, we must evaluate the claim as it was presented to us’,385 and that 
therefore the claim constitutes a constitutional matter as it concerns her right to 
administrative justice under section 33 of the Constitution, as given effect to by PAJA.386 The 
reasons for the disagreement of Skweyiya J flow from a mischaracterisation387 of the claim. 
Therefore as a whole the applican’ts complaint is that her dismissal should be evaluated in 
terms of PAJA and not the LRA. 
Whether Chirwa’s claim has been assigned solely to the Labour Court 
For Langa CJ, section 157(1) and (2) has been the subject of considerable debate in which 
two schools of thought have emerged. The first approach adopts a purposive reading of the 
section, giving effect to the purpose of the LRA to have labour disputes adjudicated solely 
within the structure.388 This was the approach followed by Conradie JA and Ngcobo J as 
noted above. The second approach adopts a literal meaning for the section, whereby only 
those matters assigned explicitly to the LC by the LRA are excluded from the HC’s 
jurisdiction. In essence it was the second approach that was followed by Mthiyane JA and 
Cameron JA in the SCA.389 Langa CJ correctly stated that, although this debate is difficult 
and has plagued the courts in one jurisprudential direction, it has already been settled by the 
CC judgment in Fredericks where O’Regan J endorsed the literal approach, holding that 
‘section 157(1) had to be interpreted in light of section 169 of the Constitution.’390 
Langa CJ rejects the approach taken by Skweyiya J in distinguishing Fredericks narrowly 
because the effect of Fredericks meant that the question was no longer whether a claim is in 
‘essence’ a labour matter but rather whether the LRA contains a provision referring a 
particular constitutional matter to the jurisdiction of the LCs.391 Section 157(1) when read 
with section 191(5) of the LRA gives the LC exclusive jurisdiction within its terms to address 
questions of unfair dismissals. However for Langa CJ, Chirwa’s claim was not an unfair 
dismissals for two reasons. The first reason is that the claim must be approached as it was 
pleaded as understood by the SCA and the HC and therefore: 
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‘The claim concerns whether an action is an administrative act . . . by the State in its 
capacity as an employer, and if so, whether that act should be set aside.  This is 
exactly what section 157(2)(b) of the LRA places in the concurrent jurisdiction of 
both the High Court and the Labour Court.’392 
 
Determining whether a dismissal does constitute administrative action forms part of the 
merits of the claim and is not a jurisdictional requirement. Moreover, Chirwa formulated her 
case on the basis of PAJA, and a court must assess its jurisdiction in light of the pleadings.393 
The second reason flows from what is mentioned above under section 191(5) (a) (i), which 
requires disputes about unfair dismissals for conduct or capacity to be decided by the CCMA 
and not the LC. Therefore Langa CJ held that, under the LRA in most cases of unfair 
dismissals, these claims will not be decided at first instance by the LC, but by the CCMA.394 
Therefore, Langa CJ relies on what was held in Fredericks and holds that Chirwa’s case is 
the same in Fredericks and that ‘section 169 of the Constitution requires that the LRA be 
interpreted so as not to exclude the jurisdiction of the HC in constitutional matters that are 
referred to bodies that are not of similar status.’395 In conclusion, Chirwa’s claim needed to 
be adjudicated at first instance by the CCMA; therefore exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
the claim cannot be conferred upon the LC, and the HC must have had jurisdiction to 
consider the case.396  
Policy Considerations 
Langa CJ showed concern for the judgments of Skweyiya J and Ngcobo J as there are several 
policy issues that were raised397. Langa CJ accepts that there is no doubt that it is 
advantageous for specialist issues to be decided by specialist tribunals; however this principle 
is not applicable in Chirwa’s matter because for Langa CJ there is a difference between a 
claim that a dismissal is unfair and a claim that administrative action is unfair. Although the 
claim may refer to the same facts and raise similar substantive concerns, they are different 
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and not identical, and therefore the ‘mere fact that her claims arose from the employment 
context cannot rob them of their administrative nature as section 157(2)(b) of the LRA makes 
it clear that it was the legislature’s intention for this to be the case’;398 therefore, as it was 
noted in Chapter 1, Chirwa ‘is not asking a “non-labour” court to decide a purely “labour 
issue”; instead Chirwa had approached the HC to decide an administrative law issue.’399 
The use of a purposive interpretation adopted by the majority was inconsistent with not only 
the interpretation adopted by previous jurisprudence of the CC in Fredericks, but was also 
inconsistent with the clear language of the provisions adopted by the legislature. Therefore, 
Langa CJ rightly held that: 
‘While we may question that intention and may have preferred a legislative scheme 
that more neatly divided responsibilities between the different courts that is not the 
path that the legislature has chosen. We must be careful as a court not to substitute 
our preferred policy choices for those of the legislature. The legislature is the 
democratically elected body entrusted with legislative powers and this court must 
respect the legislation it enacts, as long as the legislation does not offend the 
Constitution...it is not for this court to adopt an interpretation of section 157 at odds 
with the language of the section to achieve such a purpose.’400 
 
Langa CJ agreed with Cameron JA’s judgment in the SCA and held that, ‘while it may be 
possible for the legislature to prefer one right over another, the legislature must do so more 
explicitly than it has in the LRA and PAJA.’401 Langa CJ held that: 
‘Both PAJA and the LRA protect constitutional rights and we should not presume 
that one should be protected before another or presume to determine that the essence 
of one claim engages one right more than another.’402  
It is for this reason that Langa CJ was of the view that, even though two rights happen to 
cover the same ground, this is not uncommon in our law and a litigant should be entitled to 
the full protection of both rights.403  
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Langa CJ held that the policy concern raised by Skweyiya J, that public employees should not 
be given greater protection than private employees, was rejected outright for its irrelevancy to 
the question of jurisdiction for two reasons. The first reason is that ‘even if the HC had 
jurisdiction, people in the position of Chirwa would still be able to assert claims under both 
the LRA or PAJA in the Labour court.’404 This approach not only was taken by Conradie JA 
in the SCA but also, under section 158(1)(h) of the LRA, LCs are deciding administrative 
action in terms of PAJA and legality under its jurisdiction, which will be dealt with in 
Chapter 4. The second reason for Langa CJ is that there is an overlap to the right to fair 
labour practices and administrative justice; therefore without a clear legislative provision to 
the contrary, there is no reason to sacrifice one right to the other.405  
Concerning the issue that forum shopping is undesirable, Langa CJ agrees ‘that it is 
undesirable for litigants to pick and choose where they institute action in the hope for a better 
outcome, although forum-shopping may not be ideal, Langa CJ held that in terms of 
Fredericks interpreting section 157(2) in providing concurrent jurisdiction, unless the call is 
heeded where the legislature intervenes, the meaning is set thus the possibility of forum 
shopping is an unavoidable consequence of that legislative decision which must be respected 
by the courts.’406 Langa CJ held that the concern that there would be possible incoherence in 
law which may lead to having two courts adjudicating the same issue is not a problem, 
holding that ‘our law often develops with conflicting opinions from different divisions of the 
HC, therefore there is no intractable problems which cannot be settled on appeal which is also 
what section 157(2) ultimately envisaged.’407 
Administrative Action  
The real question for Langa CJ was whether the dismissal of Ms Chirwa by Transnet 
constituted administrative action within the meaning of section 33 of the Constitution and 
PAJA. It was held by the minority that the dismissal did not constitute the exercise of a public 
power or the performance of a public function and was therefore not administrative action 
under PAJA.408 In arriving at this conclusion, Langa CJ correctly held that, in terms of 
section 1 of PAJA, the dismissal clearly constituted a decision by an organ of state that 
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adversely and directly affected someone’s rights, which did not fall under any of the 
enumerated exclusions.409 
Turning to whether the decision was taken in terms of any legislation, the conclusion reached 
was the same as that of Ngcobo J, namely, that because the South African Transport Services 
Condition of Service Act410 which used to govern Transnet employeeslapsed after 1991 and 
there was no successor enacted in its place, there was no legislative provision in other 
legislation providing for the appointments and dismissals of persons previously occupied by 
persons in the position of the applicant.411 Langa CJ held that the dismissal of the applicant 
did not take place in terms of any statutory authority but rather of the contract itself. 
However, Langa CJ held that, even if there was legislation, this alone would not have 
rendered the decision as administrative action as it was argued by Ngcobo J. 
In determining whether the decision amounted to an exercise of public power or the 
performing of a public function, Langa CJ held that in exercising its contractual rights, 
Transnet had no specific authority over its employees. The power flows merely from its 
position as employer and would have been identical if it had been a private company.  The 
dismissal did not have sufficient impact, if any, on the public even though Transnet 
conducted work that had constant and significant public impact. the reasoning was that the 
role of Chirwa’s position only affected the proper functioning of the body that ensures the 
future of Transnet employees after they retire.412 
Langa CJ held that determining the source of the power is not decisive on its own however 
because the source of the power is contractual, Langa CJ maintains that this factor which 
strongly points in the direction that the power is not a public one.413 For Langa CJ, the final 
factor to consider was whether those powers exercised were exercised for the public rather 
than private interest. Langa CJ held, in distinguishing POPCRU, that: 
 
‘Transnet Pension Fund does not however have the same public character that the 
Correctional Services Department has…whilst there is a clear pre-eminence of 
public interest in the proper administration of correctional services under section 195 
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of the Constitution, the same cannot be said for the Human Resources Department of 
Transnet Pension Fund, therefore.’414  
 
The decision of Transnet was arguably within the administration and more internal in 
dismissing Chirwa; therefore it ‘amounted to nothing more than acting in the best interest of 
Transnet Pension Fund and Transnet’s employees by ensuring the smooth running of their 
pension fund.’415 
Ultimately, Langa CJ and O’Regan J agreed with the majority, for different reasons, that 
Chirwa’s dismissal did not constitute administrative action. However, they drew the line at 
accepting Ngcobo J’s approach that dismissals in the public sector can never constitute 
administrative action, holding that: 
 
‘Where, for example, the person in question is dismissed in terms of a specific 
legislative provision, or where the dismissal is likely to impact seriously and directly 
on the public by virtue of the manner in which it is carried out or by virtue of the 
class of public employee dismissed, the requirements of the definition of 
administrative action may be fulfilled.’416 
 
Clarity on whether the dismissal of Chirwa amounted to administrative action was not 
adequately answered. Skweyiya J held, only on jurisdictional grounds, that it was not 
administrative action because it was a labour issue. Ngcobo J agreed with Skweyiya J that 
Chirwa’s matter was a quintessential labour dispute and that the LRA should have been 
approached from the outset. However, Ngcobo J found that, had the decision to dismiss 
Chirwa been sourced in statute, the CC would have been prepared to conclude that the 
decision was administrative action under section 33 and PAJA. Langa CJ, with O’Regan J 
concurring, agreed with Fredericks that jurisdiction is determined on the pleadings and 
followed that, since Chirwa had pleaded under section 33 and PAJA, that is what needed to be 
determined. On the question of administrative action, Langa CJ agreed with Ngcobo J that the 
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decision was not administrative action but disagreed on the reasoning. For Langa CJ, the 
decision was more internal and lacked external legal effect. 
As a result of the conflicting views by the CC, the question as to whether a dismissal amounts 
to administrative action remains unanswered as it did in the SCA.  
 
3.2.6 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security and others 417 at the 
Constitutional Court 
 
In Chapter 1, the Gcaba judgment hasd been discussed briefly as part of the general context 
to the debate. It does, however, require re-examination. The Gcaba judgment is the latest CC 
finding on this issue, and therefore it is vital that it be discussed further to gain a clear 
understanding as to how the court reasoned.  
Van der Westhuizen J418 wrote for a unanimous majority. It is important to recognise how the 
court proceeded from the very beginning of the judgment because it would seem that public 
sector employee rights would be determined by the court. The court starts by recognising that 
as the highest court in all constitutional matters, an opportunity had arisen to provide some 
clarity and guidance, based on a proper interpretation of the relevant provisions of the 
Constitution, the LRA and PAJA.419 
Before the issues are dealt with, it is important to briefly set out the facts leading up to the 
CC. Gcaba was not a case concerning a dismissal but one of non-appointment as SAPS 
Station Commissioner. Gcaba (the applicant) was appointed as station commissioner for a 
period of about three years. When the position was upgraded, the applicant applied, was 
shortlisted and went through the interview process, not, however, beingt appointed. The 
applicant initially proceeded to lodge a grievance with the South African Police Service 
SAPS, later abandoning this process and proceeding to refer the dispute to the Safety and 
Security Sectoral Bargaining Council. The applicant later withdrew the dispute shortly after 
the representative of SAPS failed to attend the pre-arbitration meeting. The applicant then 
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approached the HC with an application to review the decision not to appoint him as station 
commissioner under section 33 and PAJA.420 
In the Eastern Cape HC, Erasmus J held that the HC lacked jurisdiction to entertain the 
application as it related to an employment matter. In coming to this conclusion, Erasmus J 
considered himself bound by the full bench of the Bisho HC in Nonzamo Cleaning Services 
Cooperative v Appie and Others421 where it was held ,at to the extent that Chirwa and 
Fredericks were mutually irreconcilable, Chirwa should be seen to have overruled Fredericks 
and therefore in the result Erasmus J dismissed the application. 
Gcaba approached the CC in an application contending that the decision not to appoint him 
was subject to administrative review and should be set aside. However, the respondents 
argued that, on the basis of principle confirmed in Chirwa, the applicant was not entitled to 
pursue additional causes of action or remedies under PAJA.422 The respondents further 
contended that, although it was accepted that the power to appoint was exercised by an organ 
or state in terms of the enabling provision of statute and regulations (implementing 
legislation), it was the view of the respondents that such a power was private and not public 
as a decision to appoint was no different to a decision to dismiss or to change the shift 
arrangements.423 The respondents finally argued that, as it was held in Chirwa, it ‘could never 
have been the intention of the legislature to engage in forum shopping, particularly in light of 
the objects of the LRA, and on a proper reading of section 157(2) of the LRA.’424 
The main question before Van der Westhuizen J was whether the HC was correct in holding 
that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the application to review and set aside the decision of 
the SAPS not to appoint Mr Gcaba as station commissioner, consequently dismissing the 
application. For Van der Westhuizen J, in order to determine this question, answers to the 
questions such as the following would inform the main question: whether the decision not to 
appoint the applicant was administrative action and thus subject to administrative review; 
whether an applicant whose claim is based on a labour matter may approach a HC or has to 
follow the Channels provided for by the LRA; and whether the court’s decision in Fredericks 
and Chirwa can be reconciled.425 As to the question whether Gcaba’s application raises a 
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constitutional matter, the courts held that it does as it involves the interpretation of the LRA 
and PAJA which are firmly rooted in the Constitution, and, furthermore, that the matter 
revolves around the interpretation of previous decision of the CC.426 
General Principles and Policy Considerations 
Van der Westhuizen J correctly clarifies and retreats from the categorical approach which 
informed the majority judgments in Chirwa by correctly holding that ‘rigid 
compartmentalisation should be avoided.’427 In conclusion, he holds that it is not uncommon 
and is ‘undoubtedly correct that the same conduct may threaten or violate different 
constitutional rights and give rise to different causes of action in law, often even to be 
pursued in different courts or fora.’428   
Van der Westhuizen J furthermore recognises that each of the ‘areas of law is named and 
labelled for the purposes of systematic understanding and not necessarily on the basis of 
fundamental reasons for a separation.’429 For Van der Westhuizen J, the constitutional and 
legal order is made up of a coherent system for the protection of resolutions disputes and 
rights, and, therefore, as ‘a related principle legislation must not be interpreted to exclude or 
unduly limit remedies for the enforcement of constitutional rights.’430 The court reasons that 
human rights are intrinsically independent, indivisible and inseparable,431 and therefore the 
court rightly underscores this principle by holding that section 157 of the LRA should not be 
interpreted to destroy causes of action; moreover, where a remedy lies in the HC, section 
157(2) cannot be read to mean that it no longer lies there and should not be read to mean as 
much.432 
Van der Westhuizen J correctly held that a general principle or policy consideration which 
the Constitution recognises is the need for specificity and specialisation in a modern and 
complex society under the rule of law.433 As a result, the legislature is specifically mandated 
to create detailed legislation for a particular area such as equality and just administrative 
action under PAJA and labour relations under the LRA.434 It is these specific structures or 
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remedies that are ‘preferable’ and must be followed in order to effectively resolve disputes 
and protect rights within that specific area of law.435 As forum shopping is not ‘desirable’, 
Van der Westhuizen J hinted at the possibility of a litigant choosing a forum from the start, 
stating that: 
‘Once a litigant has chosen a particular cause of action and system of remedies (for 
example, the structure provided by the LRA) she or he should not be allowed to 
abandon that cause as soon as a negative decision or event is encountered.’436 
For Van der Westhuizen J, the structures of the LRA were created specifically for the purpose 
of dealing with labour matters as was stated by the majority judgments in Chirwa.437 The 
facts of Chirwa are distinguishable to that of Gcaba, as the LRA route had been chosen 
initially and subsequently abandoned, and therefore in these instances, once Gcaba initially 
chose the LRA route, he should have completed that forum to the very end. However,  the use 
of language used by our CC, with words such as it is ‘desirable ‘or ‘preferred’ to use the LRA 
route, does not provide sufficient finality in the debate. PAJA, like the LRA, is a 
constitutionally mandated piece of legislation, which gives effect to section 33 of the 
Constitution. Like the LRA, if a litigant chooses to bring an application much like Gcaba 
under section 33 and PAJA, is it not then ‘desirable’ or ‘preferable’ to use that system as its 
structures specifically deal with PAJA disputes? At this stage, it is not certain whether public 
sector employees can enforce the right which they have chosen to litigate as will be shown 
under the next issue.  
Whether the failure to promote and appoint Gcaba amounted to administrative action  
Hoexter noted that, while the reader up to this point in the judgment would have welcomed 
the court’s position in re-addressing Chirwa’s alarming tendencies,438 this feeling was short-
lived as Van der Westhuizen J was keen in redirecting employment-related traffic away from 
administrative law and the HC by providing that, generally speaking, employment and labour 
relationships issues do not amount to administrative action within the meaning of PAJA.439 
Accordingly it was held that the failure to promote and appoint Gcaba was not administrative 
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action.440 In coming to this conclusion, Van der Westhuizen J held that, where an employee 
raises a grievance relating to the conduct of the state as employer, it has few or no direct 
implications or consequences for other citizens and it therefore does not constitute 
administrative action441 as the impact of the decision was felt mainly by Gcaba only.442  
The approach taken by Van der Westhuizen J on the administrative action question raises 
further questions about administrative law as the judgment does not elaborate on which 
elements of PAJA remains unsatisfactory.443 Moreover, the SCA in Greys Marine recognised 
that the definition of PAJA can neatly be divided into seven elements which convey the 
principal elements in determining PAJA’s applicability. For Ngcobo J, one of the elements in 
PAJA that went against Chirwa was the lack of implementing legislation. Therefore, had 
there been legislation, the outcome would arguably have been different for the majority. Van 
der Westhuizen J remained silent on this element even though it was submitted by the 
respondents’ that the power to appoint was exercised by an organ of state in terms of the 
enabling provisions and regulation.444 Hoexter states that it is not clear why the court relies 
on the diagnoses of Ngcobo J in Chirwa in support of its own analysis as there was no 
suggestion that the non-appointment was governed by contract rather than legislation.445 
Hoexter further states that the decision in Gcaba must ‘surely be an instance of implementing 
legislation as it can hardly be anything else.’446  
Van der Westhuizen J ignores this element among the others, notwithstanding the CC 
judgment in Bato Star447 where it was held that the grundnorm of administrative law is to be 
found in the principles of the Constitution and, therefore, since PAJA is legislation, giving 
effect to section 33 of the Constitution, PAJA is the first port of call. The effect of Van der 
Westhuizen J’s approach confuses the reader as to which factor in SARFU is lacking, and. 
Moreover, which elements in PAJA are lacking.  
Wallis J in Sokhela and Others v MEC for Agriculture and Environmental Affairs (Kwazulu-
Natal) and Others448 correctly states that when approaching the question as to whether a 
decision amounts to administrative action, one is required to make a positive finding; 
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therefore the question cannot be determined by default because it does not somehow fit into 
some other juristic pigeonhole. Determining whether a decision is administrative in nature 
demands a detailed analysis of the nature of the public power or public function being 
exercised as this would determine its true character. It would seem that the CC’s aim in 
achieving certainty has been driven by strong policy considerations which have the effect of 
deviating from previously settled precedent. Conversely, the CC seems to take a rather 
different and unclear approach since Gcaba in Viking Pony Africa Pumps (Pty) Ltd t/a 
Tricom Africa v Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd and Another,449 where Mogoeng J held 
Whether or not administrative action, which would make PAJA applicable, has been taken 
cannot be determined in the abstract.  
Van der Westhuizen J arguably reasons that the failure to promote and appoint Gcaba 
‘appears’ to be a quintessential labour-related issue, and notes, moreover, that the ‘decision 
was almost as clear as an unfair dismissal.’450 It is arguable that in coming to this conclusion, 
the use of the word ‘appears’ suggest that the court determines the essence of the claim rather 
than assesses the claim as it was pleaded. It is uncertain as to how the court comes to this 
conclusion based on how Gcaba pleaded as Van der Westhuizen J agreed with Fredericks and 
Langa CJ in Chirwa that ‘jurisdiction is determined on the basis of the pleadings and not the 
substantive merits of the case.’451  Van der Westhuizen J further recognises that in 
determining the pleadings it must be interpreted to establish the legal basis of the applicant’s 
claim, and therefore it is not for the court to say that the facts asserted by the applicant would 
also sustain another claim only within the jurisdiction of another court.452  
Van der Westhuizen J holds that because Gcaba was unable to plead facts to sustain a cause 
of action of administrative action that is cognisable by the HC, Gcaba should approach the 
LC. Although the elements of PAJA were not dealt with in the judgment, the court does, 
however, provide an arguable eighth factor to consider.  
Gcaba was unable to sustain a cause of action because the decision did not have sufficient 
public impact. Had this been the case, the court implies that the decision may have been 
decided under PAJA as almost all the elements are arguably present. It is unclear what public 
impact means as the definition of PAJA provides for external legal effect. The meaning of 
this element has been settled by the SCA in Greys Marine as being that when administrative 
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action has been taken, it impacts directly and immediately on individuals, and that therefore 
the decision merely needs to have the capacity to effect legal rights.453 It is trite that the 
decision not to promote and appoint Gcaba necessarily affected his legal rights as an 
individual, and, moreover, ‘external effect’ should not be literally interpreted to mean that the 
action taken cannot affect those within the administration. What seems to be clear from Greys 
Marine and Nxele is that administrative action could very well effect individuals such as 
Gcaba, as well as members outside the administration.  
The addition of the ‘public impact’ factor seemed to suggest that, although administration 
action had been taken against Gcaba and thus affected his rights, the decision must also have 
public impact, which the court found lacking Gcaba. 
The cCourt held in Van Zyl v New National Party454 that the ordinary dictionary meaning of 
the phrase ‘exercising a public power’ amounted to acting ‘in a manner that affects or 
concerns the public.’455 The addition of a ‘public impact’ factor is strange considering that 
the decision to appoint involved an exercise of public power and given the subsequent 
approval of Ngcobo J in Chirwa and the respondent’s submissions in Gcaba that the decision 
amounted to an exercise of public power by implementing legislation. Hoexter states that for 
Gcaba to conclude that, because there was an absence of impact, the decision was not 
administrative action ‘seems to be like jurisprudential sleight of hand.’456 Plasket J in 
POPCRU restated the position that very often administrative action affects only the 
individual concerned, the person whose benefit has been withdrawn, or whose application for 
a permit has been refused.457 
Since the requirement of ‘external effect’ does actually appear in PAJA, Hoexter states that it 
seems odd that the court in Gcaba did not bother to explore this concept since the court in 
SAPU had provided a meaning that was similar to that of ‘public impact’.458 Murphy AJ held 
in SAPU that the introduction of a new shift system affected only those within the 
administration (internal) and thus lacked external effect.459 For Hoexter, while the 
requirement of ‘external effect’ may not be as easily applied as it was in SAPU, the complete 
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silence on this topic by the CC not only seems baffling460 but also contradictory as the court 
seems to blame ‘the legislature, courts, legal representatives and academics’ for creating 
‘confusion and complexity rather than clarity and guidance.’461 Van der Westhuizen J’s 
disappointingly thin substantiation on the administrative action question has the effect of 
detracting from settled coherent administrative action principles; moreover, the court does not 
make clear whether it is relying on the statutory definition in PAJA or the more general 
meaning under section 33 of the Constitution.462  
The strategy in providing a general rule seems to suggest two important things: first, that 
there would no longer be any prospect of success in taking matters on review to the HC 
unless the action has direct implications or consequences for other citizens,463 and, second, 
that there is an indication that the purpose of section 33 of the Constitution and its role in 
controlling the exercise of public power cannot simply be denied and ruled out as it was done 
in Chirwa.464   
Cohen states that, when one reads the Gcaba judgment widely, ‘labour matters which in their 
essence may be regulated and remedied by the LRA, should fall within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the labour forums.’465 Cheadle argues that, if something is a labour related 
matter, it cannot also be an administrative matter, even where all the elements of PAJA are 
met.466 This approach has already been criticised by Langa CJ and there is value in repeating 
his words: 
‘Both PAJA and the LRA protect important constitutional rights and we should not 
presume that one should be protected before another or presume to determine that 
the ‘essence’ of a claim engages one right more than another. A litigant is entitled to 
the full protection of both rights, even when they seem to cover the same 
ground.’467 
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Notwithstanding the sentiment expressed by Langa CJ and the remarks made in Gcaba 
regarding rights being enforceable in different forums, Hoexter states that administrative law 
‘is ultimately side-lined just as ruthlessly as it was in Chirwa.’468 For Cohen, the matter 
remains unresolved and although the court in Gcaba was ambitious in attempting to resolve 
the jurisdictional uncertainty, finding that ‘it is ‘preferable’ to use the statutory framework 
under the LRA and ‘desirable’ not to forum-shop, along with the finding that the HC is not 
divested of jurisdiction in employment matters where a cause of action and remedy lies 
within its jurisdiction, the court does not provide convincing finality on the issue.469 Brassey 
follows the same line of argument as Cohen that, although there exists specific legislation to 
resolve labour related problems, unless there is express intention by the legislature to abolish 
or limit other causes of action, i.e. PAJA, a court cannot turn away a potential claimant 
simply because it considers another forum to be ‘preferable’.470 Apart from policy-driven 
reasoning, Brassey criticises Van der Westhuizen J for not dealing with the most important 
question, namely:  
‘…if public servants have an established right to invoke the principles of 
administrative law in order to challenge a decision inimical to their interest as 
employees, by what authority, statute aside, can a court deprive… [employees of 
their constitutional rights].’471  
 
Ngcukaitobi and Brickhill follow the opinion that it is difficult legally to sustain an argument 
that PAJA, as presently formulated, does not apply to all employment related decision.472 It is 
worth repeating the sentiment expressed by Cameron JA and Mpati JA in the SCA judgment 
in Chirwa: 
 
‘We must end where we began: with the Constitution. I can find in it no suggestion 
that, where more than one right may be in issue, its beneficiaries should be confined 
to a single legislatively created scheme of rights. I can find in it no intention to 
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prefer one legislative embodiment of a protected right over another; nor any 
preferred entrenchment of rights or of the legislation springing from them.’473 
 
Ngcukaitobi and Brickhill’s argument may have been written prior to Gcaba., However, it 
seems that Van der Westhuizen J indirectly follows this approach that the exercise of public 
power within employment setting cannot simply be ignored or denied, but the court does not 
provide guidance as to those instances which would fall within the exceptions to the general 
rule. It is this uncertainty, which Hoexter argues ‘that by diverting traffic away in Chirwa and 
Gcaba, … has come at a considerable cost and may not prove effective in any event in future 
cases.’474 The CC’s constant reliance on policy based reasoning with the aim of excluding 
PAJA from employment and labour related matters has not been effective, and, until the 
legislature steps in, ‘administrative law will continue to exert its influence in relations 
between public sector employers and their employees.’475 Quinot and Maree have similar 
reservations of the effectiveness of the CC judgments in this area of law, stating that the 
overlap between administrative and labour law has not been resolved and that the HC 
continues to review public-sector employment issues under administrative principles.476 
Ngcukaitobi and Brickhill argue that to resolve this area of law, a unique approach to such 
cases would be for a court to ‘recognise the various decisions which may be taken by public 
sector employers and to analyse on a case-by-case basis determining the nature and impact of 




The purpose of this chapter has been to show the development of administrative action within 
the context of public-sector employment by discussing five cases.  
In Fredericks the court left the question open as to whether administrative action applies. 
However, it was recognised that the legislature expressly intended to provide the HC and LC 
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with concurrent jurisdiction. Fredericks further recognised the court’s competence to hear a 
matter which is invoked through the pleadings.  
In SAPU, the decision was accepted as an exercise of public power; because the decision was 
internal and not external in effect, the nature of the power fell more towards the employment 
side of the line and was not administrative in nature for the purposes of section 33 and PAJA. 
SAPU further argued that it is no longer relevant to advance labour rights under 
administrative law and regard must be placed on the current constitutional dispensation. 
POPCRU held that the decision to dismiss was sourced in statute and amounted to an 
exercise of public power. POPCRU further held that based on Fredericks and Fedlife the HC 
and LC had concurrent jurisdiction to hear disputes arising out of an employment setting.  
The SCA in Chirwa provided a split decision and left the question unanswered as to whether 
the decision to dismiss was administrative action. For Mthiyane JA with Jafta JA concurring, 
the court had jurisdiction based on Fredericks but PAJA did not apply due to a lack of 
implementing legislation; therefore source of the power was not of a public nature but rather 
based in the employment contract. For Conradie JA, since the LRA now effectively protects 
public sector employees, based on the reasoning in SAPU, HC did not have jurisdiction and, 
therefore, the question as to whether the dismissal constituted administrative action was 
immaterial. For Cameron JA with Mpati DP concurring, the decision was administrative 
action because Transnet is a public entity, created by statute and every act, including 
dismissals, derives from its public, statutory character. Cameron JA further disagreed with 
Conradie JA, holding that the legislature had not expressly intended to limit rights, and, 
therefore, that no doctrine of constitutional law deprives one right over the other when one of 
the rights has greater amplitude than the other. 
It was hoped that the majority in Chirwa would have provided clarity. However, strong 
policy guided reform was at play.  In the majority judgment, Skweyiya J dealt only with 
jurisdictional grounds that the LRA provided a better route and that it was no longer 
necessary for administrative law to apply to labour cases in the HC. Ngcobo J, writing a 
separate majority, agreed with Skweyiya J on the jurisdictional issue, but then proceeded to 
follow the view of Mthiyane JA with Jafta JA in the SCA, suggesting that had there been 
implementing legislation, the decision would have amounted to administrative action.  
For Langa CJ with O’Regan J concurring, the HC had jurisdiction under PAJA as pleaded 
and the judges disagreed with the policy-guided approach. Determining the dismissal as not 
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being administrative action, Langa CJ followed the approach in SAPU, finding the decision to 
be more internal and within the administration and thus lacking external legal effect. 
The outcome in Gcaba 
Van der Westhuizen J opted to provide a blanket approach to directing administrative law 
traffic away from the labour sphere. This has come at a cost to administrative law because it 
is not entirely clear how the court came to its conclusion on the administrative action 
question. It is not clear whether the court was applying the general meaning under section 33 
or the specific statutory meaning under PAJA. The approach taken by the CC seems to be a 
deliberate avoidance of making a positive determination as to the nature of the decision 
qualifying the action as administrative for the purposes of section 33 and PAJA. It has been 
made clear by the same court in Bato Star that PAJA is to be applied directly as the default 
pathway to judicial review. The court’s avoidance does not accord with the settled principle 
of subsidiarity. Interestingly, the general rule makes no mention of the principle of legality, 
and,therefore, where there has been an exercise of public power, review legality would still 
be open.  
Further uncertainty can be found where Van der Westhuizen J reasoned that it would have 
amounted to administrative action if the decision impacted on the public and had 
consequences for other citizens. The consequence of such a determination leaves 
administrative lawyers with uncertainty as to how the public impact factor fits in with the 
current element of ‘external effect’ under PAJA. At the same time when Gcaba was handed 
down, the same court applied the ‘direct, external legal effect’ element in Joseph. The court’s 
silence on the SAPU judgment providing similar meaning to ‘public impact’ and Langa CJ’s 
judgment in Chirwa on administrative action resulted in a baffling conclusion.   
The issue of jurisdiction was put to rest where Van der Westhuizen J recognised the approach 
taken in Fredericks and by Langa CJ in Chirwa and held that jurisdiction is to be found on 
the basis of pleadings. This acknowledgment is important because it guides the courts to 
determine the nature of the claim as pleaded. Van der Westhuizens J’s conclusion that Gcaba 
failed to sustain a cause of action under PAJA remains unsatisfactory as he does not elaborate 
on the missing requirements in PAJA when coming to this conclusion. 
However, Van der Westhuizen J recognised the interconnectedness of rights and that it was 
not uncommon for two or more rights to arise out of a single set of facts, an approach 
followed by Cameron JA in the Chirwa SCA. Van der Westhuizen J further disagreed with 
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the approach taken by the Chirwa majority that courts should not adopt a method of 
interpretation which has the effect of limiting rights.  
In light of the court’s position on the above-mentioned views, the adoption of a general rule 
limiting the right to administrative justice seems odd and indicates that the same strong 
policy-guided reform that was present in Chirwa was at play in Gcaba. The effectiveness of 
the general rule is correctly expressed by Hoexter, Ngcukaitobi and Brickhill, namely, that 
administrative law will continue to apply in labour cases where an exercise of public power 
has been performed. Chapter 4 now turns to discussing various instances where 
administrative law still finds application in labour cases, providing public sector employees 





















Chapter 3 provided in-depth analysis of arguments made by the judiciary surrounding public 
sector employment. Although the CC in Gcaba had the intention of settling the debate by 
providing clarity and guidance, the court opted to continue following a route without any 
clear legal reasoning for denying public sector employees their constitutional right to 
administrative justice. The crux of this research can be found in the quote at the beginning of 
Chapter 1 by Cameron JA. Unless there exists a clear intention by the legislature to deny 
public sector employees the right to administrative justice, policy considerations relied on by 
the CC would seem to be unconstitutional.  
This chapter identifies circumstances where the adoption of the general rule in Gcaba and the 
remarks made in Gcaba have not prevented administrative law applying to labour cases. 
Examples of various scenarios are discussed in detail under their respective headings below. 
For the sake of clarity, however, the various scenarios are briefly noted below: 
(a) The principle of subsidiarity is discussed in subsection 4.2 below. Where the CC failed to 
adhere to the principle which demands that constitutionally mandated legislation, such as 
PAJA, giving effect to a constitutional right under section 33 must be the first port of call 
when determining whether any decision and/or conduct is administrative action.  
(b)  The principle of legality, which is a more general aspect of administrative law, has 
developed over the years as a protective umbrella over all exercises of public power. The 
general rule adopted by Gcaba is confined only to provisions under section 33 and PAJA. In 
subsection 4.3 below, it is discussed that the general rule does not apply to the legality 
principle, leaving public sector employees with a means of holding the administration 
accountable. It is further discussed whether the LC may review decisions made by public 
employers under legality.   
(c)  The concept of duality of rights is not uncommon in law. In subsection 4.4 below, it is 
noted that it is not uncommon that the same conduct may threaten or violate different 
constitutional rights. Although the CC in Gcaba acknowledged the interconnectivity of 
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rights, it seems odd that the same acknowledgment was not extended to rights under section 
23 and 33 of the Constitution. Considering the CC’s acknowledgment of the interconnectivity 
of rights, this subsection discusses in detail the position on public sector employees’ dual 
rights. 
(d) The general rule in Gcaba effectively tries to prevent administrative law from applying to 
all labour cases. A possible exception to the general rule lies in circumstances where the 
consequence of a dismissal comes about via operation of law. In these circumstances, the 
LRA would not apply because the dismissal does not occur through any decision by the 
employer but rather through statute. In order to ensure that public sector employees are not 
left without protection, there is a detailed discussion in subsection 4.5 below of the 
circumstances for administrative law under section 33 and PAJA to apply the area of deemed 
dismissals. 
(e) When individuals approach, a court seeking protection, the courts competence to hear the 
matter must be invoked through the pleadings, something that is not uncommon in law. The 
CC in Gcaba importantly underscored the position on pleadings. In subsection 4.6 below the 
circumstances surrounding whether public sector employees can plead under section 23 or 
section 33 of the Constitution are discussed in detail.  
(f) Lastly, the only notable exception to the general rule by the court in Gcaba relating to 
‘public impact’ and ‘direct consequences for other citizens’ will be discussed in detail in 
subsection 4.7 below with the aim of determining through case law the meaning and 
placement of the exception within current administrative law principles.  
 
4.2 THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY 
 
Where the Constitution guarantees rights, it is important to determine the extent to which 
those rights are afforded to individuals, particularly when those constitutional rights have 
been given effect by legislation. The CC in My Vote Counts NPC v Speaker of the National 
Assembly and Others478 held that the principle of subsidiarity represents a ‘hierarchal 
ordering or institutions, of norms of principle, or of remedies, and signifies that the central 
institution, or higher norm, should be invoked only where the more local institution, or 
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concrete, or detailed principle or remedy, does not avail.’479 Furthermore, the court held that 
the ‘Constitution is the primary source, however its influence is mostly indirect, therefore it is 
perceived through its effects on legislation and the common law which must be looked at 
first.’480  
Hoexter states that the principle of subsidiarity is a norm most common in democratic legal 
systems; in this instance, since PAJA is constitutionally mandated legislation, it is the most 
immediate source of review and no longer section 33 of the Constitution.481 
The CC in My Vote Counts rightly underscored this principle holding that ‘a litigant cannot 
directly invoke the Constitution to extract a right he or she seeks to enforce without first 
relying on, or attacking the constitutionality of legislation enacted to give effect to that 
right;’482 therefore the court held: 
‘Once legislation to fulfil a constitutional right exists, the Constitution’s 
embodiment of that right is no longer the prime mechanism for its enforcement.  The 




It is important to restate, considering the My Vote Counts case, that section 33 of the 
Constitution provides for administrative action to be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. 
However, the Constitution demands legislation to give effect to its object and purpose. PAJA 
is the primary mechanism and the Constitution under section 33 is subsidiary. The CC held in 
My Vote Counts that ‘the principle of subsidiarity allows for a litigant to choose; either 
relying on a legislation that has been enacted to give effect to a right or challenge legislation 
for being inconsistent with the Constitution.’484  
The constitutional principle of subsidiarity has consistently been applied by the CC for over a 
decade.485 The CC held in Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others486 
‘where legislation has been enacted to give effect to a right, a litigant should rely on that 
legislation in order to give effect to the right or alternatively challenge the legislation as being 
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inconsistent with the Constitution.’487 In Sali v National Commissioner of the South African 
Police Service and Others,488 Jafta J writing for the minority judgment held ‘where there is 
legislation giving effect to a right in the Bill of Rights, a claimant is not permitted to rely 
directly on the Constitution.’489 Jafta J further held that an ‘applicant is not permitted to reply 
directly on the Constitution because section 6(1) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 
gives effect to section 9(3) of the Bill of Rights.’490 
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental affairs491 was the first decision by 
the CC to give recognition to the doctrine of subsidiarity.492 Although the court did not 
explicitly state the principle, O’Regan J does state that, because PAJA was enacted to give 
effect to section 33 of the Constitution, ‘the judicial review of administrative action now 
ordinarily arises from PAJA, therefore matters relating to the interpretation and application of 
PAJA will be constitutional matters and a case cannot be decided without reference to its 
provisions.’493 
Significantly in two earlier CC cases prior to Chirwa, it was held in South African National 
Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Others494 that by allowing a litigant to ignore the 
legislature and rely directly on the constitutional provisions would be to fail to recognise the 
important task conferred upon the legislature by the Constitution to respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.495 The CC held in MEC for Education, KwaZulu 
Natal and Others v Pillay496 ‘in the context of both administrative and labour law a litigant 
cannot circumvent legislation enacted to give effect to a constitutional right by attempting to 
reply directly on the constitutional right.’497  
Recently the CC in Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others498 stated 
that ‘PAJA gives content to the right to just administrative action in section 33 of the 
Constitution…the role of section 33 is therefore secondary in determining whether action 
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amounts to administrative action.’499 Quinot and Maree argue that, based on the court’s 
reasoning above, ‘section 1 of PAJA is the starting point, and moreover section 33 is turned 
to only if the definition of PAJA needs clarification.’500 Quinot and Maree correctly argue 
that ‘reliance must therefore be placed on PAJA first in identifying administrative action 
rather than going behind it to section 33.’501   
Ngcobo J in Chirwa opted not to follow this approach and found that, since section 33 does 
not apply, there was no need to apply PAJA from the outset. Hoexter argues that Ngcobo J’s 
approach seems strange considering his earlier judgment in Minister of Health v New Clicks 
SA (Pty) Ltd 502 where it was held that: 
 
‘Our Constitution contemplates a single system of law which is shaped by our 
Constitution. To rely directly on section 33(1) of the Constitution and on common 
law when PAJA, which was enacted to give effect to section 33 is applicable, is in 
my view inappropriate. It will encourage the development of two parallel systems of 
law, one under PAJA and another under section 33 and the common law.’503 
 
Ngcobo J in Chirwa acknowledges the principle of subsidiarity as it was held in an earlier 
CC case in South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Others 
(mentioned above). However, the judge seems to have ‘selectively’ applied the principle to 
the LRA, holding that the LRA gives effect to section 23 of the Constitution, and therefore it 
is the LRA which must be followed, notwithstanding that PAJA is also a piece of 
constitutionally mandated legislation and its provisions should also be followed  
Nevertheless, the principle of subsidiarity plays an important and well recognised role within 
our constitutional legal system. The CC’s constant upholding of the principle acknowledges 
the separation of powers doctrine. Moreover, legislation giving effect to constitutional rights 
provides greater clarity, meaning and context to those aforementioned rights.  
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It is baffling in Gcaba504 where the CC decided not to apply the principle of subsidiarity, 
especially considering settled principles that PAJA is the default pathway to judicial review 
and more importantly the court’s recognition of its importance. It seems odd that the court in 
Gcaba chose otherwise and this again seems to suggest selective application of the principle. 
The court does this by determining that PAJA only comes into effect once it is determined 
that section 33 applies. Thus, the court concluded that the decision not to appoint Gcaba as 
station commissioner did not fall into the meaning of section 33 of the Constitution, and 
therefore the court deemed it unnecessary to identify administration action under PAJA.  
An argument could be made that since PAJA’s elemental requirements are potentially met, 
the court is aware of this. Therefore the only way to not deal with the administrative action 
question is to sweep the PAJA enquiry under the rug by relying solely on policy 
considerations, a route that has been warned against by Langa CJ. 
It is unfortunate that Gcaba’s direction by not applying the principle has gained a following 
in Botha v Matjhabeng Municipality505 where Lekale AJ held that determining whether 
conduct amounts to administrative action and subject to PAJA, the enquiry is twofold: first, 
one determines whether the conduct constitutes administrative action under section 33 and 
only if the questions is in the affirmative does the second stage of the enquiry become 
available, namely, whether the conduct amounts to administrative action under PAJA.506  
Hoexter states that the approach taken by Botha seems to be in line with Chaskalson CJ’s 
approach in New Clicks507 where PAJA is to be construed consistently with section 33.508Yet 
for Hoexter this approach does not imply that PAJA only becomes relevant once action 
qualifies under section 33.509 Even if the approach taken by Gcaba was correct, the court 
does not enlighten the reader as to which factors in SAFRU remain incomplete. Furthermore, 
the court does not elaborate on which element in PAJA remains unsatisfactory. Hoexter 
argues that the court covers up and deals with the administrative action question vaguely, 
which does not eliminate problems surrounding this area of law entirely.510  
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To conclude, it is obvious that the principle of subsidiarity plays an important role by 
allowing the courts to develop the elemental standard required under PAJA when determining 
whether action is qualified as administrative in nature under its terms. Determining whether 
the action is administrative cannot be done by directly relying on section 33 of the 
Constitution because PAJA is constitutionally mandated legislation which gives effect to the 
meaning of section 33. Nevertheless, the effect of Gcaba has seemingly influenced the 
further development of the principle of legality as another means of providing protection to 
public sector employees where the exercise of public power is unlawful and irrational.   
 
Having defined and discussed the development of the principle of legality in Chapter 2 as 
well as reservations on the principle being applied over and above PAJA, this dissertation 
plans to identify below how certain case law have applied the principle within labour cases.  
 
4.3 LEGALITY APPLIED TO LABOUR CASES 
 
It is a well-established principle that the principle of legality is a general norm and should 
only be resorted to once specific norms have run out. This approach is in line with the 
principle of subsidiarity as well as the principle of avoidance,511 which requires legislation or 
the common law to be sought before constitutional remedies.512  
Ngcukaitobi and Brickhill correctly argue that, even in cases where PAJA does not apply, it 
does not mean that the principle of legality cannot found the basis for judicial review, but for 
legality to apply, decisions must amount to the exercise of public power.513 Hoexter follows 
the same argument as the authors above and states that, in cases addressed by the LRA, there 
is nothing preventing a litigant from approaching the HC on the basis of legality.514 The 
reasoning can be found in the general rule provided by Van der Westhuizen J in Gcaba that 
PAJA does not generally apply to employment and labour related cases. It is arguable that 
within employment and labour related cases, the specific norm under PAJA, because of the 
general rule (above), is no longer applicable, and therefore the general norm under legality 
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would now become available to public sector employees in the first instance. Hoexter states 
that it is unlikely that the CC’s strong policy-driven stratagem on administrative action will 
prove effective in diverting public sector employees away from the HC.515 The principle of 
legality will therefore always be needed where decisions or acts do not qualify as 
administrative action.516 Brand JA  restated in National Director of Public Prosecutions v 
Freedom under Law517 that the ‘legality principle has now become well-established in our 
law as an alternative pathway to judicial review where PAJA finds no application.’ 
Cachalia JA, in agreeing with the decision taken by Brand JA, recently stated the position on 
the applicability of the legality principle in Gijima518 where it was held that: 
 
‘…the proper place for the principle of legality in our law is to act as a safety-net or 
a measure of last resort when the law allows no other avenues to challenge the 
unlawful exercise of public power. It cannot be the first port of call or an alternative 
path to review, when PAJA applies.’519 
 
Khampepe J writing for the majority of the CC confirmed the correct approach relating to the 
legality principle in Motau520 where it was held that ‘the correct order of enquiry is to 
consider, first, whether PAJA applies, and only if it does not, what is demanded by general 
constitutional principles such as the rule of law.’521 Because of the general rule barring 
section 33 of the Constitution and PAJA from applying to public sector employees, it is 
argued that litigants can pursue claims in the HC under the principle of legality. 
The HC is not the only court available to public sector employees. An interesting and 
growing line of cases in the LC have been applying section 158(1)(h) of the LRA as a generic 
provision in establishing the LC’s jurisdiction to decide or review applications dealing with 
exercises of public power that fall short of being administrative action under PAJA. Section 
158(1)(h) of the LRA states that the LC may ‘(h) review any decision taken or any act 
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performed by the state in its capacity as employer, on such grounds as are permissible in 
law.’ 
It must be stated from the outset that section 158(1)(h) of the LRA does not establish a 
ground of review but allows the LCs flexibility in deciding on any ground of review 
permissible in law. The approach taken by our LCs seems to be like the approach adopted by 
Conradie JA in the SCA judgment in Chirwa that, even though a matter may be reviewable 
under PAJA, it should nevertheless be reviewed by our LCs and not the HC.  
In discussing the development of the principle of legality in labour cases, three judgments on 
separate cases by the LAC, SCA and CC are identified below starting with the SCA judgment 
and ending with LAC judgment. 
 
4.3.1 Ntshangase v MEC for Finance, KwaZulu-Natal522  
 
Bosielo AJA did not follow the  Chirwa and Gcaba judgments in Ntshangase and held for a 
unanimous SCA that a disciplinary decision resulting in a final written warning not only 
qualified as a public power or a public function being performed in terms of resolution 2 
(which has statutory authority under section 23 of the LRA) but in exercising such a power it 
was in the public interest and thus had direct, external legal effect on at least the appellant’s 
relationship with the second respondent. Therefore, the decision amounted to administrative 
action.523  
For Bosielo AJA, the next legal question remained as to whether the decision is reviewable 
under PAJA or section 158(1)(h) of the LRA. It was held that, based on the wording under 
the said section, the decision could be taken on review under section 158(1)(h) of the LRA.524 
Bosielo AJA held that there is no doubt that this section provides in explicit terms that the 
decision taken can be reviewed, and, moreover, the ground of review relied upon by the 
second respondent was the basis of rationality.525 It seems that, although Bosielo AJA held 
that the decision amounted to administrative action under PAJA, the court found that the 
decision was open to be reviewed in the LC under section 158(1) (h) of the LRA.526 
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4.3.2 Khumalo and Another v Member of the Executive Council for Education: 
KwaZulu-Natal527 
 
Mr Khumalo, and Mr Ritchie were employees at the Department of Education in KwaZulu-
Natal. Following an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune newspaper which specifically 
required, inter alia ‘supervisory experience at level 6 or 7 within human resources’, Mr 
Khumalo, who was employed at salary level five at the time, applied and was shortlisted. Mr 
Ritchie, who was at salary level seven, similarly applied for the post but was not shortlisted. 
Mr Khumalo was subsequently interviewed and promoted to the post. Mr Ritchie lodged a 
grievance with the Department complaining that he had not been shortlisted. When the 
grievance could not be resolved, that dispute was referred to the bargaining council where it 
was set down for arbitration. Before the proceedings commenced a settlement, agreement was 
reached granting Mr Ritchie a protected promotion.  
The MEC became aware of the irregularities in the two promotions and launched an 
application in the LC seeking that the promotions be declared unlawful and to set them aside. 
The LC granted the application. Mr Khumalo and Mr Ritchie appealed unsuccessfully to the 
LAC. Leave to appeal was subsequently granted to the CC. 
Skweyiya J writing for the majority held that Mr Khumalo’s promotion was argued to have 
been unlawful because of an alleged failure to comply with section 11 of the Public Services 
Act. For Skweyiya J, the true nature of the application was one for judicial review under the 
principle of legality, sought in terms of section 158(1)(h) of the LRA.528 Furthermore, 
Skweyiya J restated the principle of legality as being applicable to all exercises of public 
power and not only to ‘administrative action’ as defined under PAJA, legality, moreover, 
requiring that all exercises of public power are, at a minimum, lawful and rational.529  
Skweyiya J echoes the policy arguments made in Chirwa, holding that the ‘constitutional and 
legislative framework must inform an approach which does not undermine the hard-won 
protections afforded to public-sector employees whilst understanding the uniqueness of 
public sector employment.’530 Although the MEC had made application under section 33 of 
the Constitution and PAJA, for Skweyiya J, the application was ambiguous as council had 
also deliberately framed the dispute in terms of the LRA in an effort to avoid the 180 day 
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time frames set by PAJA.531 Skweyiya J held that reference to section 33 and to PAJA was 
not meant to found the legal basis of her challenge but to motivate her standing to correct the 
impugned decision. Skweyiya J does continue and hols that direct reliance to section 33 and 
PAJA would nevertheless have been misplaced considering the court’s jurisprudence.532  
The reasoning as to why the matter was not administrative action was with respect an 
incorrect determination. The reasoning for this disagreement can be found by the remarks 
made in Gcaba where the court recognised the sentiment expressed by O’ Regan J in 
Fredericks that the pleadings invoke the court’s competence to hear a dispute.  
Zondo J writing for the minority judgment, did not agree with the approach taken by 
Skweyiya J, holding that the MEC’s challenge was based on the decision to promote Mr 
Khumalo and that it amounted to administrative action. In addition, the MEC did not bring 
the application under section 158(1) (h) of the LRA; therefore the MEC must stand or fall on 
the pleaded cause of action.533 Zondo J held that it is evident that the MEC deliberately chose 
to institute a claim under administrative justice. In addition, Zondo J refers to the MEC’s 
replying affidavit holding that the MEC disavowed any reliance on the LRA; therefore even 
if the facts pleaded were capable of sustaining a claim under the LRA, the courts are 
precluded from doing so.534 Zondo J held that the only reason why Skweyiya J should have 
found that PAJA did not apply was because the application was brought after the 180 day 
time frame.535 
Although the application had been brought in terms section 33 and PAJA, the conclusion 
made by Skweyiya J does confirm that where PAJA finds no application, the LC has the 
power to review decisions under the principle of legality. Skweyiya J recognised that 
bringing a challenge based on legality through section 158(1) (h) of the LRA has been 
established in several cases; moreover, the court supported the Ntshangase case as correct.536 
Where PAJA does not apply, either because of policy considerations or the facts pleaded 
failed to sustain a cause of action, the principle of legality remains open to a litigant. 
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4.3.3 Hendricks v Overstrand Municipality and Another537at the Labour Appeal 
Court 
 
The appellant, Mr Hendricks was the Chief of Law Enforcement and Security at the first 
respondent, Overstrand Municipality. Mr Hendricks was served with a notice to attend a 
disciplinary hearing to answer to various charges relating to inappropriate behaviour to a 
fellow employee, including fraudulent misrepresentation and breaching the code of conduct. 
A disciplinary hearing was held and Mr Hendricks was found guilty on the first two charges. 
A sanction had been imposed in the form of a final written warning valid for 12 months on 
the first charge relating to inappropriate behaviour and a suspension without pay for 10 days, 
coupled with a final written warning valid for 12 months on the second charge. 
The first respondent made application to the LC, seeking a review on the sanctions imposed 
and replacing the determination on the sanction with a sanction of dismissal. The application 
was brought before the LC in terms of section 158(1)(h) of the LRA on the grounds that the 
determination was irrational and unreasonable. The LC set aside the determination and 
substituted the determination with a sanction of dismissal.  
In the LAC, the appellant argued that the court a quo erred in finding that the first respondent 
was entitled to approach the court on review in terms of section 158(1)(h) of the LRA. 
Predicated on the findings by the CC in Chirwa and Gcaba, the appellant argued that LC did 
not have the power to review decision made at disciplinary hearings or at the instance of the 
employer.  
Murphy AJA concluded that the first respondent had the standing right to seek review of the 
second respondent’s decision on administrative law grounds by way of the LC in terms of 
section 158(1)(h) of the LRA. 
In coming to this conclusion, Murphy AJA reconsidered the interpretation of section 
158(1)(h) of the LRA made by the SCA in Ntshangase, holding that where one looks at the 
language of section 158(1)(h), the essential enquiry is whether those grounds of review are 
‘permissible in law’. The appellant’s objection was that the SCA and LAC in Ntshangase 
erred in holding the decision to be administrative action and maintained that the review under 
PAJA in the present case was not permissible in law. The appellants relied on Chirwa and 
Gcaba, holding that the decision was contractual rather than administrative. Murphy AJA 
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held that the appellant’s submissions rested on too narrow an interpretation of the decisions 
of the CC in Gcaba. Murphy AJA held that the court ‘expressly qualified its pronouncement 
that employment issues do not amount to administrative action “within the meaning of PAJA” 
by adding that such would “generally” be the case.’538 
For Murphy AJA, it was unnecessary to determine whether the decision was administrative 
action within the meaning of PAJA. Although the court was prepared to determine that the 
decision was within the realm of PAJA, Murphy AJA importantly held that there was no need 
to go that far as ‘there is strictly speaking no need to classify the decision as administrative 
action in terms of PAJA before a review will be competent under section 158(1)(h)’539.  
Furthermore, Murphy AJA recognised that review under PAJA is only one kind of 
administrative law review and that other exercises of public powers are reviewable on 
constitutional grounds of legality. Murphy AJA held that the findings made in the LAC and 
SCA in Ntshangase are not inconsistent with the findings of the CC in Gcaba and Chirwa. 
Murphy AJA reasons that the findings restricted their conclusions to instances where unfair 
labour practices and dismissals would not normally constitute administrative action as there 
are adequate alternative remedies existing under the LRA.540 The CC in Khumalo mentioned 
above cited Ntshagase with approval that the court saw no inconsistency in the approach 
taken in that case with its earlier decision, and therefore legality has now been confirmed as 
an alternative form of review in employment matters where there are administrative acts.  
Murphy AJA agreed with the court in Chirwa and Gcaba and recognised that the underlying 
rationale behind the ratio decidendi541 was for practical purposes and that remedies for unfair 
dismissals and unfair labour practices contained in the LRA should be used by aggrieved 
employees, rather than seeking review under PAJA. Murphy AJA interestingly held that the 
ratio cannot justifiably be extended to deny employers without a remedy as section 191(1)(a) 
of the LRA expressly restricts these remedies to ‘employees’.542 Murphy AJA arguably 
recognises the implied reasoning in Gcaba that administrative law cannot simply be denied, 
as to deny the employer any remedy at all against an abuse of power would result in exercises 
of public power being unchecked.543 The only remedy available to the employer aggrieved by 
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the disciplinary sanction imposed by an independent presiding officer is the right to seek 
administrative law review through section 158(1) (h) of the LRA empowering the LC to hear 
and determine the review.544 
Although the courts mentioned above seem to suggest that the legality route is only available 
as an alternative option, the possibility seems to be open to a litigant from the outset to 
approach the LC under section 158(1)(h) of the LRA or the HC which has original 
jurisdiction under section 169 of the Constitution to hear constitutional matters.   
It has been stated above that the legality principle should only be applied where PAJA finds 
no application. This would be in line with the principle of subsidiarity where more specific 
norms should apply before more general norms. However, Hendericks follows that, even 
where PAJA does apply, the legality route would still be open to the LC to review in terms of 
section 158(1)(h) of the LRA. 
Considering Gcaba and the court’s recognition on the sentiment in Fredericks, where PAJA 
or the LRA apply, there is arguably nothing stopping a litigant from making application in the 
HC or in the LC and pleading under the principle of legality. Where there is confusion about 
the nature of the dispute being administrative action or an unfair labour practice, a growing 
line of cases are emerging since Gcaba, following the Fredericks position. Under Fredericks, 
all that a litigant would have to do is plead under the principle of legality but also disavow 
any reliance to section 33 of the Constitution and PAJA as well as section 23 of the 
Constitution and the LRA. This approach to the pleadings would allow legality to apply 
because, since PAJA no longer applies generally, or where one disavows reliance to PAJA, 
the decision taken would become a non-administrative action issue.  
To conclude, Bosielo AJA in Ntshangase seemed to have followed the approach taken by 
Conradie JA in the Chirwa SCA judgment. However, for Bosielo AJA, the approach was not 
as restrictive as for Conradie JA as section 158(1)(h) of the LRA was another means of 
reviewing the decision; since rationality as a ground of review was relied on, review under 
the LC would have been open.  
Skweyiya J in Khumalo followed the same policy considerations in denying the applicability 
of PAJA, even though the facts pleaded were solely under PAJA. Nevertheless, the court 
recognised Ntshangase as correct and held that all exercises of public power must be at 




minimum lawful and rational. Where PAJA find no application, Skweyiya J confirmed that 
review under the principle of legality would be competent under section 158(1)(h) of the 
LRA.  
Murphy AJA in Hendricks confirmed the views in Ntshangase and Khumalo as correct. 
Murphy AJA recognised that there is no need to classify a decision as administrative action in 
terms of PAJA before a review will be competent under section 158(1)(h) of the LRA.   
Having discussed the principle of legality as another means of review within labour cases, the 
next subsection seeks to determine whether public sector employees have dual rights in light 
of the court in Gcaba recognising the interconnectedness of rights and further recognising 
that it is not uncommon for more than one right to apply to a single set of facts. 
 
4.4. DUALITY OF PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES’ RIGHTS  
 
The purpose of this subsection is to determine whether public sector employees have dual 
rights under section 23 and 33 of the Constitution which are actionable simultaneously., If 
not, then it is important to determine the extent to which those fundamental rights are 
afforded to public sector employees.  
 
4.4.1 THE EXTENT OF RIGHTS AFFORDED TO PUBLIC SECTOR 
EMPLOYEES. 
 
It is relevant to state the words of Plasket J from the outset in POPCRU545 and although this 
judgment had been dealt with in Chapter 3, the view expressed based on fundamental rights is 
of importance for the purposes of this subsection.  Plasket J held that:  
‘There is nothing incongruous about individuals having more legal protection rather 
than less, or of more than one fundamental right applying to one act, or of more than 
one branch of law applying to the same set of facts.’546 
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In Chapter 1, two schools of thought were examined. The first assumes that all employment 
relationships should be governed by section 23 of the Constitution and its associated 
legislation and not by section 33 of the Constitution and its associated legislation. The second 
argues that exercises of public power attracts the protection under both administrative and 
labour law. 
If the first school of thought were to be expanded, there are two further lines of reasoning: 
first, section 23 of the Constitution and the LRA have been enacted to extend to virtually all 
employment relationships. Therefore, it would no longer be necessary for administrative law 
to be applied in the field of employment relationships in the public sector. Second, it is 
impermissible for one act to involve both labour law and administrative law. 
Plasket J disagreed with this reasoning because it represents a ‘parsimonious approach to 
fundamental rights: they fail to give individuals the full measure of their fundamental 
rights.’547 The effect of the CC  ‘attempting to place administrative law and labour law into 
neat pigeonholes runs the risk of elevating what may be no more than a convenient 
classification into a source of legal rules.’548 Moreover, there is no conflict between PAJA 
and the LRA. The LRA does not trump PAJA in terms of section 210 of the LRA because, 
for Plasket J, the protections afforded by labour law and administrative law are 
complementary and cumulative and are not destructive simply because those areas of law are 
different.549  
It is arguable that in advocating for the pre-eminence argument, because the Constitution has 
entrenched the right to labour practices, this right trumps every other right, such as the right 
to just administrative action. Plasket J held that the consequence of the pre-eminence 
argument seems to lose sight of the intention of the legislature.550 Plasket J accordingly 
disagrees with the pre-eminence approach and recognises that, if one were to look at section 
157(2) of the LRA, the wording of the section itself envisages that certain employment 
related acts will also be administrative action, thus investing jurisdiction in the LC 
concurrently to that of the HC. Plasket J further states that section 157(2) extends the 
jurisdiction of the LC to determine employment-related cases in which, inter alia, 
fundamental rights to just administrative action is infringed or threatened by the state as 
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employer.551 Moreover, the section does not vest in the HC unfair labour practice jurisdiction 
but rather concurrent constitutional review jurisdiction in the LC552 However, Skweyiya J did 
not follow this approach in Chirwa 553 and opted for the pre-eminence argument that the 
section 23 rights in the Constitution essentially trumps  the section 33 rights in the 
Constitution.554 
Plasket J further relies on certain case law (discussed below) which recognise that one 
employment-related act may give rise to more than one cause of action.555 Nugent AJA held 
in Fedlife Assurance Limited v Wolfaardt556 that the LRA should not be construed to the 
effect that the legislature intended to deprive existing rights and remedies unless the 
legislature expressly intended to do so.557  
Nugent JA held in Denel (Pty) Ltd v Vorster558 that it is not correct to submit that: 
 ‘the relationship between employer and employee is governed only by a reciprocal 
duty upon the parties to act fairly towards another, with the result that contractual 
terms requiring anything more must necessarily give way.’559  
Nugent JA, agreeing with Fedlife, held that ‘if the new constitutional dispensation did have 
the effect of introducing into employment relationships a reciprocal duty to act fairly then it 
does not follow that it deprives contractual terms of their effect.’560  
In the Fredericks561 case, the CC had to determine the scope of the jurisdiction of the HC to 
determine certain complaints arising out of an employment relationship. The applicants 
applied for voluntary retrenchment but were refused. The applicants submitted that the 
refusal constituted a breach of their right to equality in terms of section 9 of the Constitution 
and a breach of their right to administrative justice in terms of section 33. Although the 
circumstances emanate out of an employment relationship, the CC importantly recognised 
that the claim was not based on contract, but rather was based on their constitutional rights to 
                                                          
551 Ibid. 
552 Ibid.  
553 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC). 
554 Ibid para 50. 
555 Ibid. 
556 2002 (1) SA 49 (SCA). 
557 Ibid para 16. 
558 2004 (4) SA 481 (SCA). 
559 Ibid para 16. 
560 Ibid; see also Fedlife (note 559 above) para 15. 
561 2002 (2) SA 693 (CC). 
108 
 
administrative justice and equal treatment as pleaded.562 The CC further implies that although 
the applicants also had a right to section 23(1) of the Constitution, it was not open for the 
court to decide as the applicants had disavowed any reliance on their right to fair labour 
practices.563 
Plasket J held that, if any doubt existed as to whether employees have more than one 
actionable right, that doubt was put to rest564 by Nugent JA in United National Public Service 
Association of South Africa v Digomo NO and others.565 Nugent JA correctly stated: 
 
‘The remedies that the Labour Relations Act provides against conduct that 
constitutes an ‘unfair labour practice’ are not exhaustive of the remedies that might 
be available to employees in the course of the employment relationship. Particular 
conduct by an employer might constitute both an ‘unfair labour practice’ (against 
which the Act provides a specific remedy) and it also might give rise to other rights 
of action. The appellant’s claim in the present case was not that the conduct 
complained of constituted an ‘unfair labour practice’ giving rise to the remedies 
provided for by the Labour Relations Act, but that it constituted administrative 
action that was unreasonable, unlawful and procedurally unfair. Its claim was to 
enforce the right of its members to fair administrative action – a right that has its 
source in the Constitution and that is protected by section 33 – which is clearly 
cognisable in the ordinary courts.’566 
 
The CC in Chirwa,567 however, was arguably not prepared to recognise the interconnectivity 
of rights, nor did the court follow the approach of Cameron JA in the SCA judgment in 
Chirwa,568 where fundamental rights were recognised and given their full effect to public 
sector employees. Cameron JA rightly underscores the view expressed by Plasket J as he 
importantly states: 
‘We must end where we began: with the Constitution. I can find in it no suggestion 
that, where more than one right may be in issue, its beneficiaries should be confined 
to a single legislatively created scheme of rights. I can find in it no intention to 
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prefer one legislatively embodiment of a protected right over another; nor any 
preferential entrenchment of rights or of the legislation springing from them.’569 
 
For Ngcobo J in Chirwa, administrative action is different to employment and labour 
relations, although they may share some characteristics, and the Constitution contemplates 
separate and different forms of regulations, review and enforcement.570 Skweyiya J followed 
the same approach holding that the LRA envisages a ‘one stop shop’ for all labour related 
matters and even where a labour dispute implicates other rights, a litigant should approach 
the LRA structures.571 It is clear that in both judgments, the ‘essentialist’ approach by the 
courts facilitated the view that section 23 and 33 of the Constitution are separate and in sealed 
compartments.572  
Langa CJ, in the minority judgment in Chirwa, recognises the views expressed by Cameron 
JA in the SCA judgment in Chirwa and importantly held that a litigant is entitled to the full 
protection of both rights, even where they seems to cover the same ground, and therefore it 
may be possible for the legislature to prefer one right over the other; however, the legislature 
has yet to do so and, when the legislature decides this is the route that is needed, it must do so 
much more explicitly than it has in the LRA and PAJA.573 It was further held that, while 
rights to fair labour practices and just administrative action may overlap in cases of public 
sector employees, this is not a legitimate reason to sacrifice one right over another without a 
clear legislative provision to the contrary.574 Langa CJ further underscores the views of 
Cameron JA, holding that the implication is that there is no constitutional reason to prefer 
adjudication of a claim that may simultaneously constitute both a dismissal and 
administrative action.575  
Recently in Sewsunker v Durban University of Technology,576 application to review and set 
aside the decision of the respondent to deny the applicant ‘post-retirement medical aid 
benefits’ in terms of PAJA was brought before the HC. The applicant had been in the 
employment of the respondent and his services were terminated after a disciplinary hearing 
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found him guilty of misconduct. The policy adopted by the university subsidised the medical 
aid contributions to its staff members who retire and the policy had continued to apply to 
retirees and not to those employees whose services are terminated due to dismissal. 
Van Zyl J found that, in considering whether the University’s decision amounted to 
administrative action for the purposes of PAJA, the court relied on the views adopted by 
Chirwa that the source of the power was contractual and does not constitute reviewable 
administrative action in terms of PAJA.  
Van Zyl J then proceeded to hold that ‘even if the respondent’s refusal of benefits were 
correctly classifiable as administrative action, then not all administrative acts are reviewable 
in terms of the provisions of PAJA.’577 The view expressed by Van Zyl J is arguably 
incorrect as it seems to suggest that the court recognises that, even if administrative action 
had taken place, PAJA would invariably have been invoked. The court nevertheless followed 
the CC’s policy-driven approach, which effectively and with no legal basis, denies a right 
under section 33 of the Constitution by proceeding to prefer section 23 of the Constitution. 
The views expressed by Van Zyl J seem to overlook the CC view in New Clicks578 where 
Ngcobo J importantly held: 
 
‘Legislation enacted by Parliament to give effect to a constitutional right ought not 
to be ignored. And where a litigant founds a cause of action on such legislation, it is 
equally impermissible for a court to bypass the legislation and to decide the matter 
on the basis of the constitutional provision that is being given effect to by the 
legislation in question.’579 
 
In contrasting Sewsunker, the LC in Public Servants Association of South Africa and Another 
v Minister of Labour and Another580 recently recognised the views expressed by the court in 
Gcaba as being conclusive that ‘the same conduct on the part of an employer may give rise to 
different causes of action and remedies in law.’581 Therefore, the fact that the second 
applicant could have constructed his case as an unfair labour practice, but chose not to, has no 
bearing on the jurisdiction of the LC  to entertain an administrative law or legality review. 
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Myburgh AJ importantly recognised that the LC has jurisdiction to review the claim as it was 
pleaded under section 158(1) (h) of the LRA.582  
The HC in Nakin v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape583correctly recognised that 
Chirwa seems to have ‘resurrected [what] Fedlife had laid to rest a number of years ago 
based on sound jurisprudential grounds.’584 For Froneman J, the development of a 
jurisprudence of labour related disputes in different courts has been advanced and not 
restricted by its wider application in courts other than the LC.585 Ensuring a coherent and 
emerging labour and employment jurisprudence is not primarily determined by its 
development in one exclusive forum.586 Therefore, for Froneman J, ‘fundamental 
constitutional rights do not operate in tightly fitted compartments. In many, perhaps even 
most instances, they overlap and are interconnected.’587 Froneman J held that ‘the substance 
coherence and development of employment law can only gain insights derived initially from 
administrative concerns.’588  
Nugent JA in Makhanya v University of Zululand589 criticises the majority in Chirwa, holding 
importantly that: 
 
‘The law does not exist in discrete boxes, separate from one another. While its rules 
as they apply in various fields are often collected together under various headings 
that is for convenience of academic study and treatment, and should not be allowed 
to disguise the fact that the law is a seamless web of rights and obligations that 
impact upon one another across those fields.’590 
 
Hoexter makes the point that it seems startling and odd that a few weeks before the Chirwa 
judgment was handed down, the CC in Sidumo v Rustenburg platinum Mines Ltd591 rejected 
the approach that section 23 and 33 of the Constitution should be dealt with separately and in 
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sealed compartments.592 Navsa AJ, writing for the majority, held that it is a ‘misconception 
that the right to section 23 and 33 are exclusive’593 of each other. For Navsa AJ, ‘the right to 
fair labour practices is consonant with the right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair, therefore these rights overlap and are interconnected.’594  
In the concurring judgment of Sachs J, it was importantly held that ‘courts should not feel 
obliged to obliterate one right through establishing the categorical or classificatory pre-
eminence of another.’595 For Sachs J, the Bill of Rights does specifically identify a number of 
rights for special constitutional protection; each are independently delineated, reflecting 
historical experience pointing to the need to be on guard in the area of special potential 
vulnerability and abuse.596 However, Sachs J held that ‘the Bill of Rights should not always 
be seen as establishing independent normative regimes operating in isolation from each 
other’. While  he recognised that most constitutional issues fall within the parameters of one 
or other specifically protected right,597 an important point is made by Sachs J: 
 
‘…[T]here are many cases where rights will not just touch at the margins but 
overlap in substance. I believe that in these matters undue preoccupation with a 
quest to establish the primacy of one or other right could defeat the constitutional 
objectives to be realised.’598 
 
Navsa AJ with Sachs J concurring goes further and gives proper understanding of the 
relationship between section 23 and 33 of the Constitution by pronouncing on the purpose of 
section 145 of the LRA. In doing so Navsa AJ held that: 
 
‘Section 33(3) of the Constitution95 provides that national legislation must be 
enacted to give effect to the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable 
and procedurally fair. Section 145 of the LRA constitutes national legislation in 
respect of ‘administrative action’ within the specialised labour law sphere. Of 
course, section 145 has to meet the requirements of section 33(1) of the Constitution 
                                                          
592 Hoexter (note 505 above) 51. 
593 Ibid para 112. 
594 Ibid.  
595 Ibid para 148. 
596 Ibid para 150. 




ie it has to provide for administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair.’599  
 
Navsa AJ goes further to state there is nothing in section 33 of the Constitution which 
precludes specialised legislation regulation of administrative action such as section 145 of the 
LRA alongside general legislation such as PAJA.600 Hoexter states that in essence what the 
CC does is ‘characterise section 145 of the LRA as specialist legislation which gives effect to 
section 33 within the labour sphere’.601 Therefore, the effect of the majorities’ 
characterisation is that it is ‘the strongest possible affirmation that one would have thought of 
the close relationship between the two rights and the bodies of law governed by them.’602   
The crux of the argument proposed by Ngcukaitobi underscores the approach mentioned 
above. For Ngcukaitobi the right to fair labour practices and fair administrative action, at the 
very core, is concerned with the constraint of the exercise of public power.603 These rights do 
not stand disjunctively or in opposition to each other. For Ngcukaitobi, ‘section 33 seeks to 
regulate the exercise of public power by confining the exercise in being lawful, rational and 
procedurally fair’604, and ‘section 23 is concerned with substantive and procedural fairness; 
however, substantive fairness is not concerned with lawfulness.’605 The views expressed by 
Froneman J in Nakin, as noted above, are underscored by Ngcukaitobi, who stated that a 
piquant approach exists where labour law could be used to ‘supplant the rights to 
administrative justice of public sector employees.’606 The reasoning is that ‘administrative 
law is not concerned with substantive fairness whereas labour is, moreover labour law does 
not incorporate lawfulness.’607  Although this approach seems to be beneficial to 
administrative law issues emanating within an employment setting, our courts have not 
followed it as there is a growing jurisprudence that both rights regulate different things and 
therefore they are dealt with separately. The question remains as to whether both rights under 
section 23 and 33 of the Constitution could be applied together in one application or whether 
one right must be chosen from the outset. 
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4.4.2 CONSOLIDATION OF RIGHTS 
 
In Fredericks and Fedlife, Cheadle recognises that the HC retains jurisdiction to determine 
violations of fundamental rights arising from employment or labour relations, only if those 
rights are based on rights other than those rights contained under section 23 of the 
Constitution.608  
The CC in Gcaba609 recognised without any doubt that the same conduct may threaten or 
violate different constitutional rights and give rise to different causes of action in law, often 
even to be pursued in different courts or fora.610 The court then proceeded to provide 
examples where overlaps existed: 
‘…aggressive conduct of a sexual nature in the workplace could constitute a 
criminal offence, violate equality legislation, breach a contract, and give rise to the 
action iniuriarum in the law of delict and amount to an unfair labour practice.’611 
The court then correctly recognised that ‘areas of law are labelled or named for the purpose 
of systematic understanding and not necessarily on the basis of fundamental reasons for a 
separation.’612 The court then proceeded to follow the view expressed in Fredericks and 
Cameron JA in the SCA in Chirwa that ‘rigid compartmentalisation should be avoided.’613  
The CC significantly proceeded to follow the views expressed by Sidumo that ‘human rights 
are intrinsically interdependent, indivisible and inseparable. The constitutional and legal 
order is one coherent system for the protection of rights and the resolution of disputes.’614 To 
protect fundamental rights afforded to individuals, Van der Westhuizen J proceeded to hold 
that ‘a related principle is that legislation must not be interpreted to exclude or unduly limit 
remedies for the enforcement of constitutional rights.’615  
Van der Westhuizen J further underscored the interpretation argument mentioned above that 
‘the LRA does not intend to destroy causes of action or remedies and section 157 should not 
be interpreted to do so’.616  The judge, moreover, held that ‘where a remedy lies in the High 
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Court, section 157(2) cannot be read to mean that it no longer lies there and should not be 
read to mean as much.’617 Van der Westhuizen J importantly held that, although the LC deals 
with ‘labour and employment related dispute for which the LRA created specific remedies, it 
does not mean however that all other remedies which might lie in other courts like the High 
Court or the Equality Court, can no longer be adjudicated by those courts.’618 
In De Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa for the Time 
Being and Another,619 Moseneke DCJ held in the circumstances within that case that 
‘arbitration is the appropriate forum for the applicant and respondent to seek where the 
balance between dogma and tolerance should be struck.’620 The court reasoned, based on the 
Doctrine of Entanglement, that it would be inappropriate for the court to interfere pre-
arbitration, especially considering that the line is close to the church’s doctrines and 
values.621 However, distinguishable to Fredericks, De Lange expressly disavowed her claim 
to unfair discrimination in order to escape the jurisdictional challenges.622  
Moseneke DCJ, relying on the authority in Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v 
George and Others623 held that:  
‘the Equality Court proceedings based on her claim of unfair discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation as well as the arbitration agreement between the parties 
should have been consolidated before a single judge sitting as Equality Court and as 
High Court.’624  
For Moseneke DCJ, the reasoning as to why the consolidation route would have been 
appropriate was because it serves the procedural requirements of Unfair Discrimination Act 
that discrimination matters must proceed to the Equality Court, as well as avoiding piecemeal 
litigation and cost.625 
Arguably similar to the Equality Court, the LC is a specialised court giving effect to a 
constitutional right. Based on the authority of De Lange and George, it would be a 
stimulating approach to persons in future cases like Chirwa or Gcaba to consolidate their 
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claims to fair labour practices and administration action in the LC before a single judge 
sitting as LC and as HC. Consolidating claims of unfair labour practices and administrative 
action in the LC would not only be in line with Conradie JA’s approach in the SCA judgment 
in Chirwa but would also arguably be in line with section 158(1) (h) of the LRA. 
Consolidation would also arguably balance the two rights, thus providing the fullest extent to 
constitutional rights.  
However, this is not the approach that our CC has chosen as Van der Westhuizen J 
recognised that employment and labour relationship issues do not amount to administrative 
action within the meaning of PAJA because they are disparate claims,626 much like Moseneke 
DCJ recognised in De Lange.627 Since a litigant’s section 33 right is different to a section 23 
right in substance, there is no legal reason as to why both rights should not be applicable.  
Obviously, it is not uncommon in our law to have more than one cause of action arise out of a 
single set of facts and there is nothing in the Constitution which restricts or denies one right 
over the other when more than one right is applicable.   
Hoexter states that when reading the Gcaba judgment initially, one would give a sigh of relief 
as the court started to fix up the alarming tendencies left in Chirwa.628The relief was short 
lived, however, as Gcaba opted to: 
 
‘…direct employment related traffic away from administrative law and the High 
Court. This is evident from the court’s brief canvassing of the main policy 
considerations that its jurisdictional reasoning in Chirwa: the need for specialist 
regimes, the undesirability of forum-shopping and the dangers of encouraging a dual 
system of law.’629  
Cheadle argues that ‘administrative justice depends on the existence of more specific rights 
such as equality and the right to fair labour practices.’630  Hoexter argues that Cheadle 
suggests that ‘because labour disputes are governed by a more specific right or ‘primary 
right’, section 33 of the Constitution has no work at all to do in relation to such disputes.’631 
Cheadle further argues that, since section 33 has no relevance in the face of a more specific 
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right, ‘section 33 would have nothing to say to expropriation because section 25 of the 
Constitution specifically governs property rights.’632 Hoexter reasons, based on Cheadle’s 
argument, that section 33 would also have nothing to say in the ‘context of environmental 
matters, citizenship or trade as all of which are governed by a more specific or primary 
constitutional rights.’633 Hoexter criticises Cheadle in that ‘such reasoning misses the point 
about administrative law, which is that it is a general, overarching system that addressed the 
abuse of public power whenever it may be found, irrespective of the subject matter of the 
dispute.’634  
Nugent JA Makhanya635 criticises Cheadle’s holding that, if the LRA trumps all other rights 
in all instances involving public sector employments, then it seems odd as to ‘why the 
legislature should have allowed a claimant his or her ordinary right to approach a High Court 
to consider such a claim to only then dismiss the claim for being bad in law.’636 For Nugent 
JA, when a claimant approaches a court to enforce a particular right derived from the 
Constitution, then that is a matter of fact. That the claim may be bad in law for not being able 
to make out a cause of action, however, is beside the point.637 Nugent JA goes further to state 
that, when a court denies a claimant the right to assert a claim, which is what the court in 
Chirwa had done, then for Nugent JA that approach would not be permissible as the court 
denies a legally recognised right which would factually not be correct.638 
It is not unusual for two rights to be asserted arising from the same facts. For Nugent JA, 
much like in Chirwa and in Gcaba where there happens to be a termination of a contract of 
employment, it is trite that a claimant has the potential to found a claim for relief for 
infringement of the LRA right, which is enforceable only in a labour forum;639 however, 
Nugent JA does not suggest that this is the only potential claim in seeking enforcement 
because claimants also have a potential claim for the enforcement of a right that falls outside 
the LRA which are enforceable either in the HC or the LC.640  
Nugent JA arguably recognises the possibility of consolidating both rights, holding that ‘it is 
the natural consequence of a claimant asserting two claims, each of which is capable of being 
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brought in a different forum’.641 Moreover, even where two claims arise from a set of 
common facts and might be asserted, it should not evoke surprise or be unusual whether they 
are dealt with separately or in the alternative.642 A potential claimant is capable of pursuing 
both claims in the LC either simultaneously or in succession643 because, for Nugent JA, they 
are different claims. However, the judge does provide further clarity as to how one would go 
about asserting ones rights by holding that: 
 
‘In one claim the Labour Court (as one of the Labour Forums) would be asked to 
enforce an LRA right (falling within the exclusive power of the Labour Forums). 
And in the other claim it would be asked to enforce a right falling outside the LRA 
(but within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Labour Court). Similarly the claimant 
would have been capable of brining one claim ( the claim to enforce an LRA right) 
in a Labour Forum and to bring the other claim (for enforcement of the right arising 
outside the LRA) simultaneously, or sequentially, in the high court.’644 
 
For Nugent JA, it is intelligible that where a litigant has only a single claim that is 
enforceable in two courts which have concurrent jurisdiction, an election must be made as to 
which court to use, and therefore ‘forum-shopping’ is specifically allowable in those 
instances.645  However, for Nugent JA, the position is entirely different when a litigant has 
two distinct claims where one is enforceable in one court and the other may be enforced in 
another.646 Therefore, denying a litigant as a matter of judicial policy appears to be 
unconstitutional.647 For Nugent JA, the law has designated the HC as a forum for pursuit of 
claims, and therefore a litigant may not be denied access to a court that the law allows.648 
Nugent JA further recognised that, where a litigant approaches a court to advance their 
constitutional rights that are ultimately available to them, ‘a court cannot shy away from 
exercising its power to consider a claim before it simply because it considers the claim may 
lead to undesirable consequences.’649  
                                                          
641 Ibid para 39. 
642 Ibid.  
643 Ibid. 
644 Ibid para 38. 
645 Ibid para 61. 
646 Ibid. 
647 Ibid para 62. 
648 Ibid para 64. 
649 Ibid para 57. 
119 
 
The CC has opted to sticking to stronger policy reasoning as opposed to any legal reasoning 
as to why section 33 and PAJA no longer applies to employment and labour disputes. This 
approach is strange considering the remarks mentioned above by Van der Westhuizen J on 
advancing and protecting constitutional rights holistically. It is apparent that a litigant’s right 
to section 33 of the Constitution is the only right which the CC denies where the right to 
section 23 is also applicable under the same single set of facts. It does not necessarily mean 
that one is left without a remedy where, for instance, the LRA or PAJA does not apply in 
certain circumstances. The principle of legality, as mentioned above, has been gaining 
momentum in providing an alternative route in controlling decisions made by the 
administration within employment related circumstances. However, there are further 
instances where exceptions to the general rule provided by Gcaba have been identified, 
making the rule not entirely discouraging in cases where, for example, the LRA is not 
applicable to cases following a dismissal via operation of law.  
Since Gcaba recognises that pleadings invoke the court’s competence to hear a particular 
dispute, there are cases where administrative law has been advanced in cases arising out of an 
employment setting. Gcaba does not definitively state that the LRA ‘must’ be applied first; 
rather the court states that it is ‘preferable’ that the LRA is dealt with first. There are 
instances where litigants since Gcaba plead their cases under section 33 and PAJA and 
disavow any reliance on section 23 of the Constitution. The issue of pleadings will be dealt 
with in subsection 4.6 below. 
There are circumstances where the LRA does not apply to cases dealing with dismissals via 
operation of law. The next subsection aims to determine those employees’ legal position and 
whether their circumstance fits into the exception to the general rule. 
 
4.5. ‘DISMISSALS’ VIA OPERATION OF LAW 
 
4.5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Langa CJ importantly held in the minority judgment in Chirwa650 that the requirements of the 
definition of ‘administrative action’ may be fulfilled in terms of dismissals where for 
example ‘the person in question is dismissed in terms of a specific legislative provision (my 
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emphasis) or where the decision is likely to impact seriously and directly on the public by 
virtue of the manner in which it is carried out or by virtue of the class of public employee 
dismissed.’651  
Van der Westhuizen J in Gcaba652 recognised the views expressed by the majority in Chirwa 
and held that essentially the first port of call in labour and employment related disputes for 
public sector employees is to use the LRA as the appropriate route.653 It has been stated in 
Chapter 3 that, although the CC resorted to the same policy considerations which drove its 
earlier decision in Chirwa, the adoption of a general rule, that employment and labour related 
matters do not amount to administration action under PAJA, arguably always comes with 
exceptions. 
Where public sector employees are to follow the courts ‘preferred’ route in all cases relating 
to labour and employment relationships, then there are some circumstances where the LRA 
route may not be open to a litigant. The first circumstance is where the ‘dismissal’ does not 
meet the definition requirements invoking the applicability of the LRA as the first port of 
call. The second circumstance, which will be discussed below, deals with a growing trend of 
cases following the Fredericks side of reasoning, that, if a litigant pleads in terms of PAJA 
and disavows reliance to the LRA, the LRA would not be open to the litigant and to the court 
to decide, and therefore the court’s competence to review is invoked in the way the litigant 
pleads.  
In dealing with the first instance, Cheadle argues that, in order for a particular claim to fall 
within the LRA, there are ‘normal incidents of employment relationships constituting the 
core elements of fair labour practices such as hiring, promoting, transferring, disciplining and 
dismissal.’654 Arguably, where PAJA is not applicable generally and where a decision does 
not amount to those ‘normal incidents’, such as a dismissal, the LRA would also not be open 
to a litigant. As a consequence, litigants are left without a remedy. It is important to recognise 
the emphasised portion of Langa CJ’s reasoning above as there are instances where public 
sector employees are deemed to have been dismissed from service via operation of law. 
The subsection below will now define what is meant by dismissals via operation of law by 
providing similar pieces of legislation. Thereafter, four cases will be discussed, one of which 
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has three judgments, with the aim of showing how the courts have extended protection to 
employees in this area of law.  
 
4.5.2 DEFINING ‘DISMISSALS’ VIA OPERATION OF LAW 
 
Cohen importantly recognises that, although the provisions relating to deemed dismissals are 
draconian in nature, there are still judicial decisions which continue to enforce these 
seemingly harsh statutory provisions.655 Essentially, public sector employees whom have 
‘absconded from their place of employment for a certain period of time have been denied 
access to those ‘protective’ labour related provisions relating to unfair dismissals.’656 
However, relief in the form of administrative review, or review in terms of section 158(1)(h) 
of the LRA, continue to play an important role in ensuring public sector employees are not 
left without a remedy. It is important now to turn to a statute regarding ‘deemed dismissals’ 
and subsequently case law will be set out with the purpose of determining the extent to which 
protection is afforded to public sector employees who have been deemed dismissible and 
under what circumstances PAJA or the principle of legality would apply.  
 
(a)  PUBLIC SERVICE ACT 103 of 1994 
 
The PSA is an important piece of legislation and its purpose is to provide for the organisation 
and administration of the public service, regulation of the conditions of employment, terms of 
office, discipline, retirement and, significantly for our purposes here, discharge of members 
from the public service. Section 17 of the PSA deals with termination of employment, and in 
particular sub-section 3 provides for circumstance where employment is deemed to have been 
terminated.  
Section 17(3) states: 
 
‘(a)(i) An employee, other than a member of the services or an educator or a 
member of the Intelligence Services, who absents himself or herself from his or her 
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official duties without permission of his or her head of department, office or 
institution for a period exceeding one calendar month, shall be deemed to have been 
dismissed from the public service on account of misconduct with effect from the 
date immediately succeeding his or her last day of attendance at his or her place of 
duty.’ (a)(ii) If such an employee assumes other employment, he or she shall be 
deemed to have been dismissed as aforesaid irrespective of whether the said period 
has expired or not.’ 
 
Section 17(3)(b) provides: 
 
‘If an employee who is deemed to have been so dismissed, reports for duty at any 
time after the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph (a), the relevant executive 
authority may, on good cause shown and notwithstanding anything to the contrary 
contained in any law, approve the reinstatement of that employee in the public 
service in his or her former or any other post or position, and in such a case the 
period of his or her absence from official duty shall be deemed to be absence on 
vacation leave without pay or leave on such other conditions as the said authority 
may determine.’ 
 
(b) THE EMPLOYMENT OF EDUCATORS ACT 76 of 1998 
 
The Employment of Educators Act (hereafter EEA) is also an important piece of enacted 
legislation. The purpose of the act is to provide for employment of educators by the state, 
regulation of the conditions of service, discipline, retirement as well as discharge of 
educators. Section 14 of the act deals specifically with deemed dismissals and the provisions 
are very similar to that of section 17 of the PSA.  
Section 14(1) ‘states that an educator appointed in a permanent capacity who: 
(a) is absent from work for a period exceeding 14 consecutive days without 
permission of the employer; 
(b) While the educator is absent from work without permission of the employer, 
assumes employment in another position; 
(c) While suspended from duty, resigns or without permission of the employer 
assumes employment in another position; or 
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(d) While disciplinary steps taken against the educator have not yet been disposed 
of, resigns or without permission of the employer 
Shall, unless the employer directs otherwise, be deemed to have been discharged 
from the service on account of misconduct, in the circumstances where- 
(i) Paragraph (a) or (b) is applicable, with effect from the day following immediately 
after the last day on which the educator was present at work; or 
(ii) Paragraph (c) or (d) is applicable, with effect from the day on which the educator 
resigns or assumes employment in another position, as the case may be.’ 
 
Section 14(2) further provides that: 
 
‘If an educator who is deemed to have been discharged under paragraph (a) or (b) of 
subsection (l) at any time reports for duty, the employer may, on good cause shown 
and notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act approve the 
reinstatement of the educator in the educator's former post or in any other post on 
such conditions relating to the period of the educator's absence from duty or 
otherwise as the employer may determine.’ 
 
4.5.3 CASE LAW 
 
(a) De Villiers v Head of Department: Education Western Cape657 
 
The De Villiers case concerned a decision by the respondent made under section 14(2) of the 
EEA by refusing to reinstate the applicant after his deemed discharge in terms of section 
14(1) of the EEA. Van Niekerk J had to determine three questions. The first question was 
whether the respondent’s decision to refuse to reinstate the applicant constituted a ‘dismissal’ 
for the purposes of the LRA. It was held that, if the answer to this question was in the 
affirmative, then the applicant would have a range of alternative remedies658 available to him. 
                                                          
657 (2010) 31 ILJ 1377 (LC). 
658 Van Niekerk J states at para 6 that the applicant has a referral to an unfair dismissal dispute to the relevant 
bargaining council, and a right ultimately of review to the Labour court under section 145 of the LRA. 
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The second question before the LC, which stands independently from the first, was whether 
the respondent’s conduct in failing to reinstate the applicant constituted administrative action, 
and whether it stands to be reviewed on that basis.  
Turing to the first question, Van Niekerk J held that the ‘respondent’s decision not to 
reinstate the applicant did not constitute a ‘dismissal’ for the purposes of the LRA.’ 659  In 
arriving at this conclusion, Van Niekerk J found support in an earlier SCA decision in 
Phentini v Minister of Education and others660and held that: 
‘The ratio of that judgment is that s14 of the EEA is constitutionally valid and that 
the discharge effected in terms of the section is not the consequence of any 
discretionary decision rather than a statutory result; hence it is not a “dismissal” for 
the purposes of the LRA…’661 
Van Niekerk J stated that the effect of section 14(2) is that ‘an employee’s contract of 
employment is terminated by operation of law independently of any act or decision on the 
part of the employer, therefore the employer does not terminate the employment contract 
when electing not to reinstate the contract as at that point the contract has ceased to exist.’662 
In turning to the second question, Van Niekerk J concluded that the respondent’s conduct in 
deciding in terms of section 14(2) of the EEA to refuse to reinstate the applicant constituted 
administrative action, and therefore the LC is entitled to exercise its review jurisdiction on 
that basis.663 In arriving at this conclusion, Van Niekerk J held that, although it is tempting to 
read the Gcaba judgment to suggest that all public sector employees may purpose their 
employment-related grievances only through the process established under the LRA and 
other labour legislation and that, in this respect, the door to administrative review has finally 
and irrevocably been closed to them, nevertheless,  one cannot read the Gcaba judgment to 
suggest that the conduct of a state employer can never be categorised as administrative 
action. The reasoning adopted by Van Niekerk J can be found in paragraph 65 of the Gcaba 
judgment, where the wording of ‘the dictum regarding the relationship between section 23 
                                                          
659 Ibid para 8. 
660 (2006) 27 ILJ 477 (SCA). 
661 De Villiers (Note 660 above) para 7; See MEC, Public Works, Northern Province v CCMA and Others 
(2003) 10 BLLR 10 27 (LC) where the Labour Court earlier stated the same position on the effect of a deemed 
dismissal.  
662 Ibid. 
663 Ibid para 21. 
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and 33 of the Constitution clearly acknowledges the existence of the exceptions to the general 
rule, however limited those might be.’664 
Van Niekerk J recognised that in terms of section 14 of the EEA:  
‘No other employer is legislatively immunised from an unfair dismissal referral in 
circumstances where an employee fails to report for work for a continuous period of 
14 days. No other employer enjoys the right to consider reinstatement of its 
employees within its sole discretion.’665 
Unlike in Chirwa and Gcaba, the applicant had no alternative right of recourse as there was 
an absence of a dismissal as defined in the LRA, and therefore the option to refer a dispute 
constituting an unfair dismissal to the bargaining council was not open to him. Van Niekerk J  
held that, because the LRA does not cover these types of dismissals ‘a “hands-off” approach 
to its oversight function over the exercise of a discretion under section 14(2) would remain 
unchecked, therefore leaving the applicant without a remedy.’666  
Van Niekerk J recognised that, if PAJA is not open to the applicant, the respondent’s action 
remains open to review under the LRA under Section 158(1) (h) on the ground of legality.667 
Functionaries exercising public power in a manner that is irrational or arbitrary must be 
accountable for the manner in which that power is exercised. 
Davis JA in MEC For The Department Of Health, Western Cape v Weder, In Re: MEC For 
The Department Of Health, Western Cape v Democratic Nursing Organization Of South 
Africa obo Mangena668 underscored the views expressed by Van Niekerk J, and held that the 
effect of those deemed dismissal provisions legislatively immunises an employee from an 
unfair dismissal referral.669 In cases where PAJA does not apply, Davis J held that ‘the 
requirements of legality prevent an employee from being helpless in the face of an 
employer’s arbitrary conduct.’670 
McGregor and Budeli are of the view that the decision taken by Van Niekerk J was incorrect 
in finding the department’s decision constituted administrative action.671 Public sector 
                                                          
664 Ibid para 15. 
665 Ibid para 20. 
666 Ibid.  
667 Ibid para 22. 
668 [2014] 7 BLLR 687 (LAC). 
669 Ibid para 36. 
670 Ibid para 37. 
671 McGregor M & Budeli M ‘Labour law’ 2010 AS 797. 
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employees who are absent from employment are not afforded the protections under the LRA 
where there is a termination by operation of law. Since the jurisdictional standard as to what 
constitutes a dismissal under section 192 of the LRA is absent, as per the general rule in 
Gcaba, it is established that administrative action in terms of PAJA applies along with 
legality review in the alternative. On the reasoning above, McGregor and Budeli are 
incorrect.  
It is important to recognise that an employee who has been dismissed via operation of law 
cannot approach a court on review under the LRA or PAJA as there is no ‘decision’ by the 
functionary nor any active ‘decision’ to terminate the contract of employment by the 
employer. In Phenithi, 672 the SCA held that the deeming provisions do not depend upon any 
decision and accordingly do not constitute administrative action. It has been stated in De 
Villiers above that the power of discretion afforded to the employer is thus reviewable under 
PAJA or legality. Until the power of discretion is exercised by the employer, Francis J held in 
Public Servants Association of SA obo Van der Walt v Minister of Public Enterprises and 
Another673 that the employee is not without a remedy and must report for duty and make 
representations and show good cause (it is up to this point in Francis J’s reasoning that is in 
line with De Villiers J’s). Francis J further held that ‘should the department refuse to consider 
the representations made or find that there exist no good cause shown, the employee could 
then declare a dispute and refer it to the relevant bargaining council and after that, if need be, 
on review.’674 
 
(b) Grootboom v NPA and another675 at the Labour Court 
 
Molahlehi J held that the refusal to reinstate an employee in terms of section 17(5)(b)676 (now 
section 17(3)(a) and (b)) of the PSA was an exercise of power given to the employer by 
statute.677 Molahlehi J accordingly agreed with the De Villiers decision and held that: 
 
                                                          
672 Phenithi (note 663 above). 
673 (2010) 31 ILJ 420 (LC). 
674 Ibid para 18. 
675 (2010) 9 BLLR 949 (LC). 
676 In terms of section 25 of Act 30 of 2007, section 17(5) of the PSA is now sub-section 17(3) (a) and (b). The 
only difference between the two sections are that the word ‘officer’ has been substituted with the word 
‘employee’. 
677 Grootboom (note 678 above) para 47. 
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‘Refusal by an employee whoes employment has been deemed to have been 
terminated by operation of law constitute administrative action which can be 
challenged before the Labour Court in terms of section 158(1)(h) of the LRA. The 
decision can also be challenged on the basis of legality.’678 
 
On arriving at this conclusion, Molahlehi J emphasised that when an employer is considering 
whether to reinstate, the employer is not considering terminating the contract of employment 
because at the stage of exercising the discretion, termination of the contract would have 
already taken place by virtue of automatic operation of law.679 It was further held that the 
only power which statute provides after the termination has taken place is for the employer to 
consider whether there are good reasons for the employee’s absence and to exercise this 
discretion.680 Molahlehi J argues that the answer as to why the termination via operation of 
law does not amount to an unfair labour practice can be found under  section 186(2)(c) of the 
LRA which reads as follows: ‘(c) a failure or refusal by an employer to reinstate or re-employ 
a former employee in terms of an agreement.’ For Molahlehi J this section refers to a failure 
to reinstate in terms of an agreement and not in terms of the legislation, which is what section 
17(5) of the PSA provides for.681 
Turning to the facts of the case, Molahlehi J arguably held that when the applicant went to the 
United Kingdom on a 12-month scholarship without the NPA’s permission, the applicant had 
accordingly absented himself as envisaged by section 17 of the PSA. For Molahlehi J, an 
employee who has been suspended still has a duty to inform the employer of his or her 
whereabouts during the period of suspension and to seek permission to be away, because if 
the employer requested the employee to resume duties, the employee would not have been 
able to do so; therefore the fact that the employer has knowledge of the whereabouts through 
email communication is irrelevant as what is key is whether or not the absence was 
authorised.682 The court found that the absence was not authorised and that therefore section 
17(5)(a) of the PSA had correctly come into operation.  
                                                          
678 Ibid para 47. 
679 Ibid paras 45 and 46. 
680 Ibid. 
681 Ibid para 55. 
682 Ibid para 50. 
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Molahlehi J in Mogola and Another v Head of Department: Education N. O683 followed the 
approach in the same court’s earlier judgment in Grootboom above. Molahlehi J held that it is 
obvious that the termination of employment in terms of section 14(1) of the EEA does not 
amount to a dismissal as envisaged under section 186 read with section 191 of the LRA.684 
The issue before Molahlehi J was whether the LC has jurisdiction to entertain a claim under 
section 14(2) of the EEA. In determining this issue, Molahlehi J relied on De Villiers and its 
earlier decision in Grootboom, where it was held that the statutory provision providing 
discretion not to reinstate amounts to administrative action. For Molahlehi J, exercises of 
public power must be checked because: 
 
‘In this respect it could never have been the intention of the legislature that those 
employees whose services were terminated under section 14(1) of the EEA should 
not have a remedy in case they were to report for work after the expiry of the 14 
(fourteen) days of absence. In granting the discretion under section 14(2) the 
legislature recognised that there would be cases where there is legitimate and 
reasonable explanation for absence from duty and those where there would be none. 
It is for this reason that the Court is duty bound to intervene where the discretion has 
not been properly exercised.’685 
 
Molahlehi J correctly stated the position as trite that in the event where section 33 and PAJA 
are incorrectly approached, the alternative basis where the LC has jurisdiction in matters 
involving the provisions of section 14(2) of the EEA can be found under the provision of 
section 158(1) (h) of the LRA read with the provisions of section 1 of the Constitution, in 
other words, under the basis of legality.  
 
(c) Grootboom v NPA and another686 at the Labour Appeal Court. 
 
On appeal, Tlaletsi JA agreed with the LC that the applicant’s services were terminated by 
operation of law and that the respondents had not taken any decision or action which could be 
                                                          
683 (2012) 6 BLLR 584 (LC). 
684 Ibid para 28. 
685 Ibid para 32. 
686 (2013) 34 ILJ 282 (LAC). 
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reviewed or set aside.687 Tlaleti JA arrived at this conclusion by referring to Minister van 
Onderwys en Kultuur en Andere v Louw688 and Phenithi. In Louw, the Appellate Division 
held that where the respondent notifies the employee that he had been dismissed, it did not 
flow from the discretionary decision, but was purely communication of the consequence of an 
operation of law.689 The SCA in Phenithi endorsed Louw by holding that: 
 
‘In my view, the Louw judgment is definitive of the first issue in the present matter, 
viz whether the appellant’s discharge constituted an administrative act…There was 
no suggestion that Louw was wrongly decided. There being no “decision” or 
“administrative act” capable of review and setting aside, the second part of the first 
prayer in casu, viz that the “decision be declared an unfair labour practice”, falls 
away.’690 
 
(d) Grootboom v NPA and another691 at the Constitutional Court 
 
Bosielo AJ, writing for the majority, considered the matter only in so far as to the correct 
interpretation and application of section 17(5)(a)(i) of the PSA to the facts of that case. The 
CC set aside the orders made in the LC and the LAC and declared that section 17(5)(a)(i) had 
not come into force.692  
In arriving at the conclusion that the deemed dismissal had not come into force, Bosielo AJ 
held that section 17(5) (a) (i) effectively countenances the dismissal of the state employee 
without a hearing and thus implicates the right to fair labour practices enshrined in section 23 
of the Constitution; therefore section 17(5) has the potential to affect people employed in the 
public service.693 Bosielo AJ underscores the concerns mentioned above by Cohen that 
dismissals via operation of law are draconian, stating that ‘there is adverse effect of 
terminating employment for misconduct without notice or a hearing.’694 Bosielo AJ also 
agreed with the LC and LAC and could not fault the principles flowing out of the Louw and 
Phenithi decisions; furthermore, the court does not overturn the conclusions made by 
                                                          
687 Ibid para 38 
688 1995 (4) SA 383 (A). 
689 Ibid at 388. 
690 Phenithi (note 663 above) para 10. 
691 (2014) 35 ILJ 121 (CC).  
692 Ibid para 48. 
693 Ibid paras 37-38. 
694 Ibid para 38. 
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Molahlehi J that the discretion exercised under section 17(5)(a)(i) is reviewable under PAJA 
or Legality. 
Bosielo AJ does, however, disagree with the LC and LAC on their conclusions that the 
applicant was absent without permission. For Bosielo AJ, one of the essential requirements of 
section 17(5)(a)(i) had not been met as the applicant was absent from his employment 
because he was suspended by the respondent, and therefore section 17(5) does not come into 
force by operation of law as the applicant was essentially absent with the permission of his 
employer.695 Bosielo AJ correctly holds that ‘the applicant was placed on suspension and 
prohibited from performing any official duties with clear instructions not to come to his place 
of employment or have any conduct with the NPA staff’.696 Therefore, Boisielo AJ argues 
that it is perverse to reason that ‘the applicant absented himself from employment within the 
meaning of section 17(5) (a) (i) from when his employer expressly required his absence from 
the workplace.’697 
 
(e) Solidarity and another v The Public Health and Welfare Sectoral 
Bargaining Council and others698 at the Supreme Court of Appeal since 
Grootboom. 
 
Ponnan JA dealt with similar circumstances to Grootboom that a suspension by the employer 
was effectively permission to be absent from employment, and therefore the employer could 
not rely on the ‘deemed dismissal’ provisions.699 Had the employee been absent without 
permission, Ponnan JA correctly found that by operation of law a ‘deemed dismissal’ in 
terms of section 17(5)(a)(i) of the PSA would have occurred resulting in the employee being 
unable to sustain a cause of action under section 192 of the LRA.700 In these circumstances, 
the employee had been unfairly dismissed; therefore the SCA ordered the matter back to the 
first respondent for arbitration.  
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700 Ibid paras 8-10. 
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(f) Khulong v Minister of Health and others701 at the North Gauteng High Court 
 
The applicant approached the HC seeking for an order in setting aside her discharge from the 
public service, alternatively seeking an order declaring that the decision to discharge the 
applicant from the Public Service be declared invalid and unlawful as well as reinstatement of 
her position prior to discharge with full back pay without any loss of service history and 
benefits. 
Mabena AJ recognised as significant that the deeming provisions does not include any 
discretionary decisions of the employer to end the employment relationship, and moreover 
‘the PSA deals primarily with the organisation and administration of the public service and 
therefore cannot be classified as labour legislation’. 702 However, the court found that the 
applicant did not willingly nor intentionally elect to absent herself from her place of 
employment.703  Mabena AJ found that it is inescapable to conclude that the HC does not 
have jurisdiction to hear the matter. Mabena AJ concluded that, as pleaded in the alternative, 
the applicant was correct in relying on administrative law rather than employment arguments 
and therefore the decision to discharge the applicant from the service under the provisions of 
the Act was invalid and unlawful. Manena AJ further provided the applicant with the relief 
sought that she be reinstated with full back pay and benefits. 
It has been established above that when a decision is taken not to reverse the consequence of 
a deemed dismissal, section 33 and PAJA apply as well as the principle of legality. This 
development is important as it clarifies the relevant employee’s legal position. Since Gcaba 
recognised the pleadings as founding jurisdiction, the next subsection identifies the 
significance of this recognition in cases since Gcaba.  
 
4.6 INVOKING THE COURT’S COMPETENCE THROUGH PLEADINGS 
 
4.6.1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S STANCE ON PLEADINGS 
 
                                                          
701 (59211/2009) [2013] ZAGPPHC 97 (11 April 2013 Unreported available at: 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2013/97.html). 
702 Ibid paras 12-14. 
703 Ibid para 17. 
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Langa CJ handed down an important and strong minority judgment in Chirwa704 which has 
had a positive outcome for administrative lawyers in future cases. It is vital in proceeding to 
recognise the sentiments expressed by Langa CJ on jurisdiction and pleadings. 
For Langa CJ, where an applicant makes application before the court, the claim itself must be 
approached as it is pleaded,705 Therefore, determining whether a dismissal constitutes 
administrative action is part of the substantive merits of the claim and is not a jurisdictional 
requirement.706 Langa CJ importantly held that: 
 
‘… a court must assess its jurisdiction in the light of the pleadings.  To hold 
otherwise would mean that the correctness of an assertion determines jurisdiction, a 
proposition that this Court has rejected.  It would also have the absurd practical 
result that whether or not the High Court has jurisdiction will depend on the answer 
to a question that the court could only consider if it had that jurisdiction in the first 
place.  Such a result is obviously untenable.’707 
 
In Gcaba708 Van der Westhuizen J subsequently endorsed the views expressed by Langa CJ, 
holding that jurisdiction is determined based on the pleadings and not the substantive merits 
of the case. Van der Westhuizen J appositely stated: 
 
‘In the event of the court’s jurisdiction being challenged at the outset (in limine), the 
applicants pleadings are the determining factor. They contain the legal basis of the 
claim under which the applicant has chosen to invoke the courts competence. While 
the pleadings – including in motion proceedings, not only the formal terminology of 
the notice of motion, but also the contents of the supporting affidavits – must be 
interpreted to establish what the legal basis of the applicant’s claim is, it is not for 
the court to say that the facts asserted by the applicants would sustain another claim, 
cognisable only in another court. If however the pleadings, properly interpreted, 
establish that the applicant is asserting a claim under the LRA, one that is to be 
                                                          
704 Chirwa (note 570 above). 
705 Ibid para 168. 
706 Ibid para 169. 
707 Ibid.  
708 Gcaba (note 507 above). 
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determined exclusively by the Labour Court, the High Court would lack 
jurisdiction.’709 
 
The views expressed by Langa CJ and Van der Westhuizen J have further been endorsed by 
the two recent CC judgments in My Vote Counts NPC v Speaker of the National Assembly 
and Others710 and Mbatha v University of Zululand711. In the latter case, Zondo J, writing for 
a unanimous majority, held that ‘when a court determines whether it has jurisdiction, the 
pleadings must be examined with the view on finding the legal basis of the claim under which 
the applicant has chosen to invoke the courts’ competence.’712 Zondo J importantly further 
states that: ‘whether the facts also support another cause of action is immaterial, it follows 
that the facts must be pleaded to sustain the pleaded cause of action, therefore the facts as 
pleaded are important in determining jurisdiction.’713 The LC in the Grootboom714 judgment 
appositely stated as obvious the position that a litigant must make out his or her case and 
relief sought in the pleadings and the court accordingly must approach the said matter as 
pleaded.715 
It is trite that pleadings invoke the court’s competence to hear a dispute. In addition, the CC 
has recognised that, just because a litigant has chosen to plead a particular cause of action, it 
does not mean is it not reviewable because another cause of action existed. Zondo J 
underscored the position that Nugent AJA took over a decade ago in Fedlife.716 Nugent AJA 
held that disputes fall within the terms of section 191 of the LRA, if the fairness of the 
dismissal is subject to the employee’s complaint. The fact that an unlawful dismissal might 
also be unfair is irrelevant the enquiry.717 If the  ‘subject of the dispute is the lawfulness of 
the dismissal, then the fact that it might also be, and probably is, unfair, is quite coincidental 
for that is not what the employee’s complaint is about.’718 It can be said that, if a public sector 
employee were to plead unlawfulness under section 33 and PAJA, the fact that a public sector 
employee could also have pleaded unfairness under section 23 and the LRA is immaterial.  
                                                          
709 Ibid para 75. 
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713 Ibid.  
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In Nakin719 the HC may have decided the matter before the Gcaba judgment was handed 
down; however Froneman J’s recognition of Fedlife and Fredericks could not have been 
more relevant today since Gcaba because how you plead will determine the particular cause 
of action one seeks.720 The applicant in Nakin chose to characterise the failure by the 
respondent to pay outstanding benefits as unlawful administrative action; moreover, the 
applicant chose not to formulate his claim in contract or under any empowering provision of 
the LRA or the common law contract of employment.721  
Froneman J held that the applicant does not refer to any unfair labour practice under the LRA 
in his papers, and therefore when, in the founding papers, the applicant characterises the 
failure of the department as administrative action, it fails to be reviewed and set aside under 
the provisions of PAJA.722 Froneman J continued to hold that based on the decision in the CC 
and SCA in Fredericks and Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v Gumbi723 there is no 
doubt that the HC retains jurisdiction. In coming to this conclusion Froneman J held: 
 
‘Under s.38 of the Constitution, the allegation of the infringement of a fundamental 
right would be sufficient to clothe the High Court with Jurisdiction to enquire 
whether the right to just administrative action has been infringed or not, and to grant 
appropriate relief depending on its findings. PAJA gives specific content to this 
competence in relation to the fundamental right to just administrative action.’724 
 
Van der Westhuizen J in Gcaba725 continued to recognise and cautioned that section 157 of 
the LRA should not be interpreted in a manner that effectively destroys causes of action or 
remedies, and therefore, where a remedy lies in the HC, section 157(2) of the LRA does not 
state that the remedy no longer lies there.726 For Froneman , the Chirwa judgment may have 
disturbed a settled state of affairs, but it has not had the effect of overruling the existing state 
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of law.727 It is arguable that  Van der Westhuizen J sought to give effect to settled law rather 
than continue on the path of denying fundamental rights as was done in Chirwa. 
The SCA in Makambi v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape Province728 
recognised that the CC in Chirwa did not overrule Fredericks but were content with 
distinguishing it.729 The appellant in Makambi sought to distinguish her case from Chirwa 
from the outset. The appellant did not base her case on it being a labour dispute but rather 
relied on an alleged violation of her constitutional right to just administrative action.730 The 
appeal went against the appellant as Farlam JA held that the appellant’s case does not fall on 
the Fredericks side of the line.731 In coming to this conclusion, Farlam JA held that in 
Fredericks, the applicants disavowed any reliance to section 23 of the Constitution nor did 
they rely on any of the provision in the LRA. For Farlam JA, it was correct that the appellant 
did not rely on any of the provision of the LRA; she did, however, rely on section 23 of the 
Constitution in her founding affidavit where she submitted that the department’s conduct in 
terminating her emoluments in the way it did constituted an unfair labour practice as 
contemplated by section 8 of the Constitution.732 The appellant also contended that the 
department’s conduct constituted administrative action which is unlawful, unreasonable and 
procedurally unfair as contemplated by section 33 of the Constitution.733 Farlam JA held that, 
in Chirwa, the applicant approached the HC and made it clear that her claim was based on a 
violation of the provisions of the LRA,734 For Farlam J, when one compares the complaints 
set out in the appellant’s founding affidavit with those on which Chirwa relied, it is clear that 
it is not possible to hold that the appellant’s case falls on the Frederick’s side of the line.735  
Quinot correctly recognises that ‘despite the seemingly categorical views expressed by the 
constitutional court in Gcaba, the issue of jurisdiction of the HC to adjudicate on disputes 
arising within a labour context, but pleaded in administrative-law terms, is clearly not 
settled.’736 Fredericks is arguably still good law and therefore Gcaba seemingly has settled 
the long debated application of administrative law rules to public employment decision; there 
is nothing holding future litigants from approaching the courts and pleadings unequivocally 
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under PAJA or in the alternative under legality. The appellant in Makambi should have 
approached the HC and pleaded solely on section 33 of the Constitution and PAJA and 
arguably would have succeeded. The Aberdeen case discussed below is an example of an 
unequivocal pleading approach.  
In Aberdeen Senior Secondary School v MEC for Department of Education, Eastern Cape 
Province and Others,737 the applicant sought to review the decision of the Head of 
Department to appoint the third respondent as deputy principal of Aberdeen Senior 
Secondary School.  Nhlanguela J had two issues to decide: first, whether the court has 
jurisdiction to entertain the application, and, second whether the process undertaken by the 
Head of Department in appointing the third respondent complied with the provisions of 
section 6 of the EEA read with paragraph 3.2 (b) of the Personal Administration Measures 
(hereunder referred to as PAM) which were promulgated in terms of the EEA.  
On deciding the first issue, Nhlanguela J concluded that the HC does have jurisdiction to 
entertain the application before it. In arriving at this conclusion, the court looked at an SCA 
judgment by Hurt AJA in Head, Western Cape Education Department And Others v 
Governing Body, Point High School And Others738 as it was identical to the present case 
regarding the issue of jurisdiction. Hurt AJA in analysing the nature of the cause of action of 
the department, held: ‘[t]he appointments made by the HOD were plainly the result of 
administrative action as defined in s 1 of PAJA. The empowering provisions were those set 
out in s 6(3) of the EEA.’739 
For Nhlanguela J, an analysis of those words meant that the issue before the SCA to 
adjudicate was compliant or otherwise with the provisions of the EEA and not a breach of the 
provisions of the LRA,740 and therefore ‘the complaint made by the appellant was not based 
on the unfairness of a practice that related to an employment contract between the department 
and the candidates for appointment to a higher education post.’741 Nhlanguela J continued to 
emphasise the importance of interrogating the applicant’s cause of action because ‘the 
Constitutional Court in Gcaba enjoins the court determining the issue of jurisdiction to 
interrogate the applicant’s cause of action.’742  On the issue of jurisdiction, Nhlanguela J had 
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to determine whether or not the facts as pleaded by the applicant sustain a cause of 
administrative action that is recognizsable by the HC.743 If the facts pleaded fall within the 
jurisdiction of the LC, the HC would not have jurisdiction.  
Nhlanguela J held that within the founding affidavit of the applicant’s pleadings as well as 
evidence of fact led to the conclusion that the claim pleaded is based on unlawful 
administrative action with regard to the manner in which the decision was made by the Head 
of Department to decline the recommendation of the School Governing Body.744 The 
applicant claims that the decision was irregular, irrational, unreasonable and unsupportable to 
the extent that it does not comply with the provisions of section 6 and 7 of the EEA, read with 
paragraph 3.2(b) of PAM.745 Therefore because of the alleged breaches, the court held that 
the applicant was fully entitled to approach the court for judicial reviewing under section 6(2) 
of PAJA.746 Nhlanguela J appositely held that ‘nowhere in the founding affidavit was the 
claim based on the breaches of the provisions of the LRA pleaded.’747  
Brand and Murcott argue that Gcaba seems to have not settled the status of employment-
related action as non-administrative action in the context of public-sector employment 
disputes.748 As mentioned before in this dissertation, there appears to be a great deal of 
uncertainty persisting in this regard. Consequently, the authors recognise that in 2013 
administrative law arguments in several employment-related decisions were brought before 
the courts so that issues relating to the relationship between administrative law and labour 
law had to be decided and particularly whether the HC is the appropriate forum in which to 
challenge employment related action.749 
In Provincial Commissioner, Gauteng South African Police Services v Mnguni,750 the 
respondent, who held the rank of inspector in the SAPS, was charged together with five of his 
colleges with five counts of misconduct. It was alleged, in respect of each count, that they 
had contravened regulation 20(z) of the South African Police Service Discipline Regulations.  
Although the disciplinary tribunal found him not guilty on counts 1, 4 and 5, he was found 
guilty on counts 2 and 3, where the respondent received money from members of the 
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community or prisoners in return for releasing prisoners unlawfully from police custody. The 
disciplinary tribunal imposed a sanction of dismissal from the police service for misconduct. 
The respondent subsequently appealed against his dismissal to the relevant appeals authority 
(The Provincial Commission, Gauteng SAPS) who dismissed the appeal. The respondent then 
approached the HC successfully for the review and setting aside of the decision to dismiss 
him. It was this decision which subsequently lead to the appeal in the SCA on the grounds 
that the respondent approached the HC, invoking the court to decide on the wrong body of 
law. 
Brand and Murcott argue that the respondent thought unsuccessfully that Chirwa and Gcaba 
had left a gap for him to exploit.751 The respondent in his replying affidavit disowned any 
reliance on administrative action under PAJA because dismissals no longer constitute 
administrative action, and  the fair labour practices provisions of the LRA were also 
disavowed.752 The respondent approached the HC, arguing that the decision by the appeals 
authority to dismiss him was ‘quasi-judicial’ and thus subject to common law review.  
Mpati P had to determine whether the respondent had a common law right of review. The 
court held that the respondent did not. In coming to this conclusion, Mpati P relied on the 
CC’s decision in Bato Star and Pharmaceutical Manufactures, holding essentially what was 
shown in Chapter 2, namely, that there is only one system of law which is shaped by our 
Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic, and that, moreover, the first port of call is 
now the constitutionally sourced administrative law which is given effect to under PAJA.753 
Ttherefore, for Mpati P, the respondent’s claim was destined to fail because ‘it follows that 
the respondent’s claim for a common law review, in the High Court, of the appeal tribunal’s 
confirmation of his dismissal was bad in law.’754 
Mpati P significantly recognised that the effect of the dismissal was that the respondent’s 
contract of employment was terminated and, as a result, there were three bodies of law which 
were open to the respondent in which he could have founded the challenge to his dismissal.755 
First, the respondent could have approached the LC for an infringement of his right not to be 
unfairly dismissed or subjected to unfair labour practices; second was the common law right 
to insist upon performance of contract, which, however, was not raised at all; and since the 
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respondent was a member of the public service, the third was a claim for the infringement of 
his right to just administrative action.756 For Mpati P, reliance on PAJA would have either 
been pursued in the HC or the LC.  However, since the respondent disowned reliance on 
section 33 and PAJA, it was not open to the court to decide which. The court further 
recognised that the potential claim arising out of rights created by section 185 of the LRA, 
which are enforceable only in the LC, was also disavowed. Therefore the appeal was upheld 
as there was no other basis upon which the courts competence to review was invoked.757  
In Letele v The MEC, Free State Provincial Government, Department of Education,758 the 
applicant was employed by the Department of Education as a Chief Director for a period of at 
least 12 years. The applicant was subsequently charged with misconduct and the said charges 
were a contravention of treasury regulations. She was then exonerated from any wrongdoing 
by the Misconduct Presiding Officer and this then prompted the respondent to file an appeal. 
The appeal was never held nor did the respondent request the applicant to make 
representations. The respondent then furnished the applicant with a letter of dismissal, which 
led to the applicant approaching the relevant bargaining council where the commission found 
the respondent to have acted ultra vires. The applicant then subsequently approached the HC 
for an order declaring the dismissal ultra vires and void ab initio, as well as reinstatement and 
remuneration (ancillary relief) owing from the date of the dismissal letter to the date of her 
formal reinstatement.  
The primary issue before Thamage AJ was whether the court has jurisdiction to entertain and 
adjudicate over the applicant’s case.759 Thamage AJ held that the question of jurisdiction and 
the formulation of a cause of action has already been decided by the CC in Gcaba.760 
Thamage AJ recognised that the pleadings together with the supporting affidavits should be 
scrutinised and be interpreted to determine the legal basis of the applicant’s claim.761 
Therefore for Thamage AJ the legal basis of the applicant’s claim is to get a declaratory order 
declaring that her dismissal by the respondent is ultra vires and void ab initio; the applicant 
also prayed for ancillary relief of re-instatement and for her salary from the date of dismissal 
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till the date of re-instatement.762 The applicant’s claim was not on the basis of the unfairness 
of the dismissal, nor was the claim on the basis of an unlawful dismissal as the applicant 
expressly disavowed any reliance to the LRA relating to unfair dismissals or unfair labour 
practices and specifically disavowed reliance to PAJA.763 The applicant based her application 
on the constitutional principle of legality, alleging that the ‘SMS handbook’ issued in terms 
of the Public Service Regulations of 2001 did not make provision for an appeal by the 
respondent against a decision of a misconduct presiding officer, and that therefore the noting 
of the appeal and the subsequent dismissal was ultra vires.764 The court held that the nature of 
the applican’ts claim does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the LC and thus the 
HC’s jurisdiction is not ousted.765 Thamage AJ held that the action of the respondent was 
contrary to the subordinate legislation; thus the respondent has acted ultra vires, and 
consequently the action was void ab initio.766  
However, Thamage AJ held that the HC’s jurisdiction sourced in legality only extends in so 
far as determining the validity of the conduct of public entities. For Thamage AJ, the HC 
does not have jurisdiction to entertain matters that are exclusively meant for the LC, and 
therefore it is the LC that is specifically placed to entertain ancillary relief claims.767 Based 
on how the applicant had pleaded in invoking the court’s competence, the matter was 
reverted back to the parties to act in a manner which corrects the situation.768 Hoexter 
recognises the consequences of ultimately using the principle of legality as it is a limited 
route.769 In this instance, the relief that the applicant sought should have corresponded with 
the appropriate forum. Obviously,  the LRA route in the LC would have provided such relief.  
Brand and Murcott argue that there still remains ‘a great deal of uncertainty as to the 
circumstances in which administrative law may successfully be invoked in the context of the 
public-sector employment disputes’.770 The authors state that a better approach for public 
sector employees would be to ‘invoke the court’s competence through the LRA rather than 
challenge both dismissals and unfair labour practices in the High Court.’771 The court’s 
competence to hear a matter depends primarily on how one pleads; therefore it is permissible 
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that, if a public sector employee pleads that the dismissal is unfair and bases a claim under 
fair labour practices, then the authors’ views are correct. In circumstances where only the 
LRA would be applicable, this would be the best route for the public-sector employee. 
However, the LRA route is not the only one that is available. Although it has been regarded 
as the ‘preferred’ route, it does not accordingly deny other available remedies. 
For Thamage AJ, relief does not solely emanate out of the LRA as the HC could also have 
provided such relief if the applicant pleaded and based her claim on seeking enforcement of 
an employment contract. In those circumstances, the HC would have been inclined to provide 
such additional relief. Thamage AJ further recognised that the applicant may have also been 
able to base her cause of action explicitly under PAJA.772 In contrast to the Khulong,773 had 
the applicant sought to plead on the basis that the discharge be declared as invalid and/or 
unlawful, the relief sought may very well have been granted as Thamage AJ was prepared to 
do so.  
It has been mentioned numerous times above that the pleadings invoke the court’s 
competence to hear a particular dispute and n how one pleads will determine the legal basis 
of one’s claim. This will consequently establish whether the court may grant the particular 
relief sought or not. In Tlali v Mantsopa Local Municipality,774 the case was similar to Letele 
in which the full bench of the HC was not called upon to decide the re-instatement and arrear 
remuneration, but rather the applicant sought the HC to decide on the lawfulness of the 
dismissal. Hancke J775 relied on Fedlife in holding that the question whether a dispute fall 
within the terms of section 191 of the LRA depends on what is in dispute776 For Hancke J, 
‘the fact that an unlawful dismissal might also be unfair appears to be irrelevant in this 
regard.’777 Hancke J held that, as a result of the manner in which the applicant approached the 
court, the dismissal was unlawful.778 
The LAC in Ngutshane v Arivia Kom (Pty) Ltd t/a Arivia.Kom and Others779 confirmed the 
court a quo’s decision that the LC did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter. In coming to 
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this conclusion, Hendricks AJA held that, if one were to carefully read the appellant’s 
founding affidavit attached to the notice of motion in the proceedings before the court a quo, 
it proves that the appellant did not make out a case that the court had the powers to deal with 
the matter on the basis of the law of contract, and therefore no breach of a contractual term 
was pleaded; moreover, the appellant expressly pleaded her case in terms of section 158(1)(a) 
of the LRA read with PAJA.780  
Hendricks AJA importantly recognised a clear distinction between unfair dismissals and 
unlawful termination of contract that ‘it is trite that unlawful termination of employment 
contracts are not adjudicated by the CCMA or bargaining councils.’781 Such forums only 
have jurisdiction on disputes about unfair labour practices and unfair dismissals.782 Hendricks 
AJA held that ‘…a further distinction between labour disputes involving the state as 
employer which falls under the LRA, and based on the same facts, whether the dispute may 
be considered to fall under PAJA.’783  
Hendricks AJA recognised the views expressed by the CC in Gcaba on pleadings and 
arguably in doing so considered the administrative action route under PAJA as a possible 
consideration based on how one pleads.784 Hendricks AJA held that the appellant’s case was 
not a case pleaded under the PAJA route. In coming to this conclusion, it was held that the 
appellant’s complaint was in essence about the fairness of her dismissal.785 For Hendricks 
AJA, the pleadings demonstrate that there was no reliance on her contract of employment as 
founding the basis of her cause of action before the LC, and,  since the LC is not a court of 
first instance,786 the appellant was wrong to eschew her right to approach the CCMA which is 
precisely what Henricks AJA recognised as the warning made by the CC in Gcaba.787 
In Hulane and Another v Msunduzi Municipality,788 the applicants were not as successful in 
the way the pleadings were conducted. Steyn J held that the applicants failed to establish 
jurisdiction through the infringement of a clear prima facie right and without establishing 
such a right on the basis of the pleadings, and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction.789 Steyn 
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J importantly recognised that the applicants,  placing reliance on Makhanya, did not allege 
that any administrative rights has been infringed,790 and, moreover, the fact that the applicants 
merely stated that the cause of action was based on contract does not in general mean that it 
must be dealt with as a contractual dispute.791 For Steyn J, the applicants approached the HC 
seeking a declaratory order relating to their employment with the respondent.792 The basis of 
the claim remained a labour dispute, and thus it was in those circumstances where the essence 
of the claim remains an issue to be considered by the LC, by virtue of section 157 of the 
LRA.793  
Dambuza JA, writing for the majority in South African Municipal Workers’ Union v 
Mokgatla,794 recognised the CC’s judgment in Gcaba that jurisdiction is determined by the 
pleadings. The court, therefore held that the HC did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter 
and the respondents should have approached the LC. In arriving at this conclusion, Dambuza 
JA held that the basis of the respondents’ claim from the very beginning was that they 
pleaded specifically in their application before the court a quo that the appellants should have 
complied with the relevant clauses of the union’s constitution.795The court held that the basis 
for which the HC’s jurisdiction was challenged was expressly provided under section 
158(1)(e)(i)796 of the LRA.797 For Dambuza JA, the fact that the respondents had eschewed 
any reliance to the LRA was irrelevant because they were essentially bound by the substance 
of their cases as they had pleaded.798 
The SCA in Makhanya799 provides important criticism of the Chirwa judgment, holding that 
the majority seemed to be surprised that the plaintiff ‘might formulate his or her claim in 
different ways and bring it in a forum of his or her choice’.800 However, for Nugent AJ, the 
majority’s surprise was misplaced because: 
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‘…if a claim, as formulated by the claimant, is enforceable in a particular court, then 
plaintiff is entitled to bring it before that court. And if there are two courts before 
which it might be brought then that should not evoke surprise, because that is the 
nature of concurrent jurisdiction. It might be that the claim, as formulated, is a bad 
claim, and it will be dismissed for that reason, but that is another matter.’801 
 
The SCA in SA Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie802 further recognised tha,t when a 
court is faced with a jurisdictional challenge raised, the correct approach is to determine 
whether the court has jurisdiction over the claim as pleaded and not whether it has 
jurisdiction over some other claim that has not been pleaded but could possibly arise from the 
facts.803 
A public-sector employee’s chances of success rest primarily on how the employee pleads 
their cause of action. Where there exists doubt as to the legal basis of the claim, Van der 
Westhuizen J in Gcaba804 provided some guidance, holding that the pleadings can be 
established through motion proceedings, including the formal notice of motion as well as the 
contents of the supporting affidavits.805 The court is required to interpret those documents to 
establish the basis of the applicant’s claim. Once the claim has been established, Van der 
Westhuizen J rightly states that it is not for the court to say that the facts asserted by the 
applicant would also sustain another claim, cognisable only in another court.806 From the 
outset, it would be beneficial for public-sector employees to plead the same way as was done 
in Aberdeen. In doing so, there would be no doubt as to the legal basis of the claim when 
pleaded unequivocally. 
Having discussed the significant impact that Gcaba’s recognition on pleadings has had in 
future cases, until such time as the CC provides clarity as to meaning of public impact as an 
exception, the next subsection aims to provide clarity on this issue. 
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4.7 PUBLIC IMPACT AND PUBLIC INTEREST EXCEPTION 
 
Van der Westhuizen J in Gcaba807 provided the exception to the general rule that 
employment and labour relationships issues would amount to administrative action within the 
meaning of PAJA in circumstances where a grievance is raised by an employee relating to the 
conduct of the state as employer having direct implications or consequences for other 
citizens.808 Van der Westhuizen J held that, although the failure to promote and appoint 
Gcaba was not administrative action, the situation might be different where a decision is 
taken by the president as head of the national executive in appointing a national police 
commissioner, which has huge public import.809 
It has already been shown in Chapter 2 and 3 that not all administrative acts affect more than 
one person nor in these circumstances have public impact and there is judicial support for this 
argument. Nonetheless, Gcaba’s general rule and the public impact exception has already 
been applied in case law. It is, therefore, important to discuss each case in turn below. 
 
4.7.1 PUBLIC IMPACT 
 
(a) Majake v Commission for Gender Equality and Others810 
 
Quinot and Hoexter have identified that, although the Majake judgment had been handed 
down four months prior to the Gcaba judgment, the outcome is in line with the general rule 
and its public-impact loophole.811  
In this case, the applicant approached the HC, seeking an order to be reinstated to her position 
as the Chief Executive Officer of The Commission for Gender Equality (hereafter referred to 
as CGE).812 It is important to recognise that the CGE is a body created under Chapter 9 of the 
Constitution, with the mandate to advance gender equality. It was alleged before the HC that 
the decision made by the respondent in terminating the applicant’s employment was 
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unconstitutional, unlawful and invalid.813 It was also alleged that the conduct constituted 
unlawful administrative action, a breach of the principle of legality, and a breach of the 
applicant’s contract of employment.814 It was further alleged that the applicant was adversely 
affected by the decision to dismiss without a hearing and thus the decision resulted in the 
applicant suffering reputational harm, financial prejudice and emotional stress.815 
For Mokgoatlheng J the question to be determined was whether the applicant’s dismissal is 
premised on the exercise of statutory or contractual power by the first respondent to justify 
the inference that her dismissal constituted administrative action.816 It was held that the 
dismissal constituted administrative action.817 In coming to this conclusion, it was recognised 
that the cause of action was based on section 33 of the Constitution and PAJA; moreover, 
Mokgoatlheng J recognised that the applicant expressly disavowed any reliance to section 23 
of the Constitution and the LRA and specifically based her claim under section 33 and PAJA 
and therefore it was held that the HC has the necessary jurisdiction because Fredericks, 
Fedlife and Chirwa had settled the law in this regard.818  
In applying the PAJA enquiry, it was held that the first respondent was a public entity created 
by statute and therefore operating under statutory authority and that the power to appoint the 
applicant corresponds with the power to dismiss, which is sourced in statute, and therefore 
the decision involved an exercise of public power.819 Mokgoatlheng J further held that, since 
the power to appoint is statutory and not an incidentalia arising from the contract of 
employment, the correlative power to dismiss is also sourced in statute; therefore, the 
dismissal amounts to administrative action as envisaged by section 33 of the Constitution, 
which consequently renders the decision susceptible to administrative review under PAJA.820  
Mokgoatlheng J further held that in exercising public power, the respondents must comply 
with the Constitution and the principle of legality; therefore the Chapter 9 institution is 
‘constrained by the principle that it may exercise no power and perform no function beyond 
that conferred upon it by law.’821 The respondent’s conduct, it was held, offends the notion of 
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one’s sense of justice and fairness and, in terminating the contract of employment, the 
decision was inconsistent with the Constitution and the principle of legality.822  
While Mokgoatlheng J recognised that the applicant is only entitled to reinstatement as a 
matter of contract, the court awarded the applicant reinstatement because there was a clear 
infringement of the applicant’s section 10 constitutional right to dignity and section 33 right 
to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action.823  
It is important to recognise that the applicant is the chief executive officer of a Chapter 9 
institution that is enjoined to be impartial and to exercise its powers and perform its functions 
without fear, favour or prejudice,824 Therefore Quinot correctly argues that the outcome in the 
Majake matter may be correct, in line with the Gcaba’s exception, because a Chapter 9 
institution has sufficient public interest.825 Any decision to terminate its chief executive 
officer would have public import.  
 
(b) Public Servants Association of South Africa and Another v Minister of 
Labour and Another826  
 
Myburgh AJ, writing for the LC, recognised that the review application before him was 
brought in terms of section 158(1)(h) of the LRA which established the LC’s jurisdictional 
footprint to review conduct by the state in its capacity of employer on recognised grounds in 
law.827 Myburgh AJ recognised that the application was pleaded solely on administrative 
action under PAJA with legality being the alternative route. It was pleaded by the second 
applicant that the revocation of his designation as the registrar was unreasonable, irrational, 
disproportionate and procedurally unfair.828 Myburgh AJ recognised the position mentioned 
above on the duality of rights in circumstances where the same conduct on the part of the 
employer may give rise to different courses of action and remedies in law,829 and that the fact 
that the second applicant could have constructed his case as an unfair labour practice but 
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chose not to has no bearing on the LC’s jurisdiction to entertain an administrative law or 
legality review.830  
Myburgh AJ recently recognised that, although Gcaba established a general rule that 
employment issues in the public sector do not constitute administrative action, the general 
rule is not invariable.831 For Myburgh AJ, ‘one potential exception appears to be the dismissal 
of high-ranking public servants who hold statutory offices in the public interest.’832 Myburgh 
AJ conceded that, like De Villiers and Hendricks, the present matter was also one of those 
exceptions to the general rule, and therefore it was held that the decision of the Minister of 
Labour in revoking the employee’s designation as Registrar of Labour Relations in terms of a 
specific statutory provision amounted to administrative action.833 As noted by Quinot, the 
decision to appoint and dismiss the chief executive officer of a Chapter 9 institution would 
also be regarded as an exception to the general rule.  
In coming to this conclusion, Myburgh AJ held that the ‘public impact’ requirement was met 
because the registrar occupies an independent function, performing critically important 
functions under the LRA in the interest of hundreds and thousands of trade union 
members.834 Within labour relations in general, the impact of a removal of the registrar is of 
huge public import.835 In addition, Myburgh AJ held that even where an acting registrar has 
been appointed to replace the employee, the impugned decision does not then only have an 
impact on the employee and thus has no wide consequences.836 For Myburgh AJ, it is clear 
that the broader constituency of members is affected by the decision.837 
Turning to the administrative action enquiry, Myburgh AJ held that it was accepted between 
the parties as the minister is clearly an organ of state exercising a public power or performing 
a public function in terms of the section 208A of the LRA when revoking the employee’s 
designation as registrar.838 Myburgh AJ importantly held that it was clear that the impugned 
decision adversely affects the rights of the second applicant; moreover, in light of the CC’s 
judgment in Joseph regarding the meaning of ‘direct external legal effect’, it was held that the 
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decision impacted directly and immediately on individuals,839 and therefore the impugned 
decision impacted directly and immediately on the second applicant and materially and 
adversely affected his rights under PAJA.840 The minister’s decision was set aside and the 
second applicant was reinstated, however Myburgh JA concluded that if the impugned 
decision does not amount to administrative action under PAJA, because it was clear that the 
minister exercises public powers, the legality principle could still be invoked.841 
It is apparent, based on Gcaba and the cases mentioned above, that, where decisions are made 
within employment related circumstances that have great public impact and consequences for 
others, employees can approach a HC, seeking the decision to be reviewed under section 33 
of the Constitution and PAJA as well as the constitutional standard of legality. There is, 
however, another exception identified below as the public interest exception which is not 
sought to benefit the employee directly but rather to hold the employer accountable when 
there has been an exercise of public power. 
 
4.7.2 PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
Brand and Murcott argue that ‘employers in the public sector will not be able to prevent 
administrative law challenges to their employment-related decisions in the HC where for 
instance those challenges are brought, not to enforce employment related right, but brought in 
the public interest in the aim of ensuring accountability.’ 842 
In Freedom under Law v National Director of Public Prosecutions,843 the second respondent 
argued that the challenge to the decision to lift Mdluli’s suspension and to reinstate him on 
the basis of administrative law and legality before the HC was not the correct approach and 
thus the HC lacked jurisdiction.844 However, Murphy J rejected this argument, holding that 
Freedom under Law brought this application before the HC in the interest of the public and 
not in the interest of employment.845  For Murphy J, bringing the application under 
administrative law and legality was the appropriate route, as the decision was public in nature 
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and therefore Freedom under Law were acting in the public interest.846 The matter before 
Murphy J was not one where the complaint was pleaded about the unfairness of the 
suspension but rather to challenge the decision to withdrawal suspending Mdluli.847 
Moreover, a dispute about an unfair labour practice must be between an employee and 
employer and must arise between the employment relationships.848 Murphy J recognised that, 
while the HC’s jurisdiction is limited in relation to challenges to public-sector employment 
where the complaint is on the basis of an unfair labour practice, since the challenge was not 
brought by an employee to enforce employment related rights but rather by Freedom Under 
Law acting on behalf of the public interest, the HC had the necessary jurisdiction.849  
On appeal in National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Freedom Under Law,850 
the SCA upheld the decision of the HC, where Brand JA held that the matter is one of public 
interest and national importance.851  Brand JA recognised that: 
‘The mere fact that the remedy sought may have an impact on the employment 
relationship between Mdluli and his employer does not make it a labour dispute. It 
remains an application for administrative law review in the public interest, which is 
patently subject to the jurisdiction of the high court.’852 
The HC and the SCA underscore the position on pleadings and arguably recognised the inter-
connectedness of rights and that the matter could very well have an effect on an employment 
relationship; however, the matter was pleaded on behalf of the public’s interest and not by the 




In light of the adoption of a general rule and the various significant holdings in Gcaba, this 
chapter has sought to identify circumstances where administrative law principles were 
applied in labour cases since Gcaba. The principle of subsidiarity identified in subsection 4.2 
is a constitutional principle which demands constitutionally mandated legislation to be 
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applied directly and the more general norm indirectly. The CC has been a strong proponent of 
the principle in various cases before and after Gcaba. Worryingly, the selective application of 
the principle in Gcaba impacted on the outcome and showed disregard for legislative reform 
and administrative law jurisprudence. The principle of legality identified in subsection 4.3 
has become an important alternative means of review for public sector employee’s in the LCs 
where there has been an exercise of public power.  
In subsection 4.4, it was noted that Gcaba’s recognition that the same conduct may threaten 
or violate different constitutional rights and give rise to different causes of action is 
significant for it allows for the development of labour jurisprudence under administrative law 
in different courts. Dismissals via operation of law, discussed in subsection 4.5, have been 
identified by the CC as an exception to the general rule, attracting the protection of both 
PAJA and legality review.  
One of the significant recognitions made by the court in Gcaba was that jurisdiction is 
determined on the basis of how one pleads and this was further recognised in a recent CC 
case in Mbatha. In subsection 4.5, a number of cases were identified and it was clear that the 
manner in which a litigant pleads will determine whether the HC or LC has jurisdiction. The 
SCA recently determined this approach in Mnguni by holding that if one pleads the right not 
to be unfairly dismissed or subjected to an unfair labour practice, the LC only has 
jurisdiction. However, if one pleads the right to administrative justice, the LC and the HC 
have concurrent jurisdiction under PAJA or the principle of legality. Lastly, in subsection 4.7, 
the meaning and placement of the notable exceptions identified by Gcaba are shown to be 
still in conflict with the meaning of ‘external effect’ in PAJA, which implies that the 














The effect of Gcaba 
Brand JA in Mkumatela v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another853 was of 
the view that since Gcaba ‘the train has moved on’854 – therefore the debate as to whether 
administrative law applies to labour cases has (arguably) been settled. At the time of writing 
this dissertation, however, the reality is that Gcaba has not settled the law but has rather 
disturbed established affairs. The legal status quo has shifted and, although the CC seemed 
initially to have been ambitious in an attempt to settle the waters surrounding public sector 
employment, public sector employees are still faced with uncertainty pertaining to their legal 
position. Gcaba’s general rule has not halted or deterred administrative law from applying to 
all labour cases; consequently, lower courts have come to the forefront, ensuring that the full 
extent of employees’ constitutional rights are afforded to them instead of following the pre-
eminence over another route, which arguably denies rights. 
The basis under which the CC in Chirwa and Gcaba sought to deny public sector employees 
rights was based solely on policy considerations. Policy-driven reasoning has with respect 
robbed public sector employees from accessing the full extent of their constitutional rights. 
Chapter 3 and 4 provided extensive arguments indicating that Chirwa and Gcaba proceeded 
with no legal basis other than a policy basis in effectively side-lining public sector 
employees’ access to their section 33 right to administrative justice and PAJA.  Chapter 2 
provided extensive meaning to the definition of administrative action under section 33 and 
PAJA with the aim of establishing that, under administrative law jurisprudence, section 33 
and PAJA potentially apply to decisions made by the public-sector employer where the said 
decisions adversely affect rights and thus have direct, external legal effect, in other words, 
where the decision impacts immediately and directly on an employee. The consequence for 
the CC opting for a policy-driven decision effectively drifts within the legislature’s territory, 
resulting in a violation of the separation of powers doctrine along with violating the right of 
individuals to approach a court of law seeking the protection that the Constitution promises. 
                                                          
853 2010 (4) BCLR 347 (SCA). 
854 Ibid para 11. 
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Chapter 2 further provided extensive meaning to the principle of legality. The development of 
the principle as an alternative form of review over the years has resulted in meaningful 
constitutional protection against the abuse of exercises of public power. 
Principle of subsidiarity 
The further effect of the CC in Gcaba in applying a policy-driven decision as well as, 
respectfully, turning a blind eye to the settled constitutional standard in determining the 
nature of the power exercised under section 33 and PAJA, is that the principle of subsidiarity 
has been violated, a principle underscored many a time by the CC, as well as settled 
administrative law jurisprudence being contradicted. The crux of the CC’s approach has 
effectively resulted in the constitutional right to administrative justice being denied outright 
without any legitimate legal reason. It is argued that the CC in these matters seemed to have 
selectively ignored settled jurisprudence and principles in order to make its findings easier, 
rather than opting for the much harder route which advances constitutional rights to their 
fullest extent and potential as well as developing jurisprudences for the benefit of all.  Policy 
considerations, rather than respect for legislative intent, has unduly restricted rights where 
they happen to overlap, something that is not uncommon in law. 
Duality of Rights 
One of the objectives of this research was to explore whether an infringement of dual rights 
existed arising out of a single set of facts within an employment setting.   
It is obvious that the same conduct may result in an array of applicable rights applying to a 
single set of facts. Plasket J along with many other judicial officers have underscored that 
there is nothing incongruous about this consequence. Both section 23 and 33 of the 
Constitution are fundamental rights guaranteed by our Constitution. Although the CC in 
Chirwa had been ruthless in its approach and was not prepared to recognise the 
interconnectivity of rights, thus opting to place one right over another, the court in Gcaba, 
however, significantly recognised otherwise by holding that the same conduct on the part of 
the employer may give rise to different causes of action and remedies in law. This recognition 
confirms that the law does not exist in discrete boxes.  
Gcaba recognised this view by underscoring Langa CJ’s judgment in Chirwa by holding that 
courts should be mindful not to approach cases by applying a method of interpretation which 
effectively denies rights that have been expressly provided for by the legislature. It is also 
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important to recognise that one right cannot trump another, unless the legislature has 
expressly opted for this consequence. In the absence of such an intention of the legislature, 
administrative law has been and will continue applying to labour cases in the future.  
This dissertation does not advocate that the LRA should not be pursued by public sector 
employees simply because there are other possible causes of action available. On the 
contrary, the LRA is an important means of providing specialised protection to employees 
and it would be to their benefit to choose this route from the outset because, in reality, 
employees are not as well-resourced to commit to lengthy litigation. The LRA structures 
provide expedient, cost effective protection as well as unique remedies specifically designed 
to elevate employees to meaningful bargaining positions.   
It is clear that, because the LRA is a unique cause of action, this seems to be what fuelled 
Skweyiya J, Ngcobo J and Van der Westhuizen J’s policy-driven approach. However, the fact 
that the LRA is capable of holding an employer accountable for conduct infringing on the 
rights of employees does not necessarily mean that the LRA is the only route that is capable 
of resolving the situation. The fact that another route exists, which does not have such 
favourable remedies as that of the LRA, is not a valid reason to deny a route chosen by the 
applicant before a court. Therefore, where a decision or conduct amounts to administrative 
action under section 33 and PAJA, the fact that there exists another cause of action under the 
LRA is immaterial to the PAJA enquiry where conduct has been positively determined, as it 
was noted as being correctly recognised by Wallis J in Chapter 2, as being administrative in 
nature under section 33 of the Constitution and PAJA. Chapter 2 further recognised that 
PAJA is the first port of call giving effect to section 33 of the Constitution. It is in this regard 
that one argues that Van der Westhuizen J in Gcaba was aware that PAJA applied to the facts 
of the case before him; however, he swiftly opted to follow the policy-guided approach, 
resulting in confusion of settled precedent as well as denying the very constitutional rights 
which the court is mandated to protect.  
Many labour lawyers would praise the court in Gcaba for providing a general rule that 
employment and labour related issues do not amount to administrative action. However, the 
rule has not redirected traffic to the LRA structures in its entirety.  
The LRA and PAJA have different purposes and objectives. Section 23 of the Constitution 
and the LRA serve to protect employees from unfair labour practices, whereas section 33 and 
PAJA aim to ensure that, when individuals have contact with the administration, it is lawful, 
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reasonable and procedurally fair. Chapter 4 recognised that the LRA and PAJA could 
potentially apply to one set of facts but that alone should not be a reason to side-line one right 
over another. Public sector employees are therefore entitled to any and all applicable rights in 
the Bill of Rights and courts should refrain from determining that, because another right 
exists but has not been pleaded before it, this is a reason for the court to dismiss the 
application because the unchosen route is what the court ‘prefers’.  
Alternative causes of action identified 
The reasoning as to why the general rule has not been absolute has been discussed 
extensively in Chapter 4. Gcaba recognised that the pleadings invoke the court’s competence 
to hear a dispute, and consequently three possible causes of action are available to public 
sector employees based on how one seeks to invoke the court’s competence to hear that 
matter. 
The significance of the CC’s recognition on pleadings has paved the way forward by 
providing lower courts with a means to advance fundamental rights to public sector 
employees which they are constitutionally entitled to. A pleadings-based approach as 
opposed to a purposive approach adequately balances public sector employees’ rights as well 
as reflecting the intention of the legislature when it provided for concurrent jurisdiction.  
This research has shown that the extent to which the HC and LC exercises concurrent 
jurisdiction depends primarily on how the pleadings have been sought. Where a cause of 
action is pleaded about the unfairness of a dispute, the first port of call would be for the 
litigant to use the CCMA route and thereafter the LC. Where the litigant pleads unlawfulness 
under section 33 and PAJA, the HC has original jurisdiction to hear the dispute under section 
169 of the Constitution. The LC also has concurrent jurisdiction with the HC under section 
157(2) of the LRA to hear a dispute pleaded under PAJA, provided that the litigant 
establishes in the pleadings that a fundamental right has been violated and/ or threatened, thus 
invoking the court’s competence under section 157(2). It is trite that in order to ensure that 
public sector employees’ rights are advanced, litigants must plead unequivocally and clearly 
in order to allow courts to establish the extent to which their competence is invoked.  
It is hackneyed that the LRA is one of such causes of action. It is, however, not the only 
cause of action available. For instance, where the LRA does not apply in cases dealing with 
deemed dismissals, PAJA and the principle of legality have been applied, ensuring that, 
where an employer exercises his or her statutory discretion to reverse the consequences of a 
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deemed dismissal, such a power cannot go unchecked and is thus reviewable either in the HC 
exercising original jurisdiction or in the LC through section 157(2) of the LRA or section 
158(1) (h) of the LRA.  
Notwithstanding the general rule, where the applicant has unequivocally pleaded under 
section 33 of the Constitution and PAJA, the HC and LC have proceeded to determine the 
issues presented before it. In order to ensure that there is no confusion as to what the legal 
claim is, following an approach advocated in Fredericks, disavowing ones reliance on section 
23 of the Constitution and the LRA while pleading in terms of PAJA in the HC or LC 
effectively establishes what is being sought. The extent to which section 33 of the 
Constitution and PAJA applies to public sector employees therefore depends on not whether 
there exists another route with more favourable remedies, but rather whether the applicant has 
adequately pleaded the cause of action in invoking the court’s competence to hear the matter.  
It is not just PAJA and the LRA that are open to public sector employees. The principle of 
legality has also been advancing and developing by providing another means of keeping the 
public administration employers in check where decisions emanate from exercises of public 
power. The principle of legality remains an effective constitutional check. In addition, the HC 
under its original jurisdiction and LC under section 158(1)(h) of the LRA are able to apply 
the principle with the aim of reviewing conduct and ensuring that the rule of law is upheld. 
The principle of legality applied to labour cases does not afford the court the power to award 
remuneration and reinstatement but only to set the decision aside for lack of rationality and 
lawfulness. Therefore the principle of legality should arguably be pursed as an alternative to 
the LRA or PAJA. However, just because it has fewer favourable remedies than PAJA or the 
LRA, this does not mean that public sector employees cannot approach the LC or HC and 
plead under the legality principle.  
It is significant that since Gcaba, the HC retains its jurisdiction to hear matters pleaded under 
section 33 of the Constitution and PAJA. What has become increasingly beneficial to public 
sector employees, however, is that the LCs have proceeded in advancing and applying 
administrative law within their jurisdiction, which has resulted in a unique position where 
administrative law jurisprudence is being developed within labour cases. This advancement is 
similar to the approach, discussed in Chapter 3, advocated by Conradie JA in the SCA 
judgment in Chirwa. However the former approach is not as restrictive because the HC 
retains its original jurisdiction.  
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Gcaba’s approach to Administrative Action 
Although the CC in Gcaba was disappointingly silent on the PAJA enquiry as was set out in 
Chapter 2, it did add an eighth public impact factor. If Gcaba’s exceptions to the general rule 
were to be followed strictly, notwithstanding the position on pleadings, administrative action 
under section 33 and PAJA would only be applicable, according to the CC, where the 
decision has great public import and consequences for other citizens. The Majake case 
although decided before Gcaba, remains an important judgment in reaffirming what is meant 
by ‘public impact’ as well as under which circumstances it would apply. 
It is respectfully argued that the public impact requirement could have applied to Gcaba’s 
circumstances. Not following proper procedure in appointing Gcaba as station commissioner, 
whose sole responsibility would be to run an effective police station within the surrounding 
community, would have public import and consequences for citizens. The effective running 
of a police station under the control of the station commissioner has great public interest and 
impact where the commissioner has been appointed under a procedurally unfair manner.  
Research purpose answered 
The purpose of this research set out in Chapter 1 was to establish whether public sector 
employees are presently able to approach a court of law under administrative law applied to 
labour cases and if so, under what circumstances this could be achieved. The answer to the 
main research question has been adequately established along with supporting literature, 
affirming the objectives mentioned above to provide knowledge and understanding within 
this area of law. The crux of this research emanates from the views expressed by Cameron 
JA: 
 
‘No doctrine of constitutional law which confines a beneficiary of more than one right 
to only one remedy, even where a statue provides a remedy of great amplitude, therefore 
if the legislature sought to deprive dismissed public sector employees of their 
administrative justice rights in the ordinary courts because they now enjoy rights under 
the LRA, the legislature would have said so when PAJA was enacted some five years 
after the LRA was enacted’855 
 
                                                          
855 Chirwa SCA (note 571 above) para 63. 
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Cameron JA’s views expressed along with those of other esteemed judges and the academic 
arguments set out throughout this research indicate that public sector employees may enjoy 
protection under the LRA structure, while also enjoying protection under section 33 and 
PAJA along with the principle of legality, which emanates out of section 1(c) of the 
Constitution.  
Interestingly, it has further been established that decisions made by public employers do not 
necessary have to be challenged solely by the employee. Where the decision is challenged on 
behalf of the public interest, rather than advancing employment rights by the employee, the 
exercise of public powers within labour cases could also be challenged under administrative 
law. The risk with this route is that employees’ interest would arguably not be advanced but 
rather the public interests. Employers would further be unable to hide behind the general rule 
and by preventing administrative law being applied to employment decisions.  
 
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINAL COMMENTS  
 
It is important for public sector employees to be aware of their legal position. One of the 
ways in which the public is made aware is through case law. Precedent in case law provides 
stability in knowing one’s rights and being able to predict outcomes based on settled 
jurisprudence. The approach taken by the CC on the administrative action enquiry was 
disappointing. Consequently, it would be beneficial for the CC to clarify the ‘public impact’ 
loophole and how it should fit into the existing PAJA enquiry of ‘direct, external legal 
effect’.  
It is obvious that how one proceeds to plead determines whether that particular court has 
jurisdiction. If one pleads unfairness under section 23 of the Constitution and the LRA, the 
LC would have jurisdiction. If one pleads unlawfulness under section 33 of the Constitution 
and PAJA, the HC and LC would have concurrent jurisdiction under PAJA and legality. 
Pleading this way balances the right to fair labour practices and the right to administrative 
justice and should be approached on a case-by-case basis. The fact that a particular right has 
been sought to be advanced with less favourable relief merely boils down to a litigant’s 
choice of forum and should be respected as the chosen forum and dealt with on its own 
merits. This would be in line with the particular legislature’s intention. 
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Although PAJA and the principle of legality are open to a litigant, it is recommended that 
public sector employees should approach the route provided under the LRA because of its 
unique specialised structures providing favourable relief. 
The purpose of this dissertation was not to identify possible legislative reform. If the 
legislatures intention should change in favour of only labour reform, it is recommended that 
the legislature amends PAJA by including the words ‘public sector employee’ under the 
exclusions section. The effect would be that decisions relating to public sector employees 
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